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Editors’ Introduction
Following a series of special issues, the current issue brings together articles that reveal the
enormous breadth of topics and approaches in our field. It is the intention and hope of the editors
that this diversity will open up a dialogue between the disciplines. It is further proof that our
topic cannot be understood and worked on in a silo. There is an understandable urge to unite
many of these dramatically different approaches in an overarching narrative; however, several
problems cannot be solved in each and every case. For one, we have to deal with epistemological
differences (e.g., theories of action), which cannot be quickly settled. Another closely related hurdle
is that a deep understanding of the knowledge acquired from other disciplines is required to avoid
inadequate use of research results taken from those approaches. As reflected in the diverse wealth
of perspectives in this issue, GSP would therefore, like to present readers the opportunity to discuss
these many different ways of approaching collective (genocidal) violence, as well as the possibilities
of combining these stocks of knowledge, applicable in the ever-growing field of genocide studies.
GSP lives from those who, as authors, reviewers, and members of the editorial team, contribute their
share to the (open access) academic exchange. Given the very high workload in our profession, it is
almost a miracle that it is always possible to find reviewers. The extremely positive development of
the journal in recent years is also due to the work of an editorial team that is continually changing.
To document this, we have introduced a new tributary page.
Susan Braden, Randle DeFalco, and Douglas Irvin-Erickson, for example, have made fundamental
contributions to the development of the journal during their long years of affiliation, and their
hard work and efforts should be mentioned. As managing editor, Susan, in particular, has played
a significant role in this process.
With Daniel Bultmann, Laura Collins, Fiza Lee, and most recently Georgina Holmes, the journal
has gained new, highly committed and competent contributors over the past 12 months.
Since this year, there is also the possibility for internships (if you are interested, please contact
christian.gudehus@rub.de).
GSP is still only possible through cooperation with the University of South Florida (USF). In
cooperation with Chelsea Johnson and since 2019 Carla Fotherby, we have incredibly professional
partners supporting our production aspects of the publication. Only through this cooperation can
GSP be offered in open access.
Christian Gudehus
Fiza Lee
Daniel Bultmann
Laura Collins
Roland Moerland
Diana Popescu
JoAnn DiGeorgio-Lutz

Christian Gudehus, Fiza Lee, Daniel Bultmann, Laura Collins, Roland Moerland, Diana Popescu, and JoAnn DiGeorgio-Lutz. “Editors’
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Cases Studied in Genocide Studies and Prevention and Journal of Genocide
Research and Implications for the Field of Genocide Studies
Jeffrey Bachman

American University
Washington, DC, USA

The field of genocide studies has greatly expanded over the last 20-30 years. Accompanying this
growth has been a debate among scholars in the field that has, at times, been contentious.1 As Adam
Jones notes, the field has been in a “constant state of evolution, exploration—and confusion.”2 As
a result, Jones concludes it is best to accept that genocide “will forever be an ‘essentially contested
concept’.”3 Contestation and contention cover all areas of the genocide studies geography. The
definition(s) and concept(s) forwarded by Raphaël Lemkin, who coined the very term “genocide,”
have been discussed, debated, and disputed. The pragmatism of using the legal definition of
genocide codified in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Genocide Convention) has been juxtaposed against the efficacy of employing such a constraining
definition when it does not even fully account for Lemkin’s definition and conceptualization of the
crime. How Lemkin’s understanding of genocide transformed into the one included in the Genocide
Convention has also been widely chronicled, with some debate over which state(s) are primarily
responsible for the resulting legal meaning of the term. Relatedly, questions have been raised about
whether the term “genocide” ought to be placed alongside other egregious human rights violations
as part of a broader conception of mass atrocity crimes. Finally, two of the remaining debates focus
on the omission of protection for political and social groups and the exclusion of a prohibition
against cultural genocide.
As the field of genocide studies expanded, two new journals emerged to deal with the
questions and debates associated with the study of genocide, from cases and suspected cases, to the
comparison of different cases, to legal, conceptual, and definitional debates, and to the prevention
and punishment of the crime. The Journal of Genocide Research (JGR) published its first issue in 1999.
As the Founding Editor, Henry Huttenbach identified a primary concern for the journal being the
“sterile, dual-track approach to the Holocaust and to genocide.”4 More specifically, Huttenbach
noted that, despite efforts to point out the logical fallacy of treating the Holocaust as the “apple”
and other genocides as merely other “fruit,” the separation of the former from the latter continued.
Thus, JGR was created “instead to promote a study of genocide without relegating a special status
on one or another incident of genocide.”5 Additionally, JGR aims to encourage inquiry regarding
theory and methodology, as well as to publish the works of authors from varied academic disciplines
and policy experts.
Seven years later, in 2006, the International Association of Genocide Scholars itself, founded in
1994 by Helen Fein and Robert Melson, published the first issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention
(GSP). GSP was created as an interdisciplinary journal to promote the prevention of genocide
by educating, informing, and encouraging “new generations of scholars to conduct research on
genocide and provide a forum for those who wish to work toward preventing it.”6 To this end,
GSP seeks to publish “innovative research on all aspects of the causes, dynamics, outcomes, and
colossal consequences and implications” of genocide, and is “open to contributions that go beyond
safe, approved, and established paradigms of scholarship and science,” when such contributions
1

This was experienced personally leading up to the launch of my book, Jeffrey S. Bachmann, The United States and
Genocide: (Re)Defining the Relationship (London: Routledge, 2017). Andrew Woolford discusses some of the tensions in
genocide studies in Andrew Woolford, “Unsettling Genocide Studies at the Eleventh Conference of the International
Association of Genocide Scholars, July 16-19, 2014, Winnipeg-Canada,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 2
(2015), 98-102. Additionally, Adam Jones offers evidence of the backlash he experienced from attempting to post to
a genocide studies list: “Afghanistan: Rejected Posts to H-Genocide and Related Correspondence,” accessed May 1,
2019, http://adamjones.freeservers.com/h-genocide.html.

2

Adam Jones, The Scourge of Genocide: Essays and Reflections (London: Routledge, 2013), 5.

3

Ibid., 5-6.

4

Henry R. Huttenbach, “From the Editor: Apologia Rationalis,” Journal of Genocide Research 1, no. 1 (1999), 7.

5

Ibid., 9.

6

Israel W. Charny and Roger W. Smith, “Why GSP?” Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no. 1 (2006), i.

Jeffrey Bachman. “Cases Studied in Genocide Studies and Prevention and Journal of Genocide Research and Implications for the
Field of Genocide Studies.” Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, 1 (2020): 2-20. ©2020 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
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are “anchored responsibly to the norms and safeguards of established academic and scientific
disciplines.”7
JGR and GSP began with ambitious goals for the field of genocide studies. Though genocide
studies is not “owned” by and, therefore, not limited to these two English-language journals, their
missions, objectives, and reach make them ideal for the study of any trends that might be found
in the study of genocide over the last twenty years. They offer a fixed sample of original research
articles from which data can be extracted for this purpose. The genocide studies field is also ripe
for self-analysis. As Alexander Hinton notes, “as the outlines of the field emerge more clearly, the
time is right to engage in critical reflections about the state of the field.”8 The purpose of this paper
is to identify which cases of genocide have been studied by contributors to these journals and offer
some thoughts about what this might indicate regarding the state of the field. From here, the paper
is divided into four sections: methodology, results, discussion, and conclusion.
Method
In order to identify the cases studied, every original research article published in JGR, from
1999-2018, and GSP, from 2006-2018, was cataloged. For the purpose of tracking changes to the
field, four intervals were used for each journal. JGR articles were grouped together in five-year
intervals: 1999-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-2013, and 2014-2018. Because there were years skipped in
the publication of GSP, this journal was divided into intervals by volume as opposed to by year:
volumes 1-3, volumes 4-6, volumes 7-9, and volumes 10-12.
Basic information for each article was recorded, such as the article’s author and title, as well
as the volume and issue in which it was published. Articles were then cataloged according to three
related variables: the genocide studies canon location of the cases studied,9 the primary method of
genocide used in the cases studied, and the type of government responsible for the perpetration of
genocide in the cases studied.
The above variables were chosen for a number of reasons. First, historically, genocide studies
scholarship has focused primarily on a small number of cases. According to Hinton, as represented
in his canon, “the bulk of the scholarship in the field of genocide studies, especially from the 1980s
through the 1990s, has focused on the Twentieth-Century Core, with the Holocaust both in the
foreground and in the background.”10 Tracking the cases studied in JGR and GSP will allow us
to see whether this has changed. Second, most genocide scholarship seems to have focused on
mass killing and direct physical violence as the means by which genocide is committed to the near
exclusion of other methods of genocide, such as indirect violence and biological and cultural forms
of destruction. Therefore, it is important we determine the accuracy of this perception and whether
the expansion of the field has been accompanied by a growing focus on methods of genocide
other than mass killing and direct physical violence. Third, certain types of governments have
been better understood to be capable of and willing to commit genocide. This, perhaps, is most
exemplified in Rudolph Joseph Rummel’s work on democide, with his heavy focus on Stalinist
Soviet Union, Maoist China, and Nazi Germany.11 Genocide, of course, is not a crime perpetrated
only by authoritarian/totalitarian governments. History illustrates this much. Additionally, even
when such governments are responsible for the commission of genocide, they often have the

Ibid., i-ii.
Alexander Laban Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 2 (2012), 4.
9
The genocide studies canon was created by Hinton. Hinton, Critical Genocide Studies, 13. The canon is also updated
and reproduced in Alexander Hinton et al., eds., introduction to Hidden Genocides: Power, Knowledge, Memory (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2014), 6.
10
Hinton, Critical Genocide Studies, 12. The Twentieth-Century Core includes the Holocaust, Armenians, Cambodia,
Rwanda, Bosnia, Darfur [twenty-first century], and Indigenous Peoples [taken as a whole].
11
Rudolph Joseph Rummel, Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1917 (London: Routledge, 2017); China’s
Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900 (London: Routledge, 2017); Democide: Nazi Genocide and Mass
Murder (London: Transaction Publishers, 1991).
7
8
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helping hand of republics/democracies.12 Hence, it is important we determine whether the field is
limited predominantly to the study of genocide committed by some forms of government to the
exclusion of others.
Each of the variables were pre-defined in an effort towards consistency. The case on which
an article focuses was used to determine the canon location. Thus, if genocide in Rwanda is the
focus of an article, it would be grouped with articles that focus on the canon’s Triad. All repressive
forms of government, including authoritarian, totalitarian, dictatorships, and absolute monarchies
were categorized as “authoritarian/totalitarian,” while all forms of republics, democracies,
and parliamentary and constitutional monarchies were categorized as “republic/democracy.”
Therefore, articles on Soviet genocides would be grouped with those on genocide perpetrated
by authoritarian/totalitarian governments and articles on settler-colonial genocides would be
grouped with those perpetrated by republics/democracies. A method of genocide—mass killing
and direct physical violence, indirect violence, biological, or cultural—was assigned to individual
cases of genocide based on either the prevalence of one method or the predominant focus when a
case is studied within the field. For example, genocide in Indonesia in 1965-1966 is categorized as
mass killing and direct physical violence because that was the primary method of genocide when
hundreds of thousands of real or perceived communists were killed in a matter of seven months.
Though the Holocaust included a combination of all the methods of genocide, it has been primarily
defined by the number of people killed. Therefore, it, too, is categorized as mass killing and direct
physical violence.
Before detailing and discussing the results of this research, a number of difficulties and
methodological concerns should be addressed. First, as previously noted, data collection was
limited to two, though highly important, English-language journals. Thus, the data will be limited
in its ability to represent the larger field of genocide studies. Second, and relatedly, because
scholars from various fields contribute to genocide studies, where scholars publish research on
genocide extends beyond these two journals. For example, Lindsey Kingston has an excellent
article on cultural genocide and indigenous peoples published in Journal of Human Rights.13 Thus,
it is important to state clearly that the data collected is only representative of what is being studied
in JGR and GSP. Though I try to draw some conclusions and understandings about the field of
genocide studies from this data, the results of my research are not capable of reconstructing or meant
to reconstruct the field. Third, the method of collection and categorization of the data provides
only one perspective of the field. For example, in grouping all the different types of government
into two broad categories, authoritarian/totalitarian and republic/democracy, some nuance may
have been lost. Also, the grouping of cases within four methods of genocide—mass killing, indirect
violence, biological, and cultural—might not fully represent the entire focus of individual articles.
Additionally, it is important to note that many of the articles did not include research on specific
cases of genocide. Instead, they focused on some of the definitional, conceptual, theoretical, and
thematic issues in the field. Furthermore, some of the articles on cases of genocide also addressed
some of these issues. Hence, in the future, it would be worthwhile to assess what elements of the
field are receiving the most attention and on which there is room for increased attention.
Despite its limitations, the data collected is representative of what might be the first attempt
at using statistical data to map a part of the field by analyzing what genocide studies journals
have been producing. It is, then, a first step in a process of outlining changes to the field. It is my
hope that other scholars will continue this work and launch more in-depth analyses of particular
elements of the field.
Results
From 1999-2018, JGR published 393 original research articles and from 2006-2018, GSP published
217 original research articles. In focusing on original research articles, this paper does not include
Bachman, The United States and Genocide; Jeffrey Bachman, “A ‘Synchronized Attack’ on Life: the Saudi-Led Coalition’s
‘Hidden and Holistic’ Genocide in Yemen and the Shared Responsibility of the US and UK,” Third World Quarterly 40,
no. 2 (2019), 298-316; Adam Jones, ed. Genocide, War Crimes & the West (London: Zed Books, 2004).
13
Lindsey Kingston, “The Destruction of Identity: Cultural Genocide and Indigenous Peoples,” Journal of Human Rights 14,
no. 1 (2015), 63-83.
12

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1706

Cases Studied in GSP and JGR and Implications

5

book reviews, documentary reviews, comments, letters, or editorial introductions. Specific to GSP,
IAGS conference proceedings are also omitted. Each of the following subsections measures the
prevalence and change over time for the following: location of each case studied in the genocide
studies canon, the primary method of genocide in each case studied, and the type of government
that perpetrated the genocide in each case studied.
Genocide: Canon Location
In 2012, Hinton first introduced his genocide studies canon. The canon is divided into six sections:
Prototype, Triad, Twentieth-Century Core, Second Circle, Periphery, and Forgotten Genocides.
The specific cases in each of the six sections of the genocide studies canon include: Prototype
(Holocaust), Triad (Holocaust, Armenians, Rwanda), Twentieth-Century Core (Holocaust,
Armenians, Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Darfur [twenty-first century], Indigenous Peoples [taken
as a whole]), Second Circle (East Pakistan, Kurdish Case, Guatemala, Herero/Namibian, Kosovo,
Carthage, Settler Genocides, Ukrainian/Soviet, Myanmar), Periphery (Indonesia, Argentina,
Specific Cases of Indigenous Peoples, Genocides of Antiquity, Assyrian and Greek Cases, East
Timor, Burundi, Maoist China, Democratic Republic of the Congo), and Forgotten Genocides
(defined as the “multitude of more or less invisible/hidden/forgotten cases”).14
In his article “Critical Genocide Studies,” published in GSP’s seventh volume, Hinton notes
the bulk of early genocide studies scholarship focused primarily on the Twentieth-Century Core
cases, with the Holocaust, which is also the Prototype case and one-third of the Triad, as the case
to which others are compared. Case selection and selectivity is informative in the way it shines
the light on some cases and, therefore, some perpetrators and victims, while excluding others.15
As Hinton puts it, “why, we need to ask, are certain cases forgotten, remembered, reorganized,
or even intentionally hidden or written out of history?”16 Relatedly, in an email exchange, I asked
Hinton where the U.S. war on Vietnam, which is covered in my book The United States and Genocide:
(Re)Defining the Relationship as a case of U.S.-perpetrated genocide, would fall within the canon.
He responded, “Vietnam would be a hidden genocide (which includes purposeful masking and/
or forgetting).”17 Importantly, the definitions scholars use and the cases they study “are not valueneutral but are also linked to issues of power and knowledge.”18
While the genocide studies canon illustrates some of the biases in the field of genocide studies,
it is also not a fixed categorization. The places of cases within the canon may shift over time
depending on changes within the field. As Hinton noted in an email correspondence, most cases of
genocide are contested and may move from one section of the canon to another over time, and not
always in only one direction. For example, Hinton noted that Argentina was once a forgotten case,
along with the case of Bangladesh, but Bangladesh (East Pakistan) is now located in the Second
Circle and Argentina in the Periphery. Meanwhile, Hinton sees the case of Darfur potentially
moving out of the Twentieth-Century Core and into the Second Circle.19
Hinton’s genocide studies canon was chosen as a model against which cases studied in JGR
and GSP could be juxtaposed specifically because the canon is illustrative of a belief that there exists
a hierarchy of cases within the genocide studies field. Interestingly, the canon may be understood
to be both objective and subjective. Through a measurement of cases studied in the field, the canon
can be an objective representation of the field by situating cases within different levels of the canon
based on how heavily they are studied. Yet, the canon is also subjective in that decisions are made
by scholars regarding which cases they study. Therefore, the canon is built upon the choices made
14

Hinton, Critical Genocide Studies, 13; Hinton et al., introduction to Hidden Genocides, 6. In an email communication,
Hinton informed me that Myanmar’s genocide of Rohingya fits in the Second Circle. Hinton, email communication,
March 11, 2019.

15

Similarly, Hinton writes, “but we also need to consider why we focus on certain cases and topics and what sorts of
inclusions and exclusions ensue,” Hinton, Critical Genocide Studies, 12-13.

16

Ibid., 12.

17

Hinton, email communication, February 13, 2019.

18

Hinton, Critical Genocide Studies, 12.

19

Hinton, email communication, March 11, 2019.
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by scholars who are informed by their own biases. It is with this in mind that the canon location of
cases studied in JGR and GSP were tracked for this study. In what follows, it will be shown both
the overall number of cases in each canon and any changes over time.
Among the original research articles in JGR between 1999 and 2018, there were 320 total cases
studied. The Prototype accounted for 24.7 percent of cases studied, the Triad for 18.8 percent, the
Twentieth-Century Core for 6.6 percent, the Second Circle for 24.7 percent, the Periphery for 11.9
percent, and Forgotten cases for 13.4 percent. These numbers do not tell the whole story because
the Holocaust is also part of the Triad; the Holocaust, Armenian Genocide, and Rwanda account
for nearly 43.5 percent of all cases covered. The Holocaust, Armenian Genocide, and Rwanda are
also part of the Twentieth-Century Core. As can be seen on the right half of Figure 1 below, when
combined, the entire Twentieth-Century Core accounts for a full 50 percent of all cases covered in
articles published in JGR. Still, more can be learned by breaking down some of the other categories
further. For example, among the 79 articles that focused on Second Circle cases, 28 of them analyzed
Settler Genocide cases, while 24 of them focused on Soviet cases. This is significant not because
Soviet cases are overrepresented, but because there is a near-equal focus on cases committed by one
perpetrator as there is on the multiple settler perpetrators. Notably, however, of the 38 Periphery
cases, 26 of them focused on specific cases of indigenous genocide. Finally, when combined, only
54 of the articles focus on settler/indigenous genocide, or 16.9 percent of all JGR articles.
Figure 1. JGR: Canon Location of Cases Studied

Between 2006 and 2018, original research articles in GSP studied 137 cases. Significantly
different from JGR, only 10.2 percent of GSP articles were on the Prototype. However, at 32.8
percent, there was a large focus on the Triad. Another 22.6 percent of articles were on the TwentiethCentury Core. As represented in Figure 2, when combined, the entire Twentieth-Century Core
accounts for 65.6 percent of all articles, a significantly larger portion than found in JGR. The focus
on the first three sections of the genocide studies canon has ramifications for the study of cases
lower in the canon. Only 15.3 percent focused on Second Circle cases, 9.5 percent on Periphery
cases, and 9.5 percent on Forgotten cases. Settler/Indigenous cases accounted for only 10 of the 137
cases studied, or 7.3 percent.
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Figure 2. GSP: Canon Location of Cases Studied

As is evident in Figures 3 and 4, there was increased coverage of the bottom half of the genocide
studies canon from the first interval to the last in both JGR and GSP. In JGR, during the first interval,
the top half of the canon was represented in 68.4 percent of the cases. By the last interval, this was
nearly inverted with the bottom half of the canon represented in 62.5 percent of the cases studied.
Coverage of the bottom half of the canon peaked in the third interval at 65.6 percent. Meanwhile,
GSP started with 87.5 percent of cases studied in the first interval coming from the top half of
the canon. By the fourth interval, this had decreased to 51.4 percent. Though GSP increased its
coverage of the bottom half of the canon, such cases only represented the majority during one of
the four intervals—60 percent in the third.
Figure 3. JGR: Change in Canon Locaton over Time

©2020
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Figure 4. GSP: Change in Canon Location over Time

Genocide: Perpetrator Government
In 1982, Irving Horowitz argued that “democratic and libertarian states” can be differentiated from
“repressive or totalitarian states” by the types of state violence in which they engage.20 According
to Horowitz, “wars have been fought between democratic and authoritarian states throughout the
twentieth century. And while this is by no means a simple struggle between good and evil, the fact
does remain that wars are common to all sort of social systems. Genocide, on the other hand, is the
operational handmaiden of a particular social system, the totalitarian system.”21 The problem with
Horowitz’s claim is that it is inaccurate. It is inaccurate in its primary claim but is also inaccurate
in the way it portrays democratic and libertarian states as uninterested bystanders to violence and
genocide committed by repressive and totalitarian states. As is made clear in my own book on the
U.S. and genocide and edited volume on cultural genocide, as well as the works of so many other
scholars who have turned a bright light on the acts of the West in relation to the direct commission
of genocide, acts of conspiracy, and acts of complicity, it is short-sighted to conclude that one form
of government is more genocidal than another. Doing so, as Patrick Wolfe asserted in a different
context, “confuses definition with degree.”22
Despite a history of genocidal activity by governments of all forms, data shows that scholars tend
to focus more heavily on those committed by governments classified as authoritarian/totalitarian.
In JGR, 61.9 percent of cases studied involved an authoritarian/ totalitarian perpetrator. Similarly,
in GSP, 61.3 percent involved an authoritarian/totalitarian perpetrator. Though the ratios above
do not indicate what might be considered an extreme imbalance in coverage of authoritarian/
totalitarian genocides as compared to genocides committed by republics/democracies, Figures 5
and 6 give an impression regarding just how much larger the authoritarian/totalitarian pieces of
the pie are.

20

Irving L. Horowitz, Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1982), 22.

21

Ibid.

22

Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (2006), 398.
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Figure 5. JGR: Type of Government Perpetrator

Figure 6. GSP: Type of Government Perpetrator

As shown in Figures 7 and 8, the government perpetrator fluctuated over time in both journals.
In JGR, coverage of authoritarian/totalitarian perpetrators peaked during the final interval at 75
percent, closely followed by 74.3 percent during the first interval. At its low, JGR articles focused
on authoritarian/totalitarian perpetrators 41.9 percent of the time during the third interval.23 This
was also the only time in the combined eight intervals between JGR and GSP in which the study
of cases involving a republic/democracy perpetrator exceeded those studied that involved an
authoritarian/totalitarian perpetrator.

23

During this interval, there were two special issues that focused on perpetrators categorized as republic/democracy.
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Figure 7. JGR: Change in Government Perpetrators Studied over Time

In GSP, coverage of authoritarian/totalitarian perpetrators peaked at 72 percent during the
third interval and was at its lowest during the final interval at 54.3 percent.
Figure 8. GSP: Change in Government Perpetrators Studied over Time

The data on government perpetrators appears consistent with the genocide studies canon
location data. Because the top half of the canon primarily includes cases of genocide perpetrated
by authoritarian/totalitarian governments and because the top half of the canon has received more
attention by scholars published in JGR and GSP, it is not surprising to see a corresponding focus
on authoritarian/totalitarian perpetrators. This raises important questions that could be the focus
of future research: (1) does case selection influence arguments made by some genocide scholars
about how regime type might influence the propensity for genocide, or (2) does regime type make
a significant difference regarding propensity for genocide?24
Genocide: Method of Commission
According to the legal definition of genocide, the crime can be committed against national, ethnic,
racial, and religious groups when any of the following acts are committed with the intent to destroy
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the group, in whole or in part:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or,
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.25
Thus, the legal definition of genocide includes acts of direct physical violence, acts of psychological
violence, indirect and structural violence, attempts at eliminating the viability of a group
biologically, and attempts at eliminating the viability of a group by forcibly assimilating members
of one group into another. As will be discussed later, genocide scholars also employ definitions of
genocide other than the legal one. Some of these definitions expand upon the legal one to include
cultural genocide, while others use an even narrower definition than Lemkin, limiting genocide to
mass killing.
Though the Genocide Convention includes five acts of genocide, only one of which involves
mass killing by direct physical violence, articles published in JGR and GSP overwhelmingly focus
on cases of mass killing and direct physical violence. Among the 320 cases included in JGR, in 85
percent of them mass killing was the primary method of genocide. In GSP, 83.2 percent of the 137
cases studied involved mass killing. Cases involving indirect physical violence were the second
most represented in JGR and GSP at 4.4 and 6.6 percent, respectively. Though, in GSP, cultural
genocide was equal second to indirect violence. In both journals, biological cases were nearly
nonexistent. The stark contrast between cases studied involving mass killing and those involving a
method other than direct physical violence is clear in Figures 9 and 10.
Figure 9. JGR: Methods of Genocide Studied

25

United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 260, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
December 9, 1948 (UN Doc. A/RES/260(III)), accessed January 31, 2020, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ac0.
html.
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Figure 10. GSP: Methods of Genocide Studied

The focus on mass killing and direct physical violence over time was most marked in JGR.
Scholars published in this journal who focused on this method of genocide accounted for 80.8
percent, 82.4 percent, 85.2 percent, and 91 percent of all articles across the four intervals. See Figure
11 for comparisons between the four intervals.
Figure 11. JGR: Method of Genocide Studied over Time

Though only marginally, as can be seen in Figure 12, the methods of genocide were slightly
more evenly distributed in GSP as compared to JGR. Mass killing, as the primary method of
genocide, was included in 96 percent of the cases studied in the first interval, which was also
the largest representation in any of the combined eight intervals, 79.3 percent in the second, 66.7
percent in the third, and 79.4 percent in the fourth.
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Figure 12. GSP: Method of Genocide Studied over Time

As with the data on canon location and government perpetrators, the data on primary method
of genocide used in the cases studied appears consistent with what one might expect based on
the previous data. Cases located in the top half of the canon tend to be those with large numbers
of people killed by mass killing. This, too, leaves room for further research. Are the cases that are
studied most frequently chosen because they have the tell-tale signs of what is broadly understood
to be genocide—the deaths of a substantial number of people who are members of a group by mass
killing? Or, is genocide broadly understood to involve mass killing because scholars have made a
deliberate choice to study some cases more than others based on their own perceptions and biases?
What follows in the discussion will offer an initial response to some of the questions raised.
Discussion
In The Politics of Annihilation: A Genealogy of Genocide, Benjamin Meiches analyzes how ideas,
concepts, and understandings about genocide have become entrenched. Meiches defines what he
refers to as the hegemonic understanding of genocide as the “dominant series of assumptions
and practices” that exist as part of a belief that “genocide is a self-evident concept…supported
by strong presumptions about meaning, language, and law.”26 Importantly, Meiches does not
limit the hegemonic understanding to a single definition of the concept of genocide. Rather, the
hegemonic understanding is “a form of discursive practice within the politics of genocide, which
operates as if the concept of genocide may be defined by more or less objective criteria, has stable
political implications, and can be used to set up a static taxonomy or hierarchy for governing
mass atrocities.”27 As Meiches articulates, the hegemonic understanding of genocide is problematic
because it is exclusionary; it places groups and identities that do not conform to those protected
outside the possibility of genocide, while also restricting genocide to mean only one type of violence
and its variants.
The results of the analysis presented in this paper support Meiches own analysis. It is possible
that a hegemonic understanding of genocide has contributed to a study of genocide that is generally
limited to particular cases perpetrated by one form of government carried out by a single method.
As previously shown, 50 percent of cases studied in JGR focus on the top half of the genocide
studies canon. This might at first glance appear to be parity, but when considering the distribution
of cases in the canon, the reality is far from it. The top half of the canon, made up of the Prototype,
26

Benjamin Meiches, The Politics of Annihilation: A Genealogy of Genocide (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2019), 12.

27
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Triad, and Twentieth-Century Core, includes the following cases: Holocaust, Armenian Genocide,
Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Darfur, and Indigenous Peoples taken as a whole. This means that
seven cases account for 50 percent of case studied in JGR. Meanwhile, the bottom half of the canon,
made up of the Second Circle, Periphery, and Forgotten cases, includes 15 specific cases,28 plus all
Soviet cases, individual indigenous cases, settler cases, cases of antiquity, and the innumerable
forgotten cases. The heavy emphasis on the top half of the canon is even more pronounced in GSP.
Nearly 66 percent of the cases studied are located in the Prototype, Triad, and Twentieth-Century
Core, leaving only 34 percent of cases studied being among the plethora that make up the bottom
half of the canon.
Mass killing was the primary method of genocide in 85 percent of the cases studied in JGR
and 83.2 percent of cases studied in GSP. There is a link in this regard to the cases chosen to be
studied. Among the seven cases in the top half of the canon, mass killing, and direct physical
violence are emphasized. This is especially true of the Holocaust, Armenian Genocide,29 Cambodia,
Rwanda, and Darfur. The overall death toll in Bosnia from the war, as well as the deaths of 8-10,000
men and boys at Srebrenica, are of particular focus, though attention is paid to ethnic cleansing
and cultural destruction as well.30 Similarly, though indirect means and cultural destruction are
prominent in Indigenous genocides taken as a whole, when focusing on the whole the massive
loss of life remains at the foreground. Though cases involving mass killing and direct physical
violence remain prevalent in the bottom half of the canon, there are many cases that involve indirect
violence, cultural destruction and prohibitions, or some combination thereof. Such cases include
the settler genocides, specific cases of indigenous genocide, Soviet cases, and China under Mao.
Additionally, there are the innumerous Forgotten cases, including West Papua, the results of the
sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 1990s and early 2000s, Palestine, ISIS, and Yemen, to name just a
few, which involve indirect and/or cultural violence.31
The choice of cases and the method of genocide employed within these cases also influence
what types of governments are most likely to be studied as perpetrators of genocide. Because settler
genocides and individual cases of indigenous genocide are most likely to have been committed by
republics/democracies, they have also received less attention based on the focus on the top half of
the canon, while they are in the bottom half. It is also likely that there are Forgotten cases, including
some of those mentioned above, for which republics/democracies are responsible. With increased
attention to Second Circle, Periphery, and Forgotten cases could come greater parity between
cases for which authoritarian/totalitarian governments are responsible and those committed by
republics/democracies. Furthermore, there is also room for future research on the role external
state actors, including and especially republics/democracies, play in directly aiding authoritarian/
totalitarian genocides or in facilitating the conditions in which genocide is possible.
All the above begs the question: why have a small number of cases perpetrated by authoritarian/
totalitarian governments through mass killing received a disproportionately large focus? As noted
at the outset of this discussion, the existence of a hegemonic understanding of genocide appears
to be highly influential in this regard. The definitions of genocide utilized by scholars has a direct
impact on the choice of cases studied. Mass killing through direct physical violence essentially
requires the murder of large numbers of peoples. An explicit specific genocidal intent requirement
includes some acts of violence and excludes others, such as the murder of a large number of people
when done so in the context of armed conflict or the continuous implementation of policies that
have foreseeable consequences. The ubiquitous focus on cases of genocide involving mass killing
and direct physical violence has significant implications for the study of genocide and is deeply
28

East Pakistan, Kurdish Case, Guatemala, Herero/Namibian, Kosovo, Carthage, Myanmar, Indonesia, Argentina,
Assyrian and Greek Cases, East Timor, Burundi, Maoist China, Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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Of course, this is not absolute. For example, Anush Hovanissian, “Turkey: A Cultural Genocide,” in Studies in
Comparative Genocide, ed. Levon Chorbajian and George Shirinian, 147-153 (London: Macmillan Press, 1999).
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Donna-Lee Frieze, “The Destruction of Sarajevo’s Vijećnica: A Case of Genocidal Cultural Destruction,” in New Directions in
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rooted in the definitional and conceptual constraints in the field. As Kjell Anderson notes in relation
to what he labels “slow-motion” or “cold” genocides,
the lack of adequate engagement of policy-makers and theorists with colonial and neocolonial slow-motion genocides is also a failure to engage with structural violence – violence
in which a social structure prevents people from meeting their basic needs. There are several
explanations for this analytical deficiency. Firstly, the concept of genocide largely arose from
the historical context of the Holocaust. As such, there is a tendency among genocide scholars
to ignore genocides which do not fit the Holocaust model of mass killing in pursuit of a racist
ideology. Secondly, structural violence is often more subtle than mass killing.32

“More subtle” here should not be interpreted as an assessment of the seriousness of the
violence. As is clear in Anderson’s work, genocide can take different forms and be perpetrated in
different contexts without some cases being devalued in comparison to others.
Further evidence of a hegemonic understanding of genocide and its influence on the study
of genocide can be found in surveys of scholarly definitions of genocide. These surveys reveal
that definitions advanced by many scholars are even narrower than the legal definition, which is
itself narrower than that advanced by Lemkin. Thus, there exists a disconnect between the legal
definition, the definitions typically employed by scholars in the field of genocide studies, and that
forwarded by Lemkin.
In 1933, Lemkin presented his “Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered
as Offences against the Law of Nations” at the 5th Conference for the Unification of Penal Law in
Madrid. As Donna-Lee Frieze points out, it was at this conference that Lemkin described genocide
“in its incipient forms: ‘barbarism’ and ‘vandalism’.”33 In Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of
Occupation, Analysis of Government, Lemkin describes genocide as a process, one that does not
necessarily involve the immediate destruction of a national collectivity, though such a result is
possible by mass killings of all its members. Instead, Lemkin explained, genocide signifies
a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations
of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The
objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of
culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups,
and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the
individuals belonging to such groups.34

Importantly, Lemkin did not limit genocide to mass killing of members of a national collectivity.
He believed there are other ways the existence of a group of people can be destroyed, which he
divided into eight techniques of genocide. These include political, social, cultural, economic,
biological, physical, religious, and moral. As a holistic concept, each of the eight techniques shares
some relationship with one or more of the other techniques.
Three years after the publication of Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Lemkin participated in the
development of the Secretariat Draft of the Genocide Convention. The Secretariat Draft retained
much of Lemkin’s concept of genocide, with the eight techniques of genocide pared down to three
methods of genocide: physical, biological, and cultural. Though the language moved away from
Lemkin’s eight techniques of genocide, elements of most are present in the triumvirate of genocidal
methods. From the Secretariat Draft to the text adopted by the General Assembly in December
1948, the Genocide Convention evolved through a complex and contentious period of negotiations.
For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to say that domestic and international politics greatly
influenced the negotiations, which resulted in the elimination of protection for political groups and
33
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Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), xii; Raphaël Lemkin, “Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger
Considered as Offences against the Law of Nations,” accessed May 1, 2019, www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/
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the exclusion of cultural genocide. Furthermore, what remained of Lemkin’s concept of genocide
was greatly weakened. The spirit of Lemkin’s concept partially remains, but the language is
ambiguous, making it far more subjective.
In the final legal text, the erosion of Lemkin’s concept of genocide was nearly complete.
Though the text retains some elements of his concept, it does so in a way that divorces them from
their interconnectedness. What began as a holistic concept of genocide became, in a matter of years,
based on the determinations of state actors, a list of five acts: killing group members, causing
them serious bodily or mental harm, inflicting on them conditions of life calculated to physically
destroy it in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and
forcibly transferring children from one group to another. Even the one component of the cultural
technique that remained, transferring children, did not retain the meaning it once had. As A. Dirk
Moses explains, the inclusion of the forced transfer of children was not meant to define genocidal
attempts to impede the generational sharing of group social and cultural characteristics, but rather
to “complement the emphasis on the physical/biological consequences of genocidal techniques.”35
When comparing some of the most recognized scholarly definitions of genocide to Lemkin’s
own, the disconnect between the legal definition, the definitions typically employed by scholars in
the field of genocide studies, and that forwarded by Lemkin is clear. Rather than using Lemkin’s
holistic concept of genocide as a starting point, many scholars in the field of genocide studies have
chosen to use the adopted text of the Genocide Convention for this purpose. Of course, there are
practical reasons for doing so. As Leo Kuper wrote in 1981, “I shall follow the definition of genocide
given in the [UN] Convention. This is not to say that I agree with the definition…. However, I
do not think it helpful to create new definitions of genocide, when there is an internationally
recognized definition and a Genocide Convention which might become the basis for some effective
action, however limited the underlying conception.”36 Yet, this alone cannot explain why so many
of Lemkin’s ideas about genocide were abandoned, not only by states acting in their own selfinterests during the Genocide Convention’s negotiations, but also by scholars who are not limited
by the politics of international treaty making.
In departing from many of Lemkin’s core ideas about genocide, it is arguable that the
proliferation of scholarly definitions has resulted in the emergence of a hegemonic understanding
of genocide, one that essentially synonymizes genocide with mass killing, albeit when targeting
members of a specific group. If accurate, this could offer one explanation for the data found in
JGR and GSP. Evidence of such definitional hegemony can be found in two independent, but
overlapping surveys conducted by Adam Jones and Scott Straus.37 In Genocide: A Comprehensive
Introduction, Jones collected twenty-five definitions, developed by twenty-nine scholars, spanning
from 1959 to 2014.38 By my interpretation, fifteen of the definitions limit genocide to the mass
killing/murder of members of the targeted group.39 Eight of the remaining ten definitions included
by Jones go beyond mass killing, but are nonetheless limited to physical (and, in some cases,
biological) genocide.40 Notably, only two of the scholarly definitions in Jones’ text include methods
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36
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of genocide other than physical.41 Furthermore, only one definition explicitly recognizes genocide
as a process, rather than simply as an end result of mass death. Christopher Powell and Julia
Peristerakis define genocide “as the violent erasure of a collective identity and understand genocide
as a multidimensional process that works through the destruction of the social institutions that
maintain collective identity as well as through the physical destruction of human individuals.”42
In Jones’ survey of scholarly definitions, fifteen of the twenty-five definitions (60 percent) limit
genocide to mass killing, twenty-three of the twenty-five definitions (92 percent) recognize genocide
as the physical destruction of a targeted group, whether by direct or indirect violence, leaving only
two definitions (8 percent) with attacks on the life of a group that go beyond physical. Straus’
survey shows similar results. Straus includes fourteen definitions, one of which is Lemkin’s.43
Of Straus’ thirteen definitions, not including Lemkin, seven limit genocide to mass killing (54
percent),44 five more to physical genocide (38 percent),45 and one that approaches genocide more
as a multidimensional process (8 percent).46 Combined, Jones and Straus review 33 non-repeating
scholarly definitions of genocide. Only three of these definitions, or 9 percent, include methods of
genocide other than those that will result in the physical destruction of the group.
The definitions used by genocide scholars, no doubt, influence which cases they choose to
study. This does not mean that cases that do not fit within a hegemonic understanding of genocide
will be excluded altogether, but it does mean that some cases will receive greater attention, while
others will be pushed to the margins or forgotten altogether. As already discussed, this also has an
impact on canon location, method of genocide, and perpetrator regime type, and raises questions
for further research. In addition to those areas for further research mentioned previously, it could
be worthwhile to see who is citing who in the genocide studies literature. If a small number of
voices are treated as having greater intellectual authority on the subject of genocide, this could be a
contributing factor to the emergence and perpetuation of a hegemonic understanding of genocide.
This should not be interpreted as a slight against or a devaluation of the work of early genocide
scholars. Rather, it is a recognition of the importance of the new ideas being generated by recent
and emerging scholars.
Conclusion
When scholarly definitions like those surveyed in Jones and Straus are compared to Lemkin’s
concept of genocide, one can see how much was lost. Lemkin’s holistic concept of genocide as
a “synchronized attack on different aspects of life” has been largely replaced by mass killing
and other means of causing mass death among members of a group. Such limited conceptions
of genocide stand in stark contrast with the one advanced by Lemkin in Axis Rule in Occupied
Europe. The near total absence of the method of cultural genocide from the scholarly definitions
is especially significant. As Jones notes, “Lemkin was deeply attached to the concept of cultural
genocide, and it was his most personally wounding experience, during the drafting of the UN
Convention, to see his concept jettisoned.”47
Meanwhile, Moses writes that some in the field of genocide studies have consciously or
unconsciously misinterpreted Lemkin, noting how “even his texts have been bowdlerized to
make genocide mean mass killing and/or resemble the Holocaust.”48 Not only have many scholars
defined genocide narrower than Lemkin, who it bears repeating coined the term, but they also
define genocide narrower than the definition codified in the Genocide Convention, a definition
41
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that is broadly criticized in genocide studies as being deficient. It is important to note that Lemkin’s
own concept of genocide was far from static. It evolved as his ideas about and understanding of
what genocide is progressed. It even regressed in practical terms while the Genocide Convention
was being negotiated out of a need for political expediency. In other words, to allay the anxieties
of the treaty’s negotiating parties, Lemkin sacrificed elements of his conception.49 Yet, as Thomas
Butcher notes, even though the Genocide Convention excludes Lemkin’s triumvirate of physical,
biological, and cultural genocide, “it seems clear that Lemkin was satisfied with this new tripartite
schema, as he continued to use it for the rest of his life.”50
The results of the research presented in this paper, when combined with other evidence of
a hegemonic understanding of genocide, demonstrate the influence conceptual hegemony has
on the study of genocide. Some cases of genocide receive significantly disproportionate attention
than others, mass killing is overwhelmingly the method of genocide studied, and authoritarian/
totalitarian governments are more likely to be associated with the crime. Of course, a hegemonic
understanding of genocide is only one explanation. There could be others, which in turn might
also contribute to a hegemonic understanding, such as: (1) the observability of mass killing as
compared to that of structural violence; (2) the quantifiability of death as compared to the effects
of structural violence; and/or (3) the increased attention to the study of genocide among conflict
scholars.51
Interestingly, as Meiches points out, the emergence of critical genocide studies, introduced by
the likes of Dirk Moses and Alexander Hinton, has roughly coincided with an active (re)engagement
with Lemkin.52 In 2010, Dirk Moses’ chapter on “Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of
Genocide” led off the significant edited volume he co-edited with Donald Bloxham, The Oxford
Handbook of Genocide Studies. In 2013, Donna-Lee Frieze edited Lemkin’s autobiography, Totally
Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin. In 2016, Douglas Irvin-Erickson wrote what
is arguably the seminal text on Lemkin, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide. There have
also been special issues of JGR (Volume 7, Issue 4, 2005) and GSP (Volume 13, Issue 1, 2019; see
also parts of Volume 7, Issue 1, 2012) on Lemkin. Though only speculative at this moment, it is
nonetheless quite possible that this return to Lemkin’s understanding of genocide offers at least a
partial explanation for a change in the amount of attention being paid to cases of genocide located
in the bottom half of the genocide studies canon.
Though it will not come without contention, as the field of genocide studies continues to
expand, it will benefit from increasing reengagement with definitional, conceptual, and theoretical
debates. This requires the creation of space for the entry into the debate of scholars with ideas that
challenge what has largely been the status-quo in the field. As I describe in the introduction to the
edited volume Cultural Genocide: Law, Politics, and Global Manifestations, those who seek to expand
the study of genocide beyond the hegemonic understanding, such as through the study of cultural
genocide, should not be viewed as “insurgents seeking to topple an existing regime, rather than
equal contributors to the study of a phenomenon first recognized as such by Lemkin.”53 Broad
recognition of a definition of genocide that more fully incorporates Lemkin’s understanding of
genocide, or one that at least recognizes that the legal definition contains five acts of genocide
rather than one or two, could have a trickle-down effect on what cases are studied, what methods
are employed in these cases, and what types of governments are associated with the crime.
49
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The Indian plays much the same role in our American society that the Jews played in
Germany. Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shift from fresh air to poison
gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians…reflects the rise and fall
in our democratic faith.
- Felix Cohen (1953)

We all want to think well of ourselves. This truism applies to societies as well as to their individual
citizens. In the United States, belief in American exceptionalism has sometimes produced
outlandish assertions, as when the US solicitor general, in blithe disregard of centuries of slavery
and the annihilation of Indian tribes, proclaimed in 1952 that “genocide has never existed in this
country. Under our form of government, it can never exist.”1 For rosy optimism, this verdict far
transcends even Whiggish history, which for all its faith in the march of progress nonetheless
concedes the existence of evil, if only as a minor pothole along an improving road. The Panglossian
cheerfulness of the solicitor general is not unusual in US history. Similar attitudes abound in every
era of the American past, nourished by a “bardic tradition”2 of historical writing that glorifies
European expansion across the North American continent while ignoring or minimizing its human
cost. Thus, two of the leading historians of the USA, George Bancroft and Arthur Schlesinger, each
writing at moments separated by 158 years, could extol the country’s settlement as a victory over
“feeble barbarians” (Bancroft in 1834) and “primitive tribes” (Schlesinger in 1992). In 2008, former
US officials in the Clinton administration, including ex-Secretary of State Madelaine Albright,
wrote with eyes firmly clenched shut on American history that genocide “threatens not only our
values, but our national interests.”3
Reluctance to confront national crimes is not unique to the USA. Despite the aim of the Canadian
Museum for Human Rights of “exploring human rights with a special reference to Canada,” and
despite endorsing Canada’s recognition of five genocides in world history, the Museum does not
consider the colonization of Canada genocidal. Native American critics of its view like Phil Fontaine,
the ex-grand chief of the Assembly of First Nations, have not budged the Museum from its position.4
The tendency of Canadian officials to deny the occurrence of genocide on their own soil has recently
surfaced in the debates over the report on missing and murdered indigenous women. In response
to the extraordinary numbers of Indian women and girls who have been either murdered or have
disappeared in Canada between 1980 and 2012, the Canadian government appointed a “National
Inquiry into Murdered and Missing Indigenous Women and Girls” in 2016 to investigate the matter.
In their report of June 3, 2019, the four commissioners who formed the National Inquiry charged
that “state actions and inactions rooted in colonialism and colonial ideologies”5 had enabled mass
murder and were tantamount to genocide, an accusation greeted with pushback from government
officials. Neither Prime Minister Justin Trudeau nor Premier François Legault were willing to call
the government’s sins of omission and commission “genocide.” Legault bluntly rejected the term
as applied to the murders and disappearances. While admitting the government had failed in its
1
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duties to protect native victims, he hastened to add that “genocide is something else,” and went on
to equate genocide with sensational government-initiated and administered mass killings like the
Rwandan and Nazi holocausts. Conceding the seriousness of the violence as well as governmental
nonfeasance in responding to it, Legault insisted the crimes did not fulfil the legal definition of
genocide under international law: “A genocide is when someone wants to systematically cause a
nation to disappear. I don’t think we’re talking about that.”6
Remarkably, we sometimes encounter such attitudes among Holocaust and genocide scholars
in their views on whether Euro-American treatment of native peoples was genocidal. Advocates
of the view that it was genocide include Alfred Cave, Benjamin Madley, Ben Kiernan, Gray
Whaley, Tasha Hubbard, and most recently Laurelyn Whitt and Alan W. Clarke;7 among the
dissenters are Guenter Lewy, Gary Clayton Anderson, Joseph Gone, and Steven Katz.8 Indigenous
scholars also stake out antipodal positions on the issue of North American genocide. Some are
chary of attaching the label of “genocide” to Euro-native relations for fear that this act of naming
will deprive indigenous peoples of agency, reducing them to passive victims of overwhelming
European aggression.9 The word’s connotation of merciless death-dealing obscures native people’s
“survivance”10 of Euro-American mistreatment and the sustained efforts to destroy their cultures.
The ability of indigenous people to withstand such assaults is a subject of pride for many of them
today. To quote a line from William Faulkner’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech, native Americans
“have not only endured but prevailed.”11
In virtue of the legal origins of genocide as a crime under international law, debates over the
applicability of the term to the North American frontier and Euro-American expansion quickly
become legalistic. This is strikingly evident in Steven Katz’s refusal to treat settler-Indian relations
as an instance of genocide. For Katz, the disappearance of the native peoples of the Americas was
attributable to epidemic disease, a force of depopulation that was “unwitting” and at variance with
6
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the “expressed and self-interested will of the white empire-builder or settler.”12 Katz buttresses his
view with the insistence (found in his discussion of the Pequot War) that the American colonists
harbored no genocidal intention during or after conflict with native peoples.13 The issue of intent,
along with protected class, is a touchstone in parsimonious interpretations of genocide because it is
an essential element of the crime as set forth in the UN Genocide Convention of 1948. If the accused
neither attacked a protected group (racial, religious, ethnic, or national) nor possessed the specific
intent to destroy “in whole or in part” the members of the group, then no genocide may be said to
have occurred.
The refusal of Katz and other skeptics to acknowledge genocide in Euro-American/Indian
relations seems still more enigmatic when the context of these relations is considered. That context
was settler colonialism, a distinctive type of European colonialism in which the potential for
genocide is always present. As genocide scholar John Docker has noted, the term “settler colony”
is less common in US than in non-US historiographies. It signifies “a colonial society where the
indigenous population was reduced to a small or tiny proportion of the overall population, whose
majority population becomes composed of colonizers/migrants.”14 Docker classifies South Africa,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the USA as settler colonies. For Whitt and Clarke, settler
colonies simmer with the potential for genocidal eruptions.
Unlike colonialism, “settler colonialism is a resilient formation that rarely ends.” [citing
Edward Cavanagh & Lorenzo Veracini] Settler colonizers “come to stay.” While within
colonialism, the Indigenous colonized population is indispensable, most commonly as a
source of exploitable labor, within settler colonialism, the Indigenous population is not only
imminently dispensable, but pressingly so as an obstacle to land acquisition. …This is a
“winner-take-all project whose dominant feature is not exploitation but replacement…”15

“The logic of this project,” according to Whitt and Clarke, can and often does lead to
genocide. In seeking the removal of the indigenes and their supersession by European settlers,
settler colonialism inevitably provokes resistance from native peoples. At this point, the process of
dispossession enters a period of “crisis,” and the new tense phase of the colonial project may slide
toward radical solutions. Native resistance elicits counter-insurgency in the form of massacres and
exterminatory wars supplemented with removals, imprisonment, starvation, allotment, boarding
schools, and other techniques of cultural liquidation.16 The triad of domination, resistance, and
genocide is a veritable natural law of settler genocides, a pattern that structures nearly every
instance of violence against native peoples in settler-colonial societies.
12
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Other scholars have documented this pattern in North America. Genocide historian Benjamin
Madley helpfully reminds us that the prolonged and internecine Modoc wars were launched
when a party of forty white trappers invited the Modoc to a feast in 1840. The “feast” was in
reality an ambush: as the Modoc sat eating, the trappers detonated a cannon, killing many of their
native guests. As Madley concludes, the trappers’ gratuitous and unprovoked massacre “primed
the Modoc to resist incursions.” This primal murder, in other words, was seared into the hearts
and minds of the Modoc during an early stage of their contact with Euro-Americans, embittering
their attitudes toward the newcomers and steeling their resistance. Modoc reprisals then became
a justification for their genocide. By the fall of 1855, Californians were openly demanding the total
eradication of the Modoc.17
Raphaël Lemkin believed settler colonialism was intimately connected with genocide. Although
it is often assumed that Lemkin devised his concept of genocide to cover Nazi atrocities during
World War II, in fact the elements of the offense, as Lemkin construed it, predate his systematic
elaboration of genocide in Axis Rule in Europe (1944).18 Furthermore, it is clear from both chapter 9
of Axis Rule and his unpublished writings, composed between the mid-1940s and his death in 1959,
particularly the notes he and his research assistant prepared for a never-completed world history
of genocide, that Lemkin intended his definition to apply to other mass exterminations, including
Euro-American interactions with North American Indians. In the exposition of his concept of
genocide, he was not bound by a narrow statutory formula. Despite his training as a jurist, Lemkin
would kick himself loose from the constrictive hermeneutics of legal formalism in favor of a broad
and allusive understanding of genocide. As we will see, at the heart of Lemkin’s concept was a
concern with the integrity and preservation of unique cultural forms—the very phenomena under
threat from civilian settler colonialism. Lemkin’s surprisingly non-legalistic conception of genocide
is rooted less in 20th century legal developments than in the European Romanticism of Johann
Gottfried Herder and Friedrich Karl von Savigny. While law was the integument of his concept, the
urge to protect cultural ways of being in the world was its life-blood.
Lemkin’s Concept of Genocide: from Madrid to Axis Rule in Europe
Barbarity and Vandalism
While Lemkin would over time extend his conception of genocide beyond Nazism, Hitler’s
persecution of German Jews in the months following his appointment as chancellor was the
impetus to Lemkin’s first major public statement on a proposed type of international crime that
clearly foreshadowed his subsequent definition of genocide. In his autobiography, he wrote that
he and his colleagues at the Association Internationale de Droit Pénal (AIDP) were concerned that
Hitler would transform his anti-Semitic rantings in Mein Kampf into policy, now that the Nazis
had seized power in Germany. Lemkin continued: “Now was the time to outlaw the destruction
of national, racial and religious groups.”19 In the fall of 1933, he drafted a proposal to be delivered
at the 5th Conference for the Unification of Penal Law in Madrid, Spain. His proposal identified
five “new types of crimes”20 under international law; of the five, two of them, “barbarity” and
“vandalism,” are relevant for us here.
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For Lemkin, barbarity was a crime that attacked individuals for the purpose of harming the
“collectivity” to which they belonged. Hence, barbarity does harm not only to the person but to
his or her group. It consists of “acts of extermination directed against the ethnic, religious or social
collectivities, whatever the motive (political, religious, etc.); for example, massacres, pogroms,
actions undertaken to ruin the economic existence of the members of a collectivity, etc.” Because
such acts “endanger both the existence of the collectivity concerned and the entire social order,”
Lemkin urged the international community to criminalize them by means of an international
convention.21
The second kind of collective assault Lemkin called vandalism. Where barbarity tended to
focus on physical attacks on persons based on group membership, vandalism was a “systematic and
organized destruction of the art and cultural heritage in which the unique genius and achievement
of a collectivity are revealed in fields of science, arts and literature.” The interest Lemkin sought
to protect by criminalizing vandalism was “world culture,” insofar as individual cultures made
unique contributions that enriched all of humankind. When these cultures and their artifacts were
destroyed, “it is also all humanity which experiences a loss by this act of vandalism.”22
What bound together the crimes of barbarity and vandalism in Lemkin’s early thinking about
genocide was the nature of the attack: in both cases, the assault was directed against a cultural entity,
at either a physical (barbarity) or spiritual/cultural (vandalism) level. Physical extermination was
one technique of annihilating a group. However, even in this incipient stage of Lemkin’s thought,
the physical act of killing was simply one way to achieve a more insidious end—the obliteration of
a unique collectivity and its culture. The legal good that Lemkin exhorted the world community
to protect, by recognizing barbarity and vandalism as international crimes, was the manifold and
intricate life of a culture. He advised the world community to criminalize these offenses because
the destruction of cultures robbed human civilization of the invaluable and, indeed, irreplaceable
riches that only these aggregates of human sociality might provide.
The Influence of European Romanticism on Lemkin: The Defense of Particularity
I would suggest that in his paramount concern with the well-being and continuance of group
identities, Lemkin was inspired less by the criminal-legal dogmatics of his era than by a strain of
European thought rooted in Romanticism, particularly the thought of the German philosopher
Johann Gottfried von Herder. In Lemkin’s Madrid paper and his later exposition of genocide
in chapter 9 of Axis Rule, his deep appreciation for the incommensurability of cultures evokes
Herder’s defense of cultural heritage as the highest good in human history. For Herder, as for
Lemkin, the defense of culture was not restricted purely to its Western forms; rather, it extended
to the indigenous civilizations encountered by the West, which had already become the victims of
European domination starting in the 16th century. According to intellectual historian Isaiah Berlin,
from Herder’s belief in every culture’s Schwerpunkt (center of gravity) sprung his “passionate
concern with the preservation of primitive cultures which have a unique contribution to make,
his love of almost every expression of the human spirit, work of the imagination, for simply being
what it is.”23
For Herder, the teeming customs, languages, and folkways of humankind contributed to the
realization of “a common Humanität” (humanity) that enriched everyone’s lives by enabling all
people to become more fully human. Humanity, in other words, was not a static suppositum, the
sum total of persons bearing unalterable traits, but a dynamic, evolving, and emergent phenomenon
that achieves more fully human qualities over time and with each contribution rendered to it by the
various cultures in the world. Hence, cultures must not be tampered with; they should be allowed
to grow naturally and organically. Berlin contends that Herder’s belief in cultural inviolability—
his “relativistic passion for the individual essence and flavor of each culture”—cast a wide net of
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influence over modern European thought.24 One thinker caught in that net was Raphaël Lemkin,
whose mature concept of genocide as it takes shape in chapter 9 of Axis Rule in Europe evinces a
distinctly Romantic commitment to the local and specific.
Lemkin’s Mature Concept of Genocide in Axis Rule (1944)
Genocide scholar Douglas Irvin-Erickson has argued that the destruction of culture per se was not
genocide in Lemkin’s estimation. Rather, it was the destruction of nations that fulfilled his definition
of genocide—nations understood as “aspects of consciousness that took on a social reality as a
‘family of mind’ between individuals…”25 The destruction of culture might facilitate the nation’s
destruction and thus become a technique of genocide, but it was not in itself an instance of genocide.
Specifically, Irvin-Erickson writes, “genocide was the destruction of the family of mind.”26 While
Irvin-Erickson’s assertion is well-taken, passages of Lemkin’s chef d’oeuvre, Axis Rule in Europe,
strongly suggest that it was indeed individual cultures—including those of indigenous peoples
imperiled by civilian settlers in North America—which Lemkin was striving to protect. In order to
grasp the nature of what Lemkin wanted to preserve through the criminalization of genocide, we
must examine in some depth his development of the concept in chapter 9 of Axis Rule.
An arresting feature of Lemkin’s concept of genocide in both 1933 and 1944 is its independence
of the physical act of killing. As he wrote in Axis Rule, genocide is “a coordinated plan of different
actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the
aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”27 The aim of group destruction might be accomplished
through mass killings of group members, but such direct physical attacks were neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition of genocide. This may seem surprising to those familiar with the UN
Genocide Convention’s definition, which interprets genocide almost entirely in terms of the
physical destruction of group members. By contrast, it is the annihilation of a group’s way of life
that chiefly interests Lemkin.28
Lemkin’s paramount concern with attacks on a group’s way of life, committed with the intent
to eradicate it, emerges from “the phases” into which he organizes the process of genocide. In the
first phase, we witness the destruction of the “national pattern of the oppressed group.” In the
second, we encounter “the imposition…of the national pattern of the oppressor.” Lemkin contends
that such “imposition” may be inflicted on an oppressed group allowed to remain in the conquered
territory, or it may occur after the oppressed group has been removed from the land and the newly
acquired territory has been colonized with the oppressors’ own citizens. Lemkin’s schematization
of genocide into these two phases already assumes a situation of military conflict: an outright war
between different states, a civil war in which a dominant group seeks to exterminate a minority
group, or a colonial war involving a colonizer that attacks indigenous peoples, either ejecting them
from their land and re-filling it with the colonizers’ own nationals or allowing the vanquished to
remain, but only on the condition that they accept the colonizers’ “national pattern.”29
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The elimination of a “national pattern” and its replacement by the pattern of the dominant
group may be effected through several techniques. In Chapter 9 of Axis Rule, Lemkin explicitly
links these techniques to German occupation policy. However, it is equally clear that they are also
applicable to settler relations with North American Indians—a connection Lemkin will draw in
the years following publication of Axis Rule as he researched his planned treatise on genocide in
world history. Perpetrators of genocide use these techniques to install the oppressor’s “national
pattern” in the fields of politics, society, culture, the economy, biology, “the physical,” religion,
and morality. In politics, Lemkin considered Germany’s abolition of local governmental structures
in occupied Europe and their replacement by “a German pattern of administration” a genocidal
action. In society, the Germans had sought to reconfigure Poland and Slovenia by combing each
nation of its intelligentsia and clergy—i.e., those most able to organize resistance to Nazi rule—and
sending them to Germany as forced laborers. In the cultural sphere, the Germans forbade the Poles
and other nations under the Nazi yoke from either teaching or publishing in their native language.
For the national pattern of an indigenous language, the Nazis substituted the commandment
that only German could be used as the “language of instruction” in the schools of some of the
nations they occupied. The national patterns of these countries would be further disrupted by the
assignment to their schools of German instructors who were obliged to promote Nazi ideals in
their pedagogy.30
In the economy, the Germans adopted policies to expropriate Jews and Poles and transfer
their wealth into German hands, with the aim of slashing their standard of living and raising
obstacles to their “fulfilling cultural-spiritual requirements.” Because citizens of Luxembourg
were considered racially compatible with Germans, they were given the opportunity to work on
behalf of the Nazi occupation; if they declined to cooperate, their property was confiscated and
redistributed to compliant Luxembourgers. In the “biological” realm, the Nazis strove to prevent
non-German population growth in the occupied territories while encouraging the reproduction of
ethnic Germans. They deterred non-Aryan procreation by breaking up the families of disfavored
groups and deporting the men to slave labor. Harsh rationing imposed on these groups led to
malnourishment of the parents and a concomitant increase in infant mortality. At the same time,
subsidies were awarded to ethnic German families with at least three children in Poland; in
the Netherlands and Norway, “Aryan” women impregnated by German soldiers also received
additional support.31
In Lemkin’s taxonomy, the physical aspect of genocide closely resembles his discussion of the
biological field. Here we encounter again efforts to annihilate national groups by means of “racial
discrimination in feeding.” At the top of the food pyramid were, of course, the Germans, who
received 100% of their pre-war calories, followed by national groups entitled to food allocation
based on their racial affinities with the Germans. On the lowest rung of the consumption ladder
were the Jews, who received 27% of the carbohydrates, 20% of the proteins, and 0.32% of the fat
they had consumed before the war. “Racial feeding” was the first subcategory of physical genocide;
the second was “endangering of health,” e.g., seizing warm clothes and blankets from persecuted
groups or denying them access to firewood and medicine during the winter, and the third, “mass
killings” (such as the liquidation by firing squads of the intelligentsia in Poland, Bohemia-Moravia,
and Slovenia). In religion, the Nazis undermined the national life of the nations they occupied
through persecution of the Catholic Church. Finally, the Nazis assailed the moral foundations of
the Polish nation by “creat[ing] an atmosphere of moral debasement within this group.” Their
purpose was “to weaken the spiritual resistance” of the Poles to German domination. Lemkin
claims that the Germans imposed pornographic movies and media on them and encouraged their
consumption of alcohol. A Pole could avoid strict Nazi curfew laws by presenting a casino ticket
to a German policeman. For Lemkin, in fastening their attention on “base instincts,” the Poles were
“diverted from moral and national thinking.”32
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Within these eight types of genocide, direct physical killing appears consistently in only one
of them, the “physical” category and its subtype “mass killings.” Religious forms of genocide
may also involve direct killing, such as the murder of priests in concentration camps, but just as
frequently, they express themselves in non-homicidal practices like encouraging Polish youth to
renounce their Catholic faith. The point of our analysis is that Lemkin in his 1944 book, thought
of genocide in terms well beyond mass killing. When winnowed down to its essence, genocide for
Lemkin has to do with destroying the conditions that make group identity possible. Certainly, the
Gordian knot of identity may be cut by simply murdering the members of the group. Although
the Germans committed mass murder on a scale rarely glimpsed in world history, physical killing
was only one means employed in furtherance of a greater aim: the liquidation of groups en masse
whom the Nazis considered inferior. Their assault on racial “enemies” is so shocking to us because
it displayed a malignant ingenuity in the choice of techniques to erase entire peoples and their
folkways from the face of the earth. To borrow a phrase from journalist Ron Rosenbaum, at the
heart of Nazi evil is a “demonic connoisseurship”33 that targeted entire national, religious, ethnic,
and racial groups for annihilation, most infamously the Jews but also the Poles, the mentally
handicapped, the Roma, homosexuals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and many others. What is crucial for
Lemkin is the destruction of the national pattern of these groups and its replacement by the pattern
of the Nazi occupiers.
Elimination of a group’s pattern and its supersession by another: this is the whorled fingerprint
of genocide, the unique quality that, for Lemkin, distinguished the “crime of crimes” from other
atrocities in human history. Construing genocide in this fashion, Lemkin was able to extend his
model beyond Nazi criminality to identify other events that bore the telltale fingerprint of genocide.
Among them was the centuries-long conflict between Euro-American settlers and the indigenous
peoples of North America. That conflict, as Lemkin’s world genocide research indicates, unleashes
the genocidal potential within democratic societies when native peoples stand between a colonizing
majority and coveted lands. In short, not only repressive or totalitarian societies committed
genocide. Under the proper circumstances, democracies might also commit it—not because the
people mindlessly obey an overpowering authority but because the people will it.
Genocide Beyond Nazism: Lemkin’s Concept as applied to Settler – Indian Relations on the
North American Frontier
Lemkin’s World History of Genocide34
In the years following Axis Rule in Europe until his death in 1959, Lemkin embarked on an
ambitious project that, had it been completed as planned, would likely have eclipsed Axis Rule
as the crowning scholarly achievement of his life. The project was a three-volume exploration
of genocide in world history. He was planning the book as early as fall 1947 (in November he
received a letter discouraging his application to secure funding for the project from the Rockefeller
Foundation).35 The purpose of his treatise, in Lemkin’s own words, was “to prove that genocide is
not an exceptional phenomenon, but that it occurs in intergroup relations with a certain regularity,
like homicide takes place in relations between individuals.”36 Eventually, Lemkin acquired a term
position teaching criminal law at Yale University Law School. In addition to his salary, he received
financial support from Yale in the form of an office, typing facilities, and a research assistant.
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Buoyed with this infusion as well as a subvention from the Viking Fund, Lemkin began his research
on March 1, 1948.37
At this stage of his research, Lemkin had gathered materials “on the following genocide cases:”
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

The Early Christians
The Jews in the Middle Ages; the Jews in Tsarist Russia
The Morescos [sic] in Spain
The Indians in Latin America
The Valdenses [sic]
The Armenians
The Hugenots [sic]
The Greeks in Turkey
The Turks under Greek occupation in 1922
The Indians in North America (in part)

In his collection of data, Lemkin was guided by “headings covering physical, biological and
cultural genocide”—that is, categories of genocide he had analyzed only three years previously
in chapter 9 of Axis Rule. His plan was to focus “upon the role plaid [sic] by governments, groups
and individuals in the commission of the crime,” as well as on “the psychological and sociological
factors.”38
Although North American Indians appear at the end of Lemkin’s list of genocide cases, the
work of his research assistant in the spring of 1948 indicates the importance Lemkin attached to
the North American case study in his future history of genocide. At the end of May 1948, Lemkin’s
assistant summarized his research into Euro-American/Indian relations in North America, which
included:
•
•
•
•

Liquor sales to native peoples and Indian slavery
Genocide committed on the Plains Indians and California Indians
Land cessions “and its genocidal aspects”
The aftermath of “southern removal cases” [presumably, Cherokee and
Choctaw removal]
• General Amherst’s alleged efforts to distribute smallpox-infested blankets to
the Indians
• Indian responses39
The sub-topic of “genocide against the Plains Indians and the California Indians” invites
further scrutiny. Under Plains Indians, Lemkin’s research assistant subsumed the Sand Creek
massacre; the Washita massacre; the Wounded Knee massacre; the targeted annihilation of the
buffalo “to starve Indians;” banning “tribal culture” on reservations; depriving native peoples of
food; and the practice of allotting land to Indians qua individuals so as “to destroy tribal life.”
Under California Indians, he listed the expulsion by force of native peoples into “barren mountains
where I[ndians] starved” and “wanton murder and militar[y] action against Indians who refused
to leave, rebelled or returned occasionally to get food.” While some aspects of these subtopics
involve federal or state governmental policies, others relate directly to civilian-settler genocide
against indigenous peoples. This is particularly true for the genocide of California Indians in the
latter half of the nineteenth century.
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Settler Genocide in California
In California, the annihilation of native peoples was more a local than a federally guided event.
California governors beginning in January 1851 warned that further Indian depredations on settlers
would lead to a “war of extermination…waged between the races until the Indian race becomes
extinct.” One governor, employing the language of criminal extortion, threatened the Indians
with “extermination” if they did not surrender their lands. California newspapers echoed the
drumbeat of genocide. An 1856 editorial published in a San Francisco newspaper recommended
“extermination” as “the quickest and cheapest remedy” for Indian mischief.40
The California example illustrates the impossibility of cleanly separating government from
settler-instigated genocide. In fact, in California, the two levels of action were braided and mutually
supportive. A California governor might hurl threats of extirpation at Indians, but we should recall
that he was elected by civilian-settlers, and the resonance of his threats in newspaper editorials both
expressed and shaped the attitudes of these settlers in their conduct with native peoples. When
California legislators in 1850 declared the forced indenturement of Indian children legal, they were
acting in accordance with the wishes of the population who had elected them. The enslavement
of California Indians proved to be a potent force in their destruction. Operating in a zone of near
total impunity for crimes against Indians, settler-slavers murdered native parents and abducted
their children, who were then sold into slavery. By 1860, the California legislature had enlarged the
period of forced indentures and extended them to native adults. The upshot was an enslavement
of some 10,000 California Indians. The entire juvenile population of some Indian tribes in northern
California was abducted and indentured.41
Along with enslavement, the mass killing of California Indians decimated their numbers.
Although federal troops perpetrated the inaugural two massacres of natives (the first killing 120200 Yana Indians in 1846, the second 135-200 Pomo in 1850), local militia groups and volunteers
accounted for the lion’s share of Indian deaths after 1849. Yet, in the mass killings of California
Indians by local settler groups, the interaction of center and periphery, again, acquired a lethal
synergy. Under the 1855 Bounty Land Law, the US government granted 160 acres of land to both
federal and private soldiers involved in military conflicts, including “the survivors of the militia, or
volunteers, or State troops of any State or Territory” who received federal money and participated
in combat.42 Wittingly or not, the US Congress had incentivized the physical destruction of
California’s native population. Between passage of the bounty law and 1868, some northern
California tribes were almost completely exterminated. Hardly any of the 2 to 3,000 Yana Indians
remained after a wave of settler-militia attacks reduced their number to 100 survivors. Over the
course of a decade (1854-64), the Yuki population was thinned from 12,000 to 600. Genocide scholar
Ben Kiernan quotes a settler’s recollection of killing sorties he and other settlers conducted against
the Yuki: “…[I]n 1856 the first expedition by the whites against the Indians was made…there were
so many of these expeditions…we would kill on average fifty or sixty Indians on a trip…frequently
we would have to turn out two or three times a week.” The ubiquitous pattern of genocide replayed
in California much as it did throughout the North American continent: settler encroachments on
Indian lands led to Indian raids on settler livestock, which invited the indiscriminate killing of
Indian men, women, and children by settler militias. The Petaluma Journal of April 1857 reported
on one such episode: “[W]ithin the past three weeks, from 300 to 400 bucks, squaws, and children
have been killed by the whites.” Two years later, the commander of the local garrison described
Euro-American settler reaction to a Yuki killing of two settlers in September 1859: “The whites
have waged a relentless war of extermination against the Yukas, making no distinction between the
innocent and the guilty. They have relentlessly massacred men, women and children…”43
Euro-Americans dressed up these mass killings of indigenous peoples in the language of licit
warfare. Such martialization of noncombatant slaughter has a dispiritingly long pedigree in Western
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colonialism. Benjamin Madley compares the California Modoc wars to similar episodes in Africa,
Australia, and throughout the Americas. On all these continents, the colonizers denominated as
“wars” the armed conflicts arising from native resistance to colonial domination. For Madley, the
misleading nomenclature conceals their true nature as “both genocides and wars of resistance.”
As his sobering anatomy of the seven anti-Modoc campaigns between 1851-73 suggests, the term
“war” hardly befits the retaliatory killing of native men, women, and children for offenses they had
little or nothing to do with. Indiscriminate massacre extended even to Modoc delegates invited by
the whites to a peace conference in 1852. The delegates, who had voluntarily disarmed as a token
of good will, were subsequently gunned down by their hosts. The settlers thereafter referred to the
murder of the unarmed peace delegates as a “battle.” Grotesque misrepresentations like this one
camouflage genocide with the linguistic cover of military operations.44
As the nation edged toward the Civil War, the mass murder of California Indians became
rampant. When an Indian was alleged to have killed a horse in 1859, the Euro-American bounty
hunter H. L. Hall mounted a settler posse to exact retribution, murdering 240 native men, women,
and children. The killings of women and children were deliberate and calculated and reposed
on Hall’s justification that “a nit would make a louse” (that is, Indian children had to be killed to
prevent the future reproduction of more unwanted Indians). Before the expedition was mounted,
Hall interviewed volunteers, rejecting any who voiced compunction about killing Indian women
and children. He later said about the massacre that “all the squaws were killed because they refused
to go further. We took one boy into the valley, and the infants were put out of their misery, and a
girl ten years of age was killed for stubbornness.” By 1860, California’s superintendent of Indian
Affairs could relate that “the killing of Indians is a daily occurrence,” and the following year,
the new superintendent reported that Indians “are now being hunted down like wild beasts and
killed” by settlers in actions like the December 1862 massacre of 108 native people.45
Settler-indigenous interactions in Oregon reflected an analogous pattern. The August 1853
death of a miner in southwestern Oregon became the occasion for settler resolutions demanding (as
a contemporary observer wrote) “the Extermination of the Indian race.” The head of a speculators’
group, named Miller, coveted land on the south bank of the Chetko Indians’ land. When the
Chetko denied him his request, he and his posse attacked and killed fifteen Chetko and torched
their villages. Because the Chetko were not legally qualified to testify against Miller in court, he
was able to consolidate his claim to the south bank land. With their backs pressed against the wall,
the Chetko conducted winter raids simply to stay alive, in the course of which eleven Chetko had
been killed by 1854. These and similar raids by Oregon’s indigenous population bolstered the
settlers’ calls for outright annihilation of native populations. Much as in the case of the Modocs, all
indigenous persons were targets of extermination whether or not they posed a threat to the lives
of whites. Local militias killed not only Indians accused of raiding livestock but “friendly Indians”
(in this case, natives living under peace treaties with the federal government). The cold-blooded
murder of as many as 106 friendly Indians had the predictable effect of provoking war with other
native groups. In short, as historian Gray Whaley has observed, the local militias and their civilian
supporters did not want amicable relations with native peoples; they “wanted extermination, not
treaty settlements,” and their indiscriminate attacks on native men, women, and children fomented
military conflict with them.46
For Whaley, the concept of “settler colonialism” has limited explanatory value. He instead
prefers the term “settler folk imperialism,” which furnished the “ideological framework” within
44
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which white settlers came to accept the genocide of native peoples as an option preferable to
assimilation. The ideology of folk imperialism offered an influential rationale for genocide,
holding that total eradication of native peoples would serve the well-being of settler communities.
Stoked with this folk imperialism, local militia leaders and their men, the Oregon press, and state
politicians all clamored for the extermination of Oregon’s native population. When the US Army
opposed this policy (the federal government supported assimilation of native peoples), Oregon
newspapers renewed their demands for physical annihilation, berating the army for its softness
and issuing pleas to President Franklin Pierce to sack the Commanding General of US forces in the
Oregon Territory, John Wool, who had proven a vocal critic of militia attacks on Indians.47
By 1860, California’s Indian population had declined from 100,000 to 32,000 under the
pressures of slavery and mass murder. Even then, genocide continued to engulf Native Americans.
Bounties for Indian scalps advertised in local newspapers launched new waves of mass murder
from 1859 to 1861 as claimants brought mountains of their grisly relics to the state legislature for
redemption. Nor were friendly Indians, like the Wiyots on Indian Island, safe from extermination:
in an unprovoked attack, settler volunteers murdered nearly all of the Wiyot women and children.
Although these and other assaults on Indians were often committed by settlers, federal troops (who
had refused to support militia actions against native peoples in Oregon) sometimes intervened—in
support of Indian killing. A federal investigator wrote that “[U.S.] troops were sent out to aid the
settlers in slaughtering the Indians.” He continued:
By means of mounted howitzers, muskets, Minie rifles, dragoon pistols, and sabers, a good
many were cut to pieces. But on the whole, the general policy of the government was pacific.
It was not designed to kill any more Indians than might be necessary to secure the adhesion
of the honest yeomanry of the state.48

While we cannot prove it from the scant documentary evidence at our disposal, it seems
likely that Lemkin had such incidents in mind as he pondered his study of genocide in world
history. His research assistant’s reference to the “forceful eviction from fertile valleys into barren
mountains where I[ndians] starved” assuredly alludes to the widespread practice in California of
native eviction from ancestral lands into areas inhospitable to agriculture or hunting/gathering.49
When starving native peoples raided settler livestock in a desperate effort to survive, they were
butchered in droves by settler militias. Similarly, the “wanton murder and milit[ary] action against
Indians who refused to leave, rebelled or returned occasionally to get food” mentioned in the
memorandum to Lemkin implicates civilian-settlers in the genocide of native peoples.
A Closer Look at Lemkin’s Thinking about Settler Genocide in North America
The “southern removal cases (aftermath),” “failure…to protect reservations against white intrusion,”
and “land cessions” referenced in the research memo all involve contributions by civilian settlers
to Native American extermination. Unlike the example of the California and Oregon Indians,
however, the perpetrators in the actions above frequently used techniques of genocide other than
physical killing. Lemkin derived these techniques from his taxonomy of genocide in chapter 9
of Axis Rule, transferring them from Nazi occupation policy to the North American frontier. The
“southern removal cases” demonstrate the inextricable relationship between federal authorities,
state governments, and settler demands for Indian land in the process of Native American
extermination. Reflecting an amalgam of Lemkin’s political, physical, and economic techniques of
genocide, southern governments acting on Congress’s Federal Indian Removal Law of 1830—a law
passed, in President Andrew Jackson’s words to the Choctaws, “to sustain the States in the exercise
47
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of their right” to seize native lands—nullified tribal governments, laws, and elective bodies. They
imposed taxes on Indian communities, deprived them of the right to vote or testify at trial, and
sold Indian land to white settlers. The memorandum sent to Lemkin by his research assistant cites
the “aftermath” of removal as a special focus of the planned chapter on North American genocide.
The aftermath, of course, was mass death of Indians evicted from their lands on the trek westward,
in the course of which 20% of the Choctaw nation and as much as 25% of the eastern Cherokees
perished. 700 of the 3,000 Creeks expelled from Alabama died during their forced march. Many
Indian victims succumbed to the harsh conditions of the journey to Oklahoma, while others were
carried away by cholera outbreaks; however, thousands were killed by federal troops and militia
members during roundups.50
Direct killing of native peoples during roundups preparatory to expulsion falls within the
physical type of genocide identified by Lemkin in Axis Rule, i.e., genocide by means of “endangering
of health” and “mass killings.” The abolition of tribal government and law, however, would match
his description of political genocide. Seizure of and expulsion of native peoples from their ancestral
lands, on the other hand, meet the criteria of the economic form of genocide (“the destruction of
the foundations of the economic existence of a national group [that] necessarily brings about a
crippling of its development”).51 In short, as he planned his three-volume history, Lemkin was
mapping his categories of genocide from Axis Rule onto the interactions between Euro-Americans
and native peoples.52
The nexus between land policy and genocide is particularly complex in Lemkin’s approach
to the American frontier. In his assistant’s memo, we read the following summary of research
conducted:
Obtained material on land-cessions and its genocidal aspects (on cards).
Comparison of land policies of various colonial powers
Land policy of US. – Treaty-making and breaking. Failure to provide for uprooted Indians,
to protect reservations against white intrusion. The legal fiction.53

What did Lemkin’s assistant mean by “the legal fiction?” The phrase appears again on a
handwritten notecard, ostensibly prepared by this same researcher, on which we read:
Indians (non-Spain)
Policy towards I[ndians] – post colonial
Treaties – were made as in colonial period
U.S. gov’t recognizing I[ndian] land titles. [99]
Congress had jurisdiction over all Indian affairs.
In 1871 – fiction of Indian nationhood abandoned. Thereafter “agreements” not treaties were
made. [see p. 100 for examples of treaties].
By 1890 most Amer. land was in white hands [107].
Land cessions left no provision for settlement of displaced I[ndians] [107].54 (emphasis added)

What the author of the notecard refers to is the decision by Congress in 1871 to deprive Indians
of their status under law as nations eligible to negotiate treaties with the federal government. The
50
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text of the law reads: “[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe…shall be acknowledged or recognized
as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”55
As a result, the federal government was able to seize native lands without their consent (which
would have been required if Indians enjoyed legally protected rights as sovereign nations). Legal
scholar William Bradford relates the fate of native peoples in the aftermath of this Congressional
decree:
Scores of tribes, their numbers reduced by war, disease, and starvation, were forced onto
land reservations in the 1870s and 1880s. The surviving three hundred members of the last
belligerents, the Chiricahua Apache, surrendered unconditionally in 1887 after the murder
of three thousand of their number.56

At the same time, as tribes like the Chiricahua were decimated and forced onto reservations,
Indian territory disappeared into the hands of Euro-Americans avid for cheap land. In 1887,
138 million of the 2 billion acres of the US landmass were tribal lands. By 1934, Indian holdings
had declined by 90 million acres in a process that Bradford calls “legal theft.”57 Lemkin was
unquestionably aware of this context of expropriation leading to the destruction of native patterns
of existence as the substance of his three-volume world history ripened in his mind, nor can there
be much doubt that he regarded land cession in North America as genocidal.
We ought not lose sight of the fact that abandonment of the “legal fiction of Indian nationhood,”
while effected by federal law at the center, was driven by civilian-settlers at the periphery. So
long as settlers voted in national elections, they could influence Washington’s policies. This
was certainly the case in the destruction of native peoples in California, where federal troops
reinforced settler militias in their wars against Indian men, women, and children. It was equally
true as a propulsive force behind the Congressional Act of 1871 stripping Indians of their status
as sovereign nations. Passage of the Homestead Act of 1862 (giving 160 acres of public land to
adult US citizens who were heads of households for a nominal fee) could not blunt the ravenous
demands of settlers for more land, which would now come at the Indians’ expense. Settler pressure
eventuated in passage of the 1871 Act and further plunder of native holdings. This history exposes
as an untenable falsehood the 1953 statement of the U.S. solicitor general that genocide “has never
existed in this country” because it was impossible “under our form of government.” As Lemkin
himself understood, genocide not only could happen in the USA, it did happen there, and precisely
because of democratic pressures that induced the federal government and state governments to
bow to the expressed will of the people. In Lemkin’s view by the late 1940s if not before, American
democracy was sometimes genocidal.
Conclusion
Several conclusions follow from the argument of this essay. First, it is clear that Lemkin’s concept
of genocide existed in embryo as early as 1933 and that, while the racist chauvinism expressed
in Mein Kampf and Nazi persecution of German Jews were significant stimuli of it, the essential
features of Lemkin’s idea were not exclusive to Nazism. Second, both Lemkin’s Madrid paper
and chapter 9 of Axis Rule limned a concept of genocide in which the destruction of a group’s
national pattern, rather than the physical killing of its members, was the decisive factor. Third,
when we read these two sources in juxtaposition with Lemkin’s notes for his treatise on the world
history of genocide, his belief that Euro-American treatment of native Americans was genocidal
is manifest. Fourth, the conduct Lemkin identified as evidence of genocide in the notes for his
uncompleted study often involved the actions of civilian-settlers on the frontier, who were able to
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harm native peoples through their own violent attacks or by proxy, such as importuning federal
and state authorities to do their bidding. From this premise, we may infer that Lemkin believed
civilian-settlers committed genocide on the North American frontier.
What was the harm these civilian-settlers did? As legal scholar David Luban argues, and as
Lemkin putatively thought, the harm inflicted by genocide exceeds “the loss of the slaughtered
individuals” but represents “an attack on human group plurality itself.” Genocide is the “crime of
crimes” for a reason: it “diminishes humanity” by robbing it of a group’s “ways of life, imaginative
visions of the good worked out collectively…”58 As Lemkin himself wrote in Axis Rule, “the
destruction of a nation…results in the loss of its future contributions to the world.”59 The victim,
then, is as much the world community as the shattered group itself. Douglas Irvin-Erickson identifies
the legal good Lemkin was striving to defend as “national-cultural diversity” or “people’s ability
to freely exercise their subjectivity.”60 Irvin-Erickson quotes Lemkin’s remark that “world culture
is like a subtle concerto” that “is nourished and gets life from the tone of every instrument.”61 This
conception of the interest at stake in the criminalization of genocide—namely, cultural diversity,
freely expressed subjectivity, the nourishing of world culture through the individual cultures
constituting it—reveals Lemkin as an intellectual scion of the great nineteenth century German
historicists, Herder and (in jurisprudence) Friedrich Karl von Savigny.62 Like them, Lemkin wanted
to protect the distinctive ethos of cultures (the Volksgeist, or “spirit of a people,” as Savigny termed
it), which were singular and irreducible. North American settlers laid under siege this inestimably
precious good.
For genocide scholar Patrick Wolfe, settler colonialism was not inevitably genocidal; it tended
to become so only when the dispossession of native peoples was “in crisis.”63 Whitt and Clarke
suggest, by contrast, that settler colonialism was inherently genocidal.64 So long as Indians occupied
land that settlers coveted, the antagonists tended to move with mounting velocity toward genocidal
outcomes. According to Gray Whaley, on the Oregon and California frontiers the assimilationist
policy of a relatively weak federal authority yielded to a crudely utilitarian folk imperialism, one
marked by an ideology of absolute destruction of native peoples.65 Settlers had arrived at the belief
that genocide was desirable if it served their interests.
A dynamic internal to settler colonialism seems to push it toward genocide. Lemkin
understood—perhaps with an eye on Tolstoy’s dictum (in Anna Karenina) that “every unhappy
family is unhappy in its own way”—that every genocide developed its own constellation of
motives, in which hatred toward the victims might be incidental. “Lemkin’s point,” writes IrvinErickson, “was that often it was the benefits gained through genocide—not primordial hatred—
that led people to support a genocide, to commit a genocide, or even to develop group hatreds
and kill. This, of course, meant that every individual who participated in a genocide did so for a
different reason.”66
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While there is much truth in Lemkin’s assertion, settler violence toward Indians usually
involved the desire for something the Indians possessed: land, resources, game, water, or—much
later, in a sadly neglected episode in this elegiac history—oil. The journalist David Grann has
recently told the story of the serial murder of Osage Indians in 1920s Oklahoma.67 When oil was
discovered beneath their land, the Osage for a time became one of the wealthiest groups in the
world. Their new-found prosperity invited murderous schemes to wrest their property from them.
The story Grann narrates is important; however, it should be set within the wider context of the
fraud, kidnapping, and homicide that befell native peoples in “Indian country” long after the
frontier was closed in 1890.68 According to historian Angie Debo, “forgery, embezzlement, criminal
conspiracy, misuse of notary’s seals, and other crimes against Indian property continued with
monotonous regularity, but these grosser and slightly more dangerous forms of swindling were
not as common as…investing Indian money in worthless real estate, padding guardians’ accounts,
and allowing excessive fees to guardians and attorneys.”69 In the midst of such predation, murder,
too, became a commonplace of modern Indian life. Legal scholar Rennard Strickland has referred
to the use of the law to destroy native lives and cultures as “genocide-by-law,”70 an appellation
with which Lemkin would likely have been in agreement. Debo writes:
Some spectacular crimes occurred, such as the dynamiting of two Negro children as they
slept, in order that the conspirators might secure title to their Glenn Pool [oil] property by
forged deeds; and many sinister stories were told of Indians who died under suspicious
circumstances after bequeathing their property to white men. An epidemic of such deaths
broke out among aged Choctaws…, and the Federal officials became convinced of an
organized plot whereby the Indian made out a will to the land dealers in return for a tendollar monthly pension for the remainder of his life. A suspicious fatality followed the making
of such wills, and in several cases carbolic acid or ground glass was found on the premises.
Several prominent real estate dealers were arrested, but the mystery of the Choctaw murders
was never solved.71

Is it too much to see in this appalling chronicle of human evil the spoor of the frontier settler? I
don’t think so. The mentality of Euro-American settlers coalesced through a good century or more
of interaction with Indians, during which settlers in one generation after another seized Indian
possessions for themselves, often doing so violently and with impunity. This mindset did not
vanish when the frontier closed. Instead, it persisted well into the 20th century in the form of the
ghastly abuses Debo retails.
Lemkin never finished what would likely have been his magnum opus, his three-volume
world history of genocide. He died of a massive heart attack on 42nd Street in New York City
on August 29, 1959, leaving behind only the fragmentary outlines and notecards of his chapter
devoted to genocide on the North American frontier. Six years before Lemkin’s death, another
figure interested in the historical mistreatment of the American Indian (and one who, like Lemkin,
died far too young) penned the words appearing as an epigraph to the present essay. Felix Cohen,
the architect of the “Indian New Deal” of the 1930s and the creator of modern Federal Indian Law
as a disciplinary field, was a fierce advocate of Native American rights. He likened the Indian in
American life to the Jews in Nazi Germany. For Cohen, the Indian was a “miner’s canary” much
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like the German Jew: how each was treated was a measure of a society’s political health.72 The
sickening of the miner’s canary betokened that society’s loss of faith in democracy.
Genocide in North America as Lemkin understood it opens Cohen’s metaphor in a different
direction. Rather than the sign of a flagging commitment to democracy, settler genocide shows
that popular government—government of the people, by the people, and for the people—can be as
repressive of minority groups as authoritarian or totalitarian systems, particularly in societies with
inadequate safeguards for their rights. Gray Whaley’s verdict about civilian genocide in Oregon
applies more generally to Euro-American encounters with native peoples: “The case of Oregon…
suggests that even a system premised on the natural rights of man could foster genocide when ‘the
people’ wield democratic values against those defined as outside the protection of those rights.”73
In a word, settler genocide reveals how illiberal democracy has sometimes been in the past and,
without vigilant legal protections for minority groups, may yet become in the future.
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Accounts of the 1994 Rwandan genocide most often highlight its close-contact massacres as
neighbors attacked neighbors, with less attention given to the reality of sexual violence. Nowrojee1
and Sharlach2 note propaganda which specifically targeted Tutsi women as sexual objects and mass
rape was an integral feature of the genocide. An estimated ninety percent of Tutsi women and
girls who survived the genocide experienced sexual violence by the interahamwe youth militias, by
agents of the state, or by civilians.3 This sexual violence was perpetrated with genocidal intent, as
part of the broader agenda seeking to destroy the Tutsi population.4 Mass rape during the genocide
had lasting effects on survivors, including physical injury, psychological scars, stigma, and socioeconomic marginalization.5
Sexual violence also had a powerful intergenerational effect, as evidenced by the realities and
experiences of children born of conflict-related sexual violence. Estimates reveal between 10,000
and 25,000 children were born of rapes committed during the Rwandan genocide, although these
figures are challenging to establish due to the paucity of systematic data.6 While still a burgeoning
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area of scholarly attention, initial research has shed light on the complex lives and needs of this
group, particularly the discrimination and rejection children born of war and genocide face as
a result of their stigmatized identities and origins.7 However, research has generally examined
the experiences of these two groups - children born of conflict-related sexual violence and their
mothers - in relative isolation. To foster a more holistic exploration, this article addresses the central
research question of how both children born of rape and their mothers grapple with identity and
social belonging in the post-genocide political context of national reconstruction and the outlawing
of ethnic identities. This approach recognizes the significance not only of everyday relationships,
networks, and norms, but also of the broader political context of post-genocide Rwanda in shaping
the lives and social identities of families formed from the sexual violence of the genocide.
This article takes a multi-disciplinary approach that combines perspectives from social
anthropology, social work, and human rights studies. Our aim is not to elucidate a particular
“process” of identity formation, since how people configure who they are and how they belong is
never a singular, coherent, or linear path of change, nor a fait accompli. Rather, by drawing on indepth interviews and focus groups with forty-four Rwandan mothers and sixty youth, our analysis
reveals two key sets of tensions in their experiences of identity, selfhood, and social belonging.
First, at the interpersonal level, while youth often sought to learn about their birth origins and
fathers to better understand themselves and their histories, mothers actively avoided discussing
their past in an effort to disentangle their identities from sexual violence and genocide. Second,
at the level of larger post-genocide politics, both mothers’ and childrens’ identities are caught in
the rigid ethnic politics of the genocide, a view of ethnicity the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-led
government’s project of national unity and reconciliation actively seeks to erase. Youth experiences
show how the identities of their (mostly) Hutu perpetrator fathers continue to be imposed on
them, which challenges their ability to claim the unified “Rwandan” identity central to the RPF’s
narrative of post-genocide recovery. Our analysis ultimately shows the distinction between the
personal level of everyday social life, and the larger politics of post-genocide Rwanda are not easily
distinguished,8 as challenges faced by these families exist at the nexus of the personal and the
national, the individual and the structural.
The article consists of five parts. First, we outline key issues around sexual violence and social
identity in Rwanda and other, similar contexts. Second, we situate our work in the broader politics
of post-genocide reconstruction and, particularly the government erasure of ethnicity in Rwanda.
Third, we present the study’s methodology, emphasizing a socio-ecological approach. Fourth,
we provide extensive extracts from our interviews with both mothers and youth to illustrate the
two central tensions outlined above. Finally, we conclude by discussing both the theoretical and
practical implications of our analysis.
Identity, Belonging and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
Social identity is a central site for understanding the effects of armed conflict on both individuals
and communities,9 because identities are not static, unitary, or merely what people choose for
themselves, but rather emerge relationally through ongoing social interaction.10 Indeed, social
anthropologists argue all selves are configured in some sense through relations with others – this,
children-of-hate/dd942c7b-9287-42cc-8763-bd0675c0b73f/; Jemma Hogwood et al., “‘I Learned Who I Am’: Young
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in spite of the prominence of the Western “folk model” of the bounded, autonomous, discrete
individual that supposes who we are is a product of our own interiority.11 In Rwanda, however, a
relational notion of personhood is a particularly important part of everday, common sense views
of the self, as it is in many African contexts.12 In Rwandan understandings of who people are, selves
are not prior to the relationships into which they enter, but instead are constituted by social networks
and defined by relational roles such as parent/child.13 Taylor14 has highlighted the relational nature
of Rwandan personhood as never complete and continuously built from relations with others,
including kin or exchange partners. As our analysis shows, these Rwandan views of personhood
raise difficult implications for youth interviewees’ selfhood, as their relationships to their (often
unknown) perpetrator-fathers raise obstacles to social belonging for both youth and their mothers.
As our analysis shows, the difficulty is that both knowing and not knowing one’s father raise their
own problems for these youth, and neither is conclusively preferable.
There are a wide range of potential psychological, social, cultural, political, and economic
costs for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence,15 which can interact in complex ways to
challenge and undermine their well-being, self-identity, and sense of belonging. Women survivors
of conflict-related sexual violence experience profound hardships, including experiences of
disequilibrium that may prompt a crisis of self-identity.16 Moreover, in Rwanda and elsewhere,
women who are raped often experience a drastic reduction in their societal value and status within
their communities. As part of normative cultural traditions, especially where value is ascribed
to women’s sexual “virtue,” this can negatively impact marriage suitability of women who have
been raped.17 Consequentially, social stigma may hinder women’s ability to access arable land
and income-generating activities typically acquired through marriage, thereby undermining their
livelihood opportunities.18 Furthermore, for girls, loss of virginity through rape may challenge a
potent rite of passage for group membership and womanhood.19 Thus, as is the intended effect of
conflict-related sexual violence, experiences of wartime and/or genocidal rape can fundamentally
challenge victims’ statuses and roles as community members and can significantly affect mothers’
relations with their children born of rape.20
Research on conflict-related sexual violence in multiple cultural contexts has demonstrated
rape may not only rupture mothers’ sense of selfhood, it also profoundly affects the ethnic and
11
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social identities of their offspring. In contexts of ethnic conflict, the stigma of rape may be passed
down to children who symbolically bear the mark of both “illegitimacy” and the “enemy” through
biological association with their perpetrator fathers.21 The paternal heritage of children born of
conflict-related sexual violence is a potent marker of their identities, one that can endure across
their life span.22 Seto notes in her discussion of children born of wartime rape in contexts around the
world that, despite their blamelessness in the circumstances under which they were born, youths’
ascribed identities are representative of an “enemy,” ultimately rendering them “highly politicized
subjects.”23 These imposed, stigmatizing identities carry lasting consequences with negative social
and practical implications, including children’s exclusion from key social institutions and resources
such as marriage, social and familial networks, and access to school, employment, or inheritance.24
Scholars have also demonstrated that these children’s birth origins significantly affect their sense
of self.25 For Rwandan children born of conflict-related sexual violence, their selfhood is riddled
with tension and contestation, since the relations between parents and children that constitute
personhood are, in their case, infused with a violent past. As a result, youths’ experiences of
their relational identities with respect to their mothers, siblings, wider communities, and their
(usually absent) fathers are inherently ambivalent.26 Even when children do not know their fathers’
identities or the truth about their origins, a lack of knowledge of their roots is itself a serious barrier
to belonging in their communities.27 Not knowing their paternal roots “erase[s] half of the child’s
identity,” since key relations constitutive of their personhood are unknown, which can also exclude
them from paternal inheritance.28 However, discovering the truth surrounding their conception is
by no means strictly positive, since research in multiple contexts has shown affected youth have
reported they “no longer felt the same” or feel split between their “old life” prior to their discovery
and their “new life” after learning their birth origins.29
In sum, youths’ and mothers’ stigmatized identities have real implications. The culture of
silence and stigma produces the perception that youths’ very existence is taboo. However, it
is not just at the level of interpersonal relationships that families formed from sexual violence
find themselves entangled in the contradictions of the genocide’s legacies, but also at the level of
national politics and reconciliation initiatives.
Ethnicity, Past and Present in Rwanda
In post-genocide Rwanda, the tensions between mothers’ and youths’ selfhood are shaped by
a larger set of politics, namely, the intersections of the ethnic politics of the genocide with the
RPF’s current policies of reconciliation and de-ethnicization. Youth and mothers find themselves
at the nexus of this difficult and complex history. In the Rwandan context, politics have always
been infused with the question of ethnic difference because ethnicity – or its erasure – has long
been at the center of debates about modern nationhood and who the rightful leaders of Rwanda
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are, whether the traditional Tutsi elite or the Hutu majority.30 When Belgian colonists established
rigid patrilineal descent rules and identity cards in the 1930s that governed what ethnic category
a person belonged to, sharp new inequalities emerged between Tutsi and Hutu, particularly
unequal access to education and high-ranking posts in the colonial governance apparatus, which
up until independence, were by and large reserved for the sons of the Tutsi elite.31 It was these
ethnic inequalities that were infamously invoked in the anti-Tutsi propaganda of the early 1990s
in the campaign to mobilize the Hutu population in support of the government that eventually
perpetrated the genocide.
In the aftermath of the genocide, the RPF outlawed ethnic self-identification, removed ethnicity
from national identity cards, and proclaimed all citizens should unite under a single national
Rwandan identity.32The controversies around the government’s program of de-ethnicization, unity,
and reconciliation, and its political agendas are well established in the critical literature,33 so we
do not review them all here. What is crucial is that the lives of mothers who were raped and their
children support a key finding of the post-genocide scholarship, namely how ethnic difference
persists and continues to shape the post-genocide period in spite of RPF reconciliation policies.34 As
such, mothers who were raped during the genocide and the children they bore find themselves at
an awkward juncture. These families remain symbols of the ethnic politics of the genocide, because
they are products of systematic rapes by (mostly) Hutu men that targeted Tutsi and “moderate”
Hutu women. As our data shows, youth and their mothers continue to have these ethnic labels (or
ethnically-marked monikers, like “child of the interahamwe”) imposed on them in a moment when
they are no longer politically acceptable. Thus, even as many Rwandans recognize de-ethnicization
policies as problematic, that does not mean youth and mothers might not simultaneously value
them for reasons beyond compliance with state policy.35 For example, de-ethnicization might
favour mothers’ generalized resistance to speaking about the past. Likewise, even as many youth
sought the facts of their birth origins, they may also value the state erasure of ethnicity for the
freedom from their “Hutu paternity” it promises.36 As we argue, and our interviews show, the
selfhood of these children and their mothers are sites in which national politics and interpersonal
strife intersect, in often contradictory ways that raise complex tensions around identity and social
belonging.
Methodology
This qualitative research project, funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada and led by Myriam Denov, explored the lived realities of children born of genocidal rape
and mothers who gave birth to them. The study sought to examine the post-genocide perspectives
and experiences of these mothers and children, alongside the relationships between these two
groups of participants.
The study drew upon a socio-ecological methodological framework,37 an approach used in social
work and psychology that seeks to capture relational networks and realities shaping participants’
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lives. This framework underscores that people’s lives are characterized by overlapping spheres
of family, community, society, nation, and state that are difficult to disentangle, and therefore
cannot be considered in isolation. In line with this socio-ecological approach and to ensure that
community perspectives were incorporated in the research design, the research team organized
in-depth community consultations prior to beginning data collection in the three districts of
Rwanda where the research was to be carried out. The consultations sought to engage a broad
scope of family and community members who hold experiential and/or expert knowledge on the
issue of children born of the genocide and their mothers, including youth born of the genocide,
mothers who were rape survivors, extended family members of youth and mothers, religious/
community leaders and organizations, elders, and organizations working on transitional justice,
women’s rights, and children’s rights issues. These participants took part in small and large group
discussions to offer their perspectives on relevant research questions, research design, appropriate
methods, and approaches to undertake during the course of the research. The consultations were
held with a total of sixty-seven people: twenty-seven in Region 1; eighteen in Region 2; and twentytwo in Region 3. The consultations provided vital guidance to the research team and ensured the
study explored what these community members felt was most important in relation to the topic.
This included a focus on 1) identity; 2) stigma, belonging, and social exclusion; 3) family structure
and support; 4) the development of appropriate psycho-social interventions; and 5) long-term
community reintegration.
Following the community consultations, in-depth interviews were conducted between June
and August 2016 with forty-four mothers of children born of genocide rape, and sixty youth
(twenty-nine females and thirty-one males). Mother participants were aged between thirty-three
and fifty-two. At the time of interviews, youth participants were either twenty or twenty-one years
old, with the exception of one participant, who was nineteen.38 In addition to interviews, youth
participants took part in a focus group. A total of seven focus group discussions were held with
eight youth participants in each group.39 While interview questions aimed to better understand the
life story of each participant, focus group questions were centered around the collective challenges
and needs, sources of support, and the rights of youth born of genocidal rape. Interviews and
focus groups were audio-recorded with participants’ permission. Local researchers conducted
interviews in Kinyarwanda, while Canadian researchers used English with simultaneous EnglishKinyarwanda translation.
A snowball sampling procedure was used to recruit mother and youth participants. Participants
resided in one of three regions of the country, which were selected by the research team in order
to explore the similarities and differences of youth and mothers in both rural and urban settings.
To protect the identities of participants, they are only referred to in categorical terms, e.g. “mother
participant,” or “youth participant, male.” Interview and focus group audio files were translated
and transcribed from Kinyarwanda to English. A grounded theory approach to data analysis was
employed, whereby through careful reading and coding of transcripts, the researchers identified
key themes that emerged from the data.40 An ongoing discussion of emerging themes by the
research team was part of the data analysis process.
This study received approval from two research ethics boards: the first from the Rwandan
National Ethics Committee, and the second from the Research Ethics Board of McGill University.
Given the profound ethical implications of interviews and participant disclosures, as a selection
criterion, youth respondents were required to have already been aware they had been born of
genocidal rape prior to participating in the research, although the depth of information they had
around their origins and histories varied. Since participants were being asked questions about
their lives that had the potential to both revive traumatic memories and cause significant distress,
psychosocial support structures were established in advance, in the event a participant should
become distressed and require a referral. With participants’ permission, researchers followed up
post-interview on an ongoing basis to check on and support participants’ wellbeing. To ensure
support beyond standard ethical protocols, our research team offered monthly group counseling
sessions for youth participants following their participation in the study. Led by a local Rwandan
psychologist who was part of the research team, the group counseling was free of charge and
available to all youth participants for eight months following data collection. Mothers were also
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invited to contact the psychologist following their interviews for additional support.
Youth Identities: Seeking to Explore the Past
In this section, through the voices of our youth participants, we explore key themes related to
their ambivalent experiences of identity. These include: 1) stigma, discrimination, and exclusion;
2) quests for the facts of their birth; 3) silence, shame, and avoidance; and 4) belonging and
recognition. In examining youths’ experiences, we show how their identities are inextricably linked
with their fathers, the violent past, and politically-charged ethnic labels. We highlight how youth
participants’ identities appear to be deeply entangled within two vexing relational tensions, which,
as the socio-ecological approach suggests, are difficult to fully separate.41 First, at the interpersonal
level, youths’ desire to explore the past is largely in conflict with their mothers’ efforts to silence
the past, further exacerbating tensions within the family. Second, at the level of the nation, children
born of genocidal rape find themselves in a difficult relationship to the national genocide narrative
that compels people to “coexist” in a reconciled society where ethnicity does not exist, even as their
identities remain enveloped by ethnic identity politics.
Stigma, Discrimination, and Exclusion
All youth participants reported multiple experiences of stigma, discrimination and/or exclusion
based on their connections to their perpetrator fathers. For example, labels assigned to these youth
included “child/son/daughter of a killer,” and other links with the interahamwe youth militias. These
labels directly or implicitly linked youth participants with the violent acts their fathers perpetrated
against their communities during the genocide. This often translated into youth “inheriting” the
blame and being perceived as if they were their fathers. Youths’ experiences and perspectives
underscored how, through daily interactions, their identities as children born of conflict-related
sexual violence challenged their ability to belong not only within their communities, but also
within their own families:
If your dad killed people during the genocide and your dad is not here, people are seeing you as if you
are him. You may find the people you interact with…are the one that your dad killed their families…
(Focus group participant)
The part that hurts me the most is being called a son of a killer… they do, like calling me a child of a
killer. (Youth participant, male)
One day when I was with other children who are neighbours, one child called me “interahamwe”.
What I knew was that interahamwe were killers during genocide against Tutsi. So, I went home and
told my mother about what happened to me. Instead of talking, she cried a lot. (Youth Participant,
female)
It wouldn’t even be your mother’s family only [that is rejecting you] but your father’s family too. You
feel like you belong nowhere. (Focus group participant)

The quotations above also highlight how children’s identities in their families and communities
are deeply embedded within and connected to their perpetrator fathers, and with them, the ethnic
divisions of the past. Furthermore, some youth revealed even their mothers were instigators of
stigma and discrimination. As youth already felt ostracized by their wider communities, stigma
and rejection by their own mothers was particularly distressing:
I was four years old when my young brother was born. Then my mom was calling me a bastard. Then
I was growing in that situation and was feeling not loved. (Youth participant, male)
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[My mother] does not love me, she is even calling me “interahamwe”…. Here I was sad, because
life was very difficult. During this period I realized that I don’t have a father, I was harassed by my
relatives. (Youth participant, male)

For many, the effects of marginalization as a result of their birth origins meant facing decreased
opportunities for education and economic support, lack of care and affection, and in many cases,
physical abuse. Participants linked physical abuse directly to their birth origins as children born of
genocidal rape and/or their perpetrator fathers:
My stepfather was beating me, hurting me and calling me a bastard as well. He was even telling me
to go to see my dad. (Youth participant, male)
Here, it is when I used to be beaten by my aunt. And when I was fifteen years old I asked my mum
about my father and she was angry with me. [Crying] Here they used to ask me to do all the housework
and to stay at home. I could not go to play with other children. In that case I was beaten. (Youth
participant, female)

Youth participants thus bore the ethnic identities of their perpetrator fathers that are linked
to a stigmatized “enemy other.” These youth’s “inherited” Hutu identities were particularly
politicized in the context of Rwanda’s post-genocide de-ethnicization policy under which ethnic
labels are equated with a divisive genocide ideology. This fraught politics of ethnicity ultimately
challenged their sense of belonging in the current political moment characterized by a “Rwandan”
nation:
I want them to treat me as Rwandese without asking me if I am a Hutu or a Tutsi. (Youth participant,
male)

These imposed ethnic labels further complicated participants’ identities and challenged their
ability to understand and accept themselves:
Here we lived at [place] and I remember that I was in secondary school and it is when I heard many
bad things like I was Hutu…. I was confused they were saying that my mother has children who are
Tutsis and others who are Hutus and I didn’t know what was that. And it was hard to accept myself, I
had a complex, I started feeling ashamed between others. And hearing people saying that my father is
Hutu, he killed people in the 1994 genocide…that was hard. (Youth participant, female)

Quests for the Facts of their Births
For many youth participants, stigmatization, differential treatment, and exclusion within the
family and community triggered a desire for a deeper investigation into their origins. Differential
treatment within the family, especially among siblings, alongside a lack of knowledge about their
origins, made participants feel “different” and prompted questioning of their identities:
My half siblings are light skinned, as you see I am black skinned and I had neighbors that were always
talking about how I was not their brother because we don’t look alike, some were saying that they took
me in an orphanage, others that they took me from the street and when I heard that I started being
curious of my origins and my mother told me. (Youth participant, male)
I asked them the reason why my father (…..) people from my father’s side never visit us. Then they
told me they said they can’t come to our house because we are not the same. We don’t belong to
the same ethnic group. Because my father raped my mother in 1994. And soon afterwards she died.
Because I needed to know my family from my father’s side, I went to ask them and then they told me
I am not related to them. They asked me to leave - to go to my home. (Youth participant, female)
I am always asking my mom why she didn’t want to be with us while she has got other children that
she is raising as a caring mom, but not us. I am always wondering why she doesn’t want to tell us who
is our father, nor even raising us as her own children. (Youth participant, male)
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We also have difficult to accept [sic] ourselves because we don’t know our origins. We don’t know our
fathers and their families. So it becomes a problem for us. (Focus group participant)
Yes, our mum treats us [siblings] differently. She is caring [with] them. At home, she wants me to
do heavy activities, even to cultivate our land. They are fifteen and twelve years old respectively. My
mother seems to be unhappy with me. (Youth participant, female)

For youth participants, lack of knowledge and/or connection with their paternal origins was a
potent missing piece in their relational selfhood42 that posed an obstacle to feeling they belonged
in their social worlds. These questions about their origins often resulted in youth participants
embarking on what they referred to as a “quest for the truth” at some point in their lives. Youth
spoke about questioning the circumstances surrounding their conception, the identity of their
fathers, extended family members, and their family’s genocide experiences. For most participants,
discovery of the truth was a pivotal moment in their lives that both provided sought-after answers
and raised new complications in their sense of themselves. As these participants explained:
I really wish to know my dad’s history. It is sad at our age to say that we don’t know anything about
our father … Our wish is to know him, his history, we would be happy. As of now… we don’t know
his family, we don’t know anything about him which is not normal. (Youth participant, male)
Before I knew the way in which I was born, I did not have any problem. When I learnt about my story,
I felt a lot of change inside, and I realised the reason why my mother was always angry with me, using
harsh words against me for any small mistake, especially during memorial period. Now I understand
her reactions. She suffered a lot during genocide against Tutsi. I have accepted it since I know the
truth. (Youth participant, female)
The best thing that makes me happy is to live with my mom. The worst is to live without any
information about my father. (Youth participant, male)

In line with the socio-ecological perspective, youth interviews suggested discussions around
their birth origins and paternal roots were extremely important for a participant’s conception of
self, their relational identities, building the mother-child relationship, and most importantly, for
accepting themselves:
We don’t know anything about our father, yet we have someone who knows and who shall tell us the
truth but does not want to do so… Yet if our mother told us the truth, we could accept our situation.
(Youth participant, male)
For me it is a problem to live without knowing your father – especially when he is alive. (Youth
participant, female)
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These youths’ perspectives speak to how, in the Rwandan context, one cannot “be someone”
without knowing how they are enmeshed in relations with others.43 Indeed, people are thought
to “produce each other,” through exchange, sharing substances like food and drink, and the
transmission of “parts” of parents into their children.44 However, as these youth explain, they
struggle to know where they fit in their social worlds when they do not know their fathers, while
at the same time, revelations of those details can present challenges of their own through stigma
and marginalization.
Silence, Shame and Avoidance
As a result of the deeply entrenched stigma attached to their birth origins, many youths reported
how discussions with their mothers and extended families on their birth origins were taboo and
surrounded by silence. Their mothers, who sought to avoid speaking about painful pasts, often
met their quests for the truth with silence and discomfort:
When I was young, I was living with my mother and I used to ask her why I don’t see my father in our
home. She did not tell me anything, instead she was avoiding it… On my side, when I was young, she
used to hide [any information about] my history. She was telling me that my dad died. But later she
told me the truth on how she was raped and how I was born. (Youth participant, male)
As long as she doesn’t want to talk about our Dad, I mean who he was, how he died, it’s not going
to work with us… I don’t know my biological father. I heard that he died during the genocide but to
be honest what affects me the most is that my mom doesn’t want to tell me who is my father … I am
always wondering why she doesn’t want to tell us who our father is, nor even raising me as her own
child. (Youth participant, male)

Several youths reported their mothers were still too negatively affected by the past to discuss
it, with some mothers expressing they did not want to “go back in time” to such a traumatic period
of their past:
When I came back from [place] I didn’t sleep the whole night I was crying. In the morning I asked
my mother for a pen and she told me that she doesn’t have a pen but you can see clearly that she
didn’t want to talk to me. I went to school, coming back to school I didn’t go home I went to my
grandmother’s house. I woke up the next morning and I went back home. After a week, I asked my
mother to tell me what really happened and she told me to stop making her go back in time. She cried.
So from that day, I decided to stop asking about it. (Youth participant, female)
There’s a lot I want to ask her [mother] but when I try to ask her, she acts as if she does not want me
to ask her about it….I think that when I ask her about it, the whole past story comes back into her life
and it really disturbs her a lot. (Youth participant, male)
I asked that question [about my father’s origins] to my mother and she seems to avoid to go into
details. She told me that what she knows is that he raped her and this affected her. I also asked my
aunt who is not living with us and she told that my father is known and is there [alive]. (Youth
participant, female)

For some youth participants, hearing the truth from their mothers rather than through gossip,
insults, or discrimination was vital. Youth participants often expressed that not receiving “an
adequate answer” from their mothers troubled their own sense of self, and it was also a strain on
the mother-child relationship:
Another thing is a bad relationship with you and your mother because of the things she has been
through and how she doesn’t want to talk about it and you, you are curious to know what happened,
so you are getting mad at each other. (Focus group participant)
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She [mother] has never taken time to tell me about my story. Instead, I was told this by other people
from our family…Maybe she is still affected, but also, on my side it affects me by the fact that I am
living without knowing the truth from my mother. But I hear people talking about my story, so it is a
problem. (Youth participant, female)
It was important because I wanted to know the truth from her not from other people. (Youth
participant, male)

Several youths explained how lacking information on their paternal ancestry negatively
affected their overall sense of wellbeing. For some, the silence about their origins and histories
instigated what participants often referred to as a “complex” riddled with uncertainty regarding
who they were and where they belonged:
The other thing is to always hear others talking about their dads but you don’t even know who is your
real father, it is painful. (Focus group participant)
There is a problem of feeling isolated, feeling not accepted in family as other children. (Focus group
participant)

However, in balancing their needs and their desire to protect their mothers, some youth
described how they eventually stopped asking their mothers for answers because of their strong
emotional reactions:
Every time I have tried to ask her [about my origins], she was always angry with me, so I decided to
leave it because it is like she is traumatized (Youth participant, male)
She [mother] has sacrificed her life for me, she has been a good mother for me, when everyone abandoned
her for me, she didn’t left [sic] me, she continued to love me unconditionally…She treats me good as
her child, her sister and as her best friend because we talk about everything, the only thing she doesn’t
want to tell me it is her genocide problems but I think it is because she feels ashamed for that. (Youth
Participant, female)
We didn’t talk about many things [about my origins] because I saw that she was crying too much, and
I stopped asking her questions. (Youth participant, male)

Youth Belonging and Recognition
In terms of the socio-ecological linkages between identity and larger national politics, interviews
revealed being granted official recognition as victims of the genocide was crucial for youth
participants’ sense of belonging. In an effort to usher in transitional justice, reconciliation,
and recovery in post-genocide Rwanda, the government initiated a development program to
compensate survivors of the genocide for the destruction of life, property, and livelihoods.45 This
program included The Genocide Survivors Assistance Fund/Fonds d’Assistance pour Rescapés
du Génocide (FARG), established in 1998 to provide financial assistance to Tutsi survivors of the
genocide committed from October 1st 1990 until December 31st 1994. While this fund helped to
support women survivors of rape committed during the genocide, it did not include their children
born from such rapes. Youth participants in this research project overwhelmingly called for an
official acknowledgement by the Rwandan government as a group in Rwandan society whose
origins are inextricably linked to the genocide. Many described how they believed their current
life situation was a direct result of the genocide, circumstances that made their lives “different”
from those of other young people. In other words, while young people recognized they were not
“survivors” of the genocide according to the RPF’s criteria, many considered themselves “victims”
45
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of genocide crimes perpetrated against their mothers and families:
Why can’t people understand that we are victims? Youth [who currently receive support from
the government, e.g. genocide survivors]…have opportunities because they are recognized by the
government. (Focus group participant)

Official acknowledgement of their identities and the realities they face, according to the youth,
could not only foster belonging, but also counter stigma/discrimination, and help them access
supportive resources:
We [youth born of the genocide] need to have all the rights that other children have. We need to know
each other because we have the same problems. We need to be united, to understand each other. We
also need to write our history. (Youth participant, female)
First of all, [our community and government] should see us as capable, and give us the same
opportunities provided to other children. FARG does not recognize us, whereas it pays school fees for
genocide survivors’ children. So children of my case don’t have the same opportunities as the ones
provided to the beneficiaries of FARG, like being offered scholarships. (Youth participant, female)

Mothers’ Identity Construction: “Don’t Make Me Go Back in Time”
Two central themes emerged from interviews with mothers who bore children from genocidal
rape. First, mothers sought strategies to avoid reflecting on the past because doing so made them
think of the lives and relationships they might have had with their children had they not been born
of rape. Second, and related, mothers had to contend with the stigma of their rape victim status and
the difficulty of explaining to their children the fraught kinship relationships that they shared. All
quotations in this section come from mother participants.
Mother’s Experiences of Sexual Violence: A Painful Past
Mothers in this study experienced brutal forms of sexual violence, torture, and abuse during the
genocide. Indeed, research has uncovered the devastating consequences for women who endured
sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide and gave birth to children.46 Understanding what
these women experienced and endured during the genocide enables an appreciation of why they
sought to disentangle their identities from their painful pasts:
We were a group of ten girls who were raped and I was the only one who got pregnant. Three days
after being raped, we were saved by “inkotanyi” [the Rwandan Patriotic Front forces]. All the girls we
were together, they did their studies and they are now working. When I see them, I hide myself. When
I think that I was a brilliant student, I feel so sad and lose morale.
I was raped during genocide and I got pregnant. I did not even know if I would be killed like my
relatives, but I survived. I accepted my pregnancy and gave birth to her and raised her… (crying) I
gave birth when I was alone. I raised her alone. Nobody helped me.

Mothers reported one of the most frequent tensions in the mother-child relationship was
the fact the child reminded mothers of their experiences of sexual violence and loss during the
genocide. Many mothers described how their child provoked memories of the perpetrator and
sexual violence, or the loss of their family members, which were all great sources of emotional pain

46

Woolner et al., I Asked Myself; Myriam Denov and Antonio Piolanti, “Mothers of Children Born of Genocidal Rape in
Rwanda: Implications for Mental Health, Well-Being and Psycho-social Support Interventions,” Health Care for Women
International (2019), 1-16, accessed October 2019, doi.org/10.1080/07399332.2019.1571593; Mukamana and Brysiewicz,
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Protecting Children of Sexual Violence Survivors in Conflict zones, ed. Charli Carpenter (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press,
2007), 40-52.

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1663

Denov, Eramian and Shevell

52

and stress. Their perspectives raise the difficult implications of Rwandan relational configurations
of the person in the post-genocide period, as mothers saw in their children the men who victimized
them in 1994:
And the hardest part was that the person who raped me, killed my grandfather. So every day I
remember that, and it is very painful. And when I see my daughter I see her father in her, even if we
are laughing, I can just stop laughing because of that. There are things that you can forget but those
are things that you live with and forgetting them is not easy…I am married but my husband doesn’t
accept her. So sometimes I think that it is her fault, the things that happened to me.
When I was seeing her [daughter], the situation I passed through during genocide was immediately
coming in my mind. I was seeing the man who raped me when I was 15. Nothing was making me love
her at that time… As I said, her presence was reminding me of the horrible situation I was living in
during genocide. Yet I was also a child who was in need of care. Also, I was poor while raising her.
When I was pregnant I was even advised to abort, but I did not do it. Now I try to tolerate her because
I pray.

In relation to the larger post-genocide national reconstruction efforts, mothers reported
particular distress during Rwanda’s annual genocide commemoration period when they are
compelled to recall the difficult past:
I don’t suffer anything unusual. I feel traumatized somehow when we are in memorial period.
I’m always having a headache; I never put braids or long hair. Some people carry things on their head
but me I can’t. I also have emotional problems. Sometimes I can spend the whole night thinking about
life, it actually happens during April of each year, sometimes I wake up in a very bad mood.

Mothers’ Stigma, Silence & Avoidance of the Past
Similar to youth participants, mothers’ interviews elicit how their stigmatized status of rape victim
produced profound challenges around their selfhood and social belonging in the post-genocide
period. Interviews revealed mothers experienced stigma because of having been raped as well as
having borne and raised a “child of the interahawme.” Many mothers reported this stigma was still
present at the time the interviews were conducted:
People started rumors against me that I am prostitute, that this is why I am not getting married. I
was too sad.
I feel like being raped by the killers is the worst thing which took away my dignity…I feel like nobody
sees me as a human being.
My mother, the neighbours, they were always talking about how I gave birth to a child of a killer. And
that made me so ashamed, I didn’t want to go outside.
My life was not easy, even my own family rejected me. It was too hard to see how all the families were
rejecting my son. My own family was saying that my son is from killers, while [my son’s] family
hated me, because I accused them of being killers. All the families were telling me to abandon my son.

In contrast to many children’s desire to know their pasts, histories and origins, mother
participants actively sought to avoid speaking about the past. This was apparent in mothers evading
disclosure of their children’s birth origins and paternal roots. Most mothers highlighted the moment
in which their child became inquisitive about their birth origins as particularly distressing. During
these discussions, which were mostly initiated by their children, mothers not only faced difficult
memories, but were also challenged to have conversations that had the potential to completely alter
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their relationship. While mothers reported many different reasons for not telling their children
the facts of their birth origins, many believed that having such a discussion would ultimately be
hurtful to their child and to the mother-child relationship:
It’s a sensitive issue to raise…he can’t bear it. He can’t accept it… He does not need it [to know his
origins]. He uses my father’s name as his father.
He already hates the people who killed others. I thought if he knew that his father was among the
killers, it may affect him.
I waited until she was grown up [to tell her]. Because I did not want her to be affected.
[What makes it hard to tell him?] I fear he may ask me many questions like “how can you not know
my father?” And he may think I am a bad mom. And he doesn’t ask me [about it].

In the preceding quotations, mothers express they are compelled to keep silent about their
children’s birth orgins not just because of potential difficulties at the interpersonal level, but also at
the levels of community and the politics of reconciliation. As such, several mothers also revealed
they lacked the courage to tell their children directly about their origins:
[Do you feel you can tell him the truth?] I am not able to do it.
No, it is not possible, I don’t have the courage [to tell my son]…I pray a lot for that but I am not sure
I will be able to do it…

Discussion: Tensions in Identity in Post-Genocide Rwanda
Two central and interrelated tensions emerge from the interview findings, ones that elucidate how
legacies of genocide find expression at multiple levels.47 First, mothers and youth found themselves
in a fraught relationship to the past and to each other. While youth often sought information about
their fathers, mothers resisted speaking about the past. Echoing previous research on mothers
who gave birth to children born of conflict-related sexual violence,48 our research found mothers
experienced profound forms of stigma, violence, marginalization, and shame. The stigma of having
been victims of genocidal rape was compounded by the perceived identity of their children as
belonging to the interahamwe.49 In the Rwandan context, the consequences for families formed from
this sexual violence are especially severe, as perpetrators were often neighbours of their victims
and thus continue to be a difficult presence (yet also absence) in the lives of mothers and youth. As
a result, many mothers believed withholding information from their children on their experiences
of sexual violence and their child’s birth origins could shield them from family and community
stigma.
Youth born of genocidal rape and their mothers shared experiences of stigma and
marginalization from family and community members, but differed in that for youth, stigma was
47
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linked to their ethnic birth origins whereas for mothers it was linked to their status as victims
of sexual violence. Youth reported struggling to belong in a context where they were often
intrinsically linked to their perpetrator fathers, and often regarded as ethnically Hutu. Youth
sought to understand their mothers’ experiences during the genocide, and their own birth origins,
however painful and uncomfortable. These quests for the truth about their origins, their fathers, and
their histories are entangled in core tensions in post-genocide Rwanda around past and present,
disclosure and silence, family and politics. Knowing what happened to their mothers during the
genocide and knowing the identities of their perpetrator-fathers was imperative for youth in trying
to understand who they are and how they belong. The trouble, of course, is that their perpetrator
fathers are precisely the source of their stigma and rejection, and so, both knowing and not knowing
their fathers posed obstacles for youths’ identity and belonging in their social worlds.50
Second, mothers and youth are reluctant symbols of the violent past and the ethnic politics
of the genocide. At the level of national politics, scholars have shown how ethnicity continues to
matter against state policies of de-ethnicization.51 Ethnic distinctions were unwelcome impositions
on youth participants, who had grown up in post-genocide Rwanda where ethnic labels are
outlawed. In the context of the RPF’s attempts to “re-educate” Rwandans on their history through
local sensibilisation meetings, the ingando solidarity camps,52 formal education in schools, and
reconciliation workshops, people know the importance of adhering to the RPF’s official line on
ethnicity as a colonial invention that all “good Rwandans” must eschew in the post-genocide period.
As such, when others saddle these youth with inherited paternal ethnic identities, the youth are
caught in a subject position that puts them at odds with the state narrative which says all citizens
are Rwandans, not Tutsi or Hutu. What the experiences of these mothers and youth lay bare is how
the legacy of the genocide “catches” these families in old ethnic politics and sometimes imposes
Hutu and Tutsi or other ethnically marked distinctions (e.g. “child of interahamwe”) on them.
Indeed, interviewees sometimes invoked Tutsi or Hutu labels in describing their experiences – a
language largely taboo in “post-ethnic” Rwanda – but they nonetheless relied on to communicate
their hardships. While the government’s unity campaign has been heavily critiqued as a mode
of silencing political dissent and legitimating RPF rule,53 it nonetheless produces the narrative of
ethnicity Rwandans must adhere to in order to have a place in the larger story of post-genocide
nation-building and by extension, to claim to be modern citizens for whom “parochial” matters
like ethnicity no longer matter.54 As such, the ongoing significance of inherited ethnic identities for
families formed of sexual violence means they struggle to belong not just at the level of kinship and
community, but also at the level of the national politics of reconstruction. Youth struggle with the
Hutu ethnic identifiers they inherited from their fathers and that make them politicized subjects
in their social worlds. And while there is no question many Rwandans resist the RPF’s politics of
reconciliation,55 the lives of these youth and their mothers highlight that participants are not only
compelled to navigate an imposed political project, like national de-ethnicization, but are, in many
ways, excluded from it.
A further complication of youths’ latent Hutu identities in the post-genocide period is that they
are not officially considered “victims of the genocide” according to FARG’s criteria for financial
assistance. Not only were they born after 1994, but their patrilineal heritage is typically Hutu,
not Tutsi, both of which exclude them from survivor status. The state approach to victimhood
thus focuses exclusively on direct victims (i.e., those Tutsi who suffered directly from human rights
violations), rather than the multifaceted implications of histories of violence that produce indirect
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victims (i.e., those who suffer human rights violations as a result of their link with a direct victim).56
Moreover, children born of the genocide often experience forms of physical violence directly as
a result of their birth origins and relations with their perpetrator fathers.57 Beyond the material
consequences of not receiving financial support, the exclusion of children born of genocidal rape
from FARG funding not only renders their challenges invisible and leaves their voices unheard,
but also serves to perpetuate narratives of restricted victimhood at the state level.
Conclusion
As we argue, and as our interviews show, national politics and interpersonal strife intersect
in the lives of Rwandan youth born of conflict-related sexual violence and their mothers, in often
paradoxical ways that raise complex problems of identity and belonging in their social worlds.
Both in Rwanda and elsewhere, identity and selfhood are formed through social relations with
others.58 What this means is that people can never simply choose for themselves who they are and
how they belong, as statuses and their accompanying roles are social rather than a mere product of
individual choice. However, the post-conflict situation of contemporary Rwanda puts this problem
into particularly sharp focus. Even as ascribed statuses are by definition not chosen, that does not
mean people cannot still desire greater autonomy in formulating their identities, as is the case when
Rwandan mothers struggle against the stigmatized identities the sexual violence of the genocide
imposed on them. The difficult position of mother and child-victims of sexual violence during
the genocide continues to “catch” them in the politics of the past; “inherited” ethnicity continues
to matter in their lives in ways that are difficult to overlook, even as it is deeply impolitic in the
context of the RPF’s de-ethnicitization campaign.
From an analytical perspective, what the lives of these mothers and children tell us about postgenocide Rwanda is that neither inclusion in nor exclusion from an imposed national project of unity
building is conclusively preferable. Post-genocide reconciliation politics are highly constrained,
and yet, being a part of them is the only way to “become someone” in the story of Rwanda’s
rebirth and reconstruction.59 In this way, persons and politics are deeply infused with each other
in ways that might be both enabling, as RPF unity-building policies align with mothers’ resistance
to talking about the past, and constraining, as those same politics entangle families in an outdated
view of ethnicity as an inherited property of the self and make them symbolic of the violent past.
Mothers’ and youths’ often-incompatible responses to the violent past, ethnicity, and personhood
raise important questions about the relationship between everyday social relationships and
national post-conflict reconstruction projects. Indeed, the lives of Rwandan families formed from
sexual violence show how difficult it is to parse out the level of the everyday from that of national
politics, and it is the intricate linkages between kinship, community, politics, and social structure
that render the question of what it means to have endured the violence of the 1994 genocide so
complicated.
Finally, from a practice-oriented perspective, our findings may provide important insights,
both for interventions in the lives of our research participants and for mothers and youth in
other cases of conflict-related sexual violence. Scholars have emphasized that children born of
such violence have been largely invisible in the development of national and international
policies, with some governments actively repressing reports of the phenomenon in their post-war
societies.60 For the most part, policy and protection efforts have centered on women as the victims/
survivors of sexual violence and not their children born of sexual violence. This focus has often
been implemented with the assumption that the benefits of programs designed for women will
inevitably trickle down to their children.61 However, other researchers and advocates have argued
Myriam Denov and Sarah Kahn, “’They Should See Us as a Symbol of Reconciliation:’ Youth Born of Genocidal Rape in
Rwanda and the Implications for Transitional Justice,” Journal of Human Rights Practice 11, no.1 (2019).
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that neglecting the specific dimensions of these children’s vulnerabilities may result in further
marginalization and discriminatory treatment.62 As such, effective policies and programming
would need to both grapple with, and address, the significant tensions and challenges found in
this study, particularly, the reality of mothers wanting to embrace silence in relation to the past,
and in turn, children wanting to explore the past and the identities of their fathers. Post-conflict
service provision and programming would thus benefit from adopting a socio-ecological lens by
implementing solutions that go beyond the individual child or mother to include the multiple
actors, relations, and networks at play including family, community, policy, and the nation.
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A Lacuna in International Criminal Law?
In the course of human history, humankind has proven to be capable of performing the most
horrendous acts towards itself. A locution ascribed to some of the worst of such atrocities is
genocide. After the Holocaust, the international community started treating genocide as a
substantive crime under international criminal law (ICL) rather than a regrettable consequence
of state sovereignty. The crime of genocide is commonly regarded to be positioned at the apex of
international criminality; it has been heralded in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal
Tribunals as the “crime of crimes.”1 As such, the crime of genocide currently prevails as a legal
label with strong power to condemn and communicate value-based considerations of atrocity,
displaying the intrinsic connection between law and politics in ICL.2
The crime is defined in Article II of the UN’s Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention).3 It specifies certain acts intended to destroy, in
part or in whole, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such, are condemned as genocide.
The personal scope of application, however, has not always been limited to the enumerated
collectives; that was a demarcation made during the Genocide Convention’s drafting process.
Thereby, “genocidal” acts, committed with “genocidal” intent, when directed against other
groups, such as groups defined by gender, are not considered to be genocide, at least departing
from a “formalist,” as opposed to an “instrumentalist,” interpretation of Article II. This creates a
discrepancy, perhaps even a lacuna, within the ICL system.
To exemplify the discrepancy, consider the following. A community is suffering from overpopulation. To gain control over its population size, it decides all families may have only one child
for a period of time. The imagined community follows a dogmatic interpretation of primogeniture,
meaning the child must be male. Consequently, all society-defined female children born during
this period must be eliminated. While these circumstances may appear far-fetched, they are at the
same time not too far removed from various sex-selection practices of some communities in the
world today. The same conduct and intent directed against members of any of the enumerated
groups in Article II would, with all likelihood, constitute genocide under international law. In turn,
the victims would be labeled victims of genocide. Today, the same cannot be said for the girls in
our narrative. Thereby, ICL distinguishes between the collectives and the deaths of their members
through legal terminology of inclusion and exclusion. Does this current state of affairs emerge as
problematic? Inspired by transnational feminist jurisprudence, this article delves deeper into this
inquiry in the way it relates to groups defined by gender. Hannah Arendt explores a similar notion.
The following statement can thereby serve as an illustrative point of departure.
If genocide is an actual possibility of the future, then no people on earth [...] can feel
reasonably sure of its continued existence without the help and the protection of
international law.4
To be clear, the purpose of this article is to investigate whether including groups defined by
gender, as a protected group in the Genocide Convention, appears legally plausible.5 There is
little sign today that the violent aspects of humankind are less forceful than they were when the
Genocide Convention was first drafted in 1948. As such, the need to contemplate the current state
of affairs concerning the groups the Convention protects is dire. Thereby, the purpose is, thus, not
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to argue for the extension of the protected groups to encompass the crime of genocide committed
in a gender-related manner, but rather to probe the possibilities and problems with including such
groups as a protected group pursuant to the Genocide Convention. From the outset, it should
be borne in mind there is no common cross-cultural definition of gender. As such, gender’s
complex construction as an analytical category is often used with little contemplation and harbors
some inherent difficulties. Seeking to remedy this issue, there is reason to further elaborate how
gender is understood. This paper begins the longer discussion with a focus on “genocidal” acts
against women, with an understanding that future research needs to be done on the implications
of other groups defined by gender to the arguments made in the article. Notwithstanding, the
conceptualization of gender in this article draws from Iris Marion Young’s notion of “gender as
seriality.” Seriality is made up of individuals’ ways of acting or being exposed to others’ actions.
The actions, thereby, are directed towards the same object and depend on material surroundings
being caused by various structures. In turn, the structures are a consequence of collective actions
and practices. Belonging to a series is not a deliberate choice, even if the separate actions in a series
take place deliberately. A series is “a social collective whose members are unified passively by the
objects around which their actions are oriented or by the objectified results of the material effects of
the actions of the others.”6 The view of gender as a “seriality” recognizes the uniqueness of persons
in groups defined by gender, such as women, their interests, and the reality of gender hierarchies
that surpass the confines of ethnic, cultural, and economic groups. To be specific, Young actualizes
the concept of seriality to explain why women should not be presumed to constitute a singular
group with common purposes. Yet, this point of departure threatens to lead to political lethargy. If
women, or other groups defined by gender, do not share any interests, how can we conceptualize
the disadvantages such persons suffer structurally? Young’s response is to view women as a “selfalienated series,” arguing “their womanliness will not be the only thing that brings them together,
since there are other concrete details of their lives that give them affinity, such as their class or
race position.”7 Hence, it is the concept of seriality that allows us to see women, and other groups
defined by gender, as a collective “without identifying common attributes that all women have or
implying that all women have a common identity.”8 Consequently, the concept of seriality allows
us to see gender might well emerge as a parameter to delineate a group targeted for destruction
“as such.”
The Historical Origins of the Protected Groups in the Genocide Convention
During World War II, Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide” in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.9
Etymologically, the neologism was a hybrid combining the Greek genos (race, tribe, or nation) and
the Latin cide (killing). Prima facie, a verbatim interpretation appears to restrict the ambit of the
concept to circumstances involving races, tribes, or nations. Indeed, in Axis Rule, Lemkin speaks of
genocide as directed against national minorities.10 His conceptualization of genocide was, however,
broader. He emphasized that “[i]f the destruction of human groups is a problem of international
concern, then such acts should be treated as crimes under the law of nations.”11 In this regard, the
concept of genocide was most likely conceived in a similar vein as a proposal Lemkin made in
1933. At that time, he proposed the crime of barbarity, covering acts of extermination perpetrated
“out of hatred towards a racial, religious or social collectivity.”12 Following this logic, it is plausible
Lemkin did not anticipate the concept of genocide to be limited to a select number of groups.
Rather, the object and purpose from his point of view was likely to construct a locution for “actions
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subordinated to the criminal intent to destroy or cripple permanently a human group.”13 Such a
perspective opens up for the inclusion of various human groups, such as groups defined by gender.
The concept of genocide was rapidly incorporated into legal vocabulary after World War II.
To counteract impunity for Nazi crimes, the Allied forces held an International Military Tribunal
(IMT) in Nuremberg. Pursuant to Articles 6(a)-(c) of the London Charter, the IMT was granted
jurisdiction over three separate crimes; crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. Consequently, since it was not a part of the IMT Charter, the locution “genocide” did
not appear in the judgments. It was, however, used in the indictments as well as the prosecutors’
closing arguments as an explanatory term. Even though none of the defendants were convicted of
genocide in the Nuremberg trials, the judgments did explain acts which today would be defined as
genocide. Thus, the early use of the concept of genocide set “the stage for the evolution of genocide
into a separate criminal offence.”14
After the Nuremberg trials, a US military tribunal which operated pursuant to Control Council
No. 10 (CC10) tried Nazi officials.15 In their jurisprudence, genocide started to materialize as a term
with legal substance. Genocide, the Tribunal argued, was “the prime illustration of a crime against
humanity.”16 Consequently, the Tribunal constructed genocide as a subcategory of the broader
notion of crimes against humanity. The genocide convictions pursuant to CC10 therefore highlight
the transformation of the locution “genocide” from an explanatory concept, to a part of legal
terminology in the IMT proceedings, and then to a subset of crimes against humanity.
The end of World War II signaled the onset of the desire to prevent horrendous acts like the
Holocaust from happening again, which in turn provided the momentum for international society
to make considerable efforts towards unification. This post-war momentum led to the establishment
of the UN. The adoption of an international legal instrument devoted to genocide ensued.17 The UN
General Assembly (UNGA) was the first organ to actualize the matter within the new international
order, and on December 11, 1946, it unanimously passed Resolution 96(1). The Resolution defined
the crime of genocide as “the denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide
is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings.”18 Notably, the Resolution ascertains
that “genocide is a crime under international law […] whether the crime is committed on religious,
racial, political or any other grounds.”19 Matthew Lippman labels this a liberal conceptualization,20
with the philosophical underpinning that the use of violence to exterminate groups of human
beings, on the sole basis of their affinity to a particular group, is despicable. Such a construction
opens for a broad conception of genocide. As a matter of history, the core of the resolution could
be extended to encompass gender collectives, apart from the currently enumerated ones. Since
the Resolution, coupled with the explicit reference in the Genocide Convention’s preamble, was
adopted unanimously and without debate, it is important as a matter of opinio juris.21 It has even
been argued, through the phrasing in Resolution 96(1), other groups can be considered protected
by a jus cogens norm, which prohibits genocide.22
Resolution 96(1) requested the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to prepare a draft
convention on the crime of genocide, which in turn, instructed the Secretary-General to perform

13

Ibid., 147.

14

David Nersessian, Genocide and Political Groups (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 8.

15

Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials Under Control Council Law No.
10 (Buffalo: WS Hein, 1949), 277–335.

16

Ibid., 983.

17

William Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 29.

18

United Nations. General Assembly Resolution 96(1). The Crime of Genocide. December 11, 1946 (UN Doc A/BUR/50).

19

Ibid. Emphasis added.

20

Matthew Lippman, “The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty Years Later,”
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 15, no. 8 (1998), 448.

21

Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 56.

22

Beth Van Schaack, “The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Convention’s Blind Spot,” Yale Law Journal 106, no. 7
(1997), 2259–2263.

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1679

Groups Defined by Gender and the Genocide Convention

63

the same task.23 The Secretariat’s Draft was written by the Secretariat’s Human Rights Division,
assisted by, inter alia, Lemkin himself. The Secretary-General set about drafting a treaty that would,
as far as possible, “embrace all points likely to be adopted, leaving it to the competent organs
of the United Nations to eliminate what they did not wish to include.”24 The draft convention
discarded the residual reference to “any other groups.”25 However, the Secretary-General noted
that the list of protected groups was to be considered “not exhaustive.”26 The Secretariat’s Draft
thereby gives sufficient leeway in imagining collectives defined on the basis of gender as coherent
with the other groupings. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General anticipated which groups to
protect would be “the first general question which will have to be settled,”27 thereby identifying
the crux of which groups to include as a political dilemma. To deal with these issues, an ad hoc
Committee was created.28 Notably, the Committee considered it essentially within the competence
of governments to answer the question of “[w]hat human groups should be protected? Should all
human groups [...] be protected or only some of them?”29 Eventually, the ad hoc Committee settled
for the same category of protected groups as in the Secretariat’s draft. The question of whether the
enumerated groups were to be considered exhaustive was, however, a matter left undiscussed.
The UN’s Sixth Committee drafted the final text of the Genocide Convention, who likely felt it
was important to complete the Convention swiftly, “before the memory of the barbarous crimes
which had been committed faded from the minds of men.”30 Against this background, the Iranian
delegate suggested “adopting a convention embodying all the points on which agreement was
possible,” leaving the more cumbersome problems for an “additional convention [to] settle.”31 The
draft convention by the Sixth Committee subsequently was unanimously adopted on December 9,
1948 by the UNGA and the same construction applies today.32
The deliberations over which groups ought to be protected should be understood in its
broader context. At its inception, it was imagined the spirit of the concept of genocide, illustrated
by Lemkin’s own writings and Resolution 96(1), would be applied on a wider scale. During the
drafting process, the concept became restricted due to political compromise. Consequently, as
constructed today, the scope of protection from genocide under ICL is limited to four “protected
groups,” instead of “actions subordinated to the criminal intent to destroy or cripple permanently
a human group.”33 There is, thus, an evident disparity between genocide, as Lemkin imagined it,
and the Genocide Convention, the latter being considerably more restrictive. It has been questioned
whether the drafters were aware of making decisions of legislative character, rather than political
ditto.34 In this regard, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn note “the wording of the Convention is
so restrictive that not one of the genocidal killings committed since its adoption is covered by
it.”35 Consequently, “the Convention’s list of protected groups has probably provoked more debate
since 1948 than any other aspect of the instrument.”36
The Protected Groups
The Genocide Convention does not protect all human groups. As per the definition, the crime of
genocide can only be committed against members of national, ethnic, racial, or religious collectives.
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Thus, interpreting the crime as a departure from a “formalist” interpretation of the provision,
genocide cannot be committed towards groups defined by gender. The victims, moreover, must
be chosen based on their membership to such a collective with the intent to destroy the group “in
whole or in part.” They are in this respect a means to an end.
Given the four enumerated groups are the sole beneficiaries of the protection granted by the
Genocide Convention, it could be argued it is regrettable that there is no recognized definition for
any of them in the Convention or elsewhere. However, it is near impossible to attribute a distinct
meaning to them, as they intersect and overlap significantly. The International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) Trial Chamber in Akayesu, however, set out to construct objective definitions
for each of the four groups enumerated in Article II.37 To determine whether a group fell within
the ambit of the Convention, the ICTR required an “objective evaluation” of the group to see if it fit
the scheme of the definitions they posed. The “objective approach” to the protected groups offered
by the ICTR in Akayesu was gradually moved away from the jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunals. Later judgments employ a leaning towards subjective parameters.38 The
“subjective approach” refers to the perpetrator’s point of view of the victim group.39 If the
génocidaire defines the victim group as one of the protected groups of genocide, the victim group is
such a group. The perpetrator’s perspective, thereby, becomes the defining element for the crime
of genocide. It is, however, hard to reconcile this rationale with principles of legality. Foreseeability
and specificity of criminal conduct are paramount parameters of the principle of legality, and it is
difficult to imagine the subjective approach in fulfilling such requirements. Every génocidaire will
differ in mind-set and will have a different perspective of their victims. As such, there will be a
lack of a uniform measurement of victim groups. Employing a subjective approach is, however,
coherent with the sociological processes leading up to genocide. Inherent in every act of genocide
is the génocidaire’s prejudice against “the Other” group. The génocidaire identifies, distinguishes
between, and stigmatizes the Other.40 Subsequently, they seek to exterminate it. Within the context
of sociology, the stigmatization of other groups is commonly referred to as “othering.”41 To some
extent, through leaning on subjective parameters, this process is transplanted into the context of
genocide law. The criticism directed against the subjective approach above, however, appears quite
serious. There is reason to be wary of such drawbacks. At the same time, given such stigmatization
cannot arise from a structural vacuum, the characteristics of the group can be identified in the
penumbra of its sociohistorical context via the subjective perspective.
Protecting Human Groups in International Criminal Law
Dealing with groups in a legal context is arguably more complex than what prima facie may be
expected, especially since groups exist without inherent meaning. All content is socially assigned
through interpretation and argumentation. In legal discourse, this operation is achieved in the
context of “applicable law.” Through legal vocabulary, the theoretical conception of a “group” is
diminished to a formal description, stipulating requirements for determining inclusion or exclusion.
The description then becomes a vessel for rights and obligations. In turn, such requirements must be
applied to the “everyday reality.” Thereby, legal actors, such as judges and prosecutors, take active
part in mobilizing specific discursive resources in establishing and creating a sense of legitimacy
for the requirements that define the groups.42
Forcing human groups into legal conceptions requires cursory understandings of the groups
in question. This is sometimes achieved by having group definitions revolve around quantifiable,
“objective” markers, as if the groups were material objects. Indeed, that is what the ICTR sought to
do in Akayesu. Such mechanisms prevail in the historical precedents of genocide. For instance, in
the Nazi practices of extermination during the Holocaust, the Nazis had problems “parsing out a
coherent legal definition for the Jewish community or even in identifying its members.”43 The same
difficulties in dealing with “types” of human groups actualize in a legal setting. Nevertheless, the
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Convention opts for protecting four, clearly delimited, but narrowly construed human groups.
The restrictive personal scope of the Convention has sparked critique from scholars as well as
practitioners.44 The criticism often emanates from creative interpretations of the treaty text or
finding something new from the travaux préparatoires to solve the faulty Article II. The assertions
seemingly aim to reach a predetermined conclusion of including a certain human group. Such an
altruistic goal may be commendable. The jurisprudence, however, is not.
In the ICTR, questions dealing with the problem of whether the Tutsi could be considered a
protected group pursuant to Article II of the Convention emerged. The Trial Chamber in Akayesu
noted it was unquestionably “the Tutsi ethnic group which was targeted” by the Hutu majority
government solely because of their affinity to the Tutsi group.45 The categorization of the Tutsi as
an ethnic group emanated from their history of being different from the Hutu created by previous
colonial authorities as well as between the Rwandans themselves. This was not sufficient to fit the
Tutsi within the scheme of an ethnic group in the sense of the Convention since, turning to the
defining characteristics of ethnic groups, it becomes evident the Tutsi and the Hutu who massacred
them share many traits. Disregarding the racial, or racist, considerations of the colonial authorities,
they share the same language, religion, and essentially the same culture. This prompted the tribunal
to scrutinize the theoretical underpinnings for protecting groups “as such.” The tribunal initially
sought to establish “objective” definitions of each of the four groups enumerated in the Genocide
Convention. Subsequently, the tribunal turned to the travaux préparatoires and determined the
common denominator for the enumerated groups was membership, was normally unchallengeable
by members, “who belong to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable
manner.”46 By continued reference to the travaux préparatoires, the tribunal took the position that it
was “particularly important to respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention.”47
This led the Trial Chamber to the conclusion that the drafters’ intention was “patently to ensure
the protection of any stable and permanent group.”48 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber in Akayesu
deviated from a formalist reading of Article II and constructed the physical or biological destruction
of a group “as such” as genocide, even if a victimized group fell outside the scope of the enumerated
groups. That is, insofar the group is stable and permanent. Through an “instrumentalist” approach,
the Tutsi was a protected group within the framework of the Convention.
There is reason to approach the jurisprudence in Akayesu with skepticism. The overarching
goal with the judgment was likely to expand the groups encompassed by the Convention to fit
into an “everyday reality” that had changed since the drafting of the Convention. However, the
travaux préparatoires are scarcely so consistent that it is possible to discern just a single intent. Many
states took part in the negotiations with many conflicting interests. Moreover, standpoints in treaty
negotiations are hardly sources of binding international law. They may provide evidence for opinio
juris, but as substantive legal sources, their use is limited. Additionally, recourse to preparatory
works of international treaties may be had when the provision “leaves the meaning ambiguous” or
“leads to a result which is manifestly absurd.”49 In the case of the Genocide Convention, this becomes
unlikely. Article II encompasses four groups. It would have surely followed from the treaty text
if the manifest intent was to extend the protection of the Convention to all stable and permanent
groups. If taken seriously, the “stability and permanence” criterion would mean the catalogization
of groups in Article II is meaningless. Additionally, arguing for stability and permanence as the sole
parameters worth protecting in groups is conceptually confusing. Dialectically, the tribunal argued
that group members in a “redeemable manner” could not be “stable and permanent.” Many of the
groups enumerated in the Convention do, however, allow redeemable group membership. It is
possible to exit a religion. It is possible to terminate nationality. Ethnicity can be achieved through
marriage and terminated through divorce.
44

Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 117.

45

Prosecutor v. Akayesu. Trial Chamber Judgment, September 2, 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 124.

46

Ibid., para. 511.

47

Ibid., para. 516.

48

Ibid.

49

Articles 31 and 32(a)–(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1679

Hassellind

66

Akayesu is not alone in its attempt to align the formalist “legal reality” with changing discourses
of “everyday reality.” Shortly after the creative, instrumentalist interpretation in Akayesu, the
Spanish Court of Appeals followed suit and deviated from a verbatim reading of the treaty text in
the indictment of Augusto Pinochet. The Court argued that the concept of a national group, as it
follows from the Convention, also encompasses political and social groups, and genocide should
be approached in “social terms, without any need for a criminal law definition.”50 From a different
perspective, scholars have suggested introducing new victim categories under customary law.51
The narrow conceptualization of the protected groups under Article II of the Genocide
Convention has thus sparked several arguments for introducing new victim categories within
the framework for the crime of genocide. While the arguments may not withstand scrutiny, they
highlight that the Genocide Convention is having difficulties answering contemporary challenges
concerning the groups it protects in situations where utilizing it appears appropriate. Perhaps,
the solution will not lie in extravagant readings of the treaty text or unearthing something from
the travaux préparatoires. A more appropriate approach would be to ascertain if there is a more
systemically plausible path to achieving these goals. Such an operation first requires disentangling
the theoretical underpinnings for including certain groups while excluding others. The idea of
expanding the list of protected groups is, however, not novel. It has been proposed that including
new groups places a loose lid on the Pandora’s box of protecting human groups, and there is
no “logical stopping point” if new groups were added.52 William Schabas assumes this formalist
position, as opposed to an instrumental ditto, noting that the dilemma with introducing new
groups is “the difficulty in providing a rational basis for such a measure,” arguing “if one group
is to be included, why not the disabled, or other groups based on arbitrary criteria?”53 One may as
well ask the question, “indeed, why not”?
Some parties to the Convention have opted for a wider conceptualization of the protected
groups as a matter of domestic law and include any groups defined on any arbitrary criterion.54
The overarching rationale can be explained by the fact that any arbitrary group could, theoretically,
be subject to genocidal extermination; notwithstanding which group this may be, such conduct is
abhorrent and the group must be protected. The standpoint does have merit but does not withstand
closer examination. Genocide is a sui generis crime, it is entirely unique, seeking to protect the human
diversity of groups. To preserve the crime’s standing at the “apex of international criminality,” it
cannot have a too wide scope of application. Such an order could effectively render the concept
of genocide void of content, a logic that relates to the “expressivist function” of genocide.55 Legal
constructions ought to reflect the broader social and political discourses in which they exist.
Thus, there is commendable wisdom in not encompassing all “arbitrary” groups pursuant to the
Genocide Convention. It is likely the drafters arrived at the same conclusion, seeing as they opted
to enumerate four different groups officially protected from genocide.
The common denominator for the protected groups is that they all reflect different, but
important facets of individual identity. Associating with the protected groups can be assumed
paramount to the extent the members of the groups should not be forced by means of physical
or biological genocide to relinquish affinity to their collective. This analysis is supported by the
perception of “human groups” as social constructs rather than scientific, quantifiable items. Indeed,
bearing in mind the “subjective approach,” the scientific accuracy is irrelevant in ascertaining the
crime of genocide. It is the perspective of the génocidaire that determines group membership. There
is no need for the génocidaire to be rational in their targeting for destruction. The sole parameter to
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ascertain is whether the perpetrator had a discriminatory intent to exterminate, in part or in whole,
a group based on national, ethnical, racial or religious affinity. It matters not that the group can
be objectively defined as one of the four groups, or even that the group de facto existed. The legal
construction of genocide uses groups as an analytical framework and the group that matters is
purely conceptual.
The rationale behind the protected groups can be described as the protection of individuals’
right to take part and form a kind of shared and collective existence, be it deliberate or not. Within
a legal framework of “applicable law,” this operation becomes simplified, since it is easier to speak
in terms of acts directed at “protected groups” in a court of law rather than acknowledging the
groups we speak of do not exist, but only as impromptu constructions. As such, they become
symbols for transgressions of intrinsic values of human life. The legal construction of the “protected
groups” can therefore be perceived as a proxy for the rights of individuals to engage, or be coded,
in different types of collectivity with freedom from being subject to genocidal acts. Hence, the
“crime of genocide” is best understood as an instrument which ascertains these imperative rights
of individuals through taking care of a particular group. The systemic order can be compared to
the international human rights regime, where individual rights are of principal importance. The
human rights system, on the other hand, rests on the premise that group rights are ascertained
through individuals.56 Given the Convention’s protected groups build on the effective exercise
of human rights that can only be coherent in communion on a collective scale, it is plausible the
Genocide Convention follows a similar logic.
With this foregoing as a backdrop, we now employ the interpretative canon of ejusdem
generis, meaning “of the same kind,” to analyze if the conceptual parameters of inclusion can be
extended in a similar manner to groups defined by gender, or if they are unique to the groups
enumerated. The underlying premise is if such groups are of a similar kind, then including them
within the Convention’s legal protection under the same framework may appear plausible. Groups
defined by gender are highly volatile and temporal.57 Although used in reference to exclude
political groups, stability and permanence cannot adequately justify the inclusion of groups in
the Genocide Convention. Not all the enumerated groups are stable and permanent. Indeed, the
conceptualization of groups defined by gender intersects largely with how ethnical and racial
groups are constructed. The concept of ethnicity connected to a common language or culture,
whereas the concept of race to a criterion of “hereditary physical traits.”58 Groups defined by
gender can be perceived as an amalgamation of these conceptualizations, a socially constructed
label, influenced by social and cultural preconditions. This similarity is mirrored in other aspects of
ICL.59 Similarly, to the enumerated groups, belonging to a group defined by gender can be assumed
as an intrinsic value of social existence, an important facet of individuality. Such a resemblance is
reflected within the scheme of international human rights law. Since genocide has been perceived
as the “ultimate crime and the gravest violation of human rights it is possible to commit,”60 such
a comparison is relevant. The enumerated groups can all be characterized by the rights granted
through membership; that is, the right to existence is the property of a group member, be it on
the basis of nationality, ethnicity, race or religion. The rights of groups defined by gender follow a
similar rationale; all the major international human rights treaties prohibit discrimination based on
gender and/or sex, beyond the four enumerated groups. Genocide and gender-specific genocide
focus on the physical or biological destruction of a particular group. As such, they will always deal
with the most severe infringements of fundamental human rights. It is crucial not to exaggerate this
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aspect, however. It is not the transgression of these rights per se that merits the label “genocide.”
Apart from the individual rights, genocide violates the group’s right to existence. Nonetheless, the
protected groups depart from a perspective where paramount collective rights are transgressed
through serious personal violence, which may necessitate treating the encroachment as genocide.61
It is on the aforementioned substantive fundamental rights in which the protected groups build
on, and the rights apply equally to groups defined by gender. Hence, the continued exclusion
of gender from the Genocide Convention appears disparate with the international human rights
structure. If other groups similar to such groups have a right to existence, together with a right not
to be refused that existence, groups defined by gender must do too.
Often, complexities emerge in determining whether the targeting of a group builds on the
traits of any of the enumerated groups, gender traits, or if it is a hybrid. Yet, the subjective approach
merely requires the genocidal acts be essentially based on any of the enumerated traits. To that
end, a gendered aspect of genocide is simply sorted away as legally irrelevant. Under these
circumstances, a perpetrator can claim a genocidal act was committed on gender-specific basis as a
viable defense for the crime of genocide. Thereby, the current construction of the protected groups
favors gender discrimination over, for instance, religious discrimination. In a similar manner,
surely, the current structure of the convention may, for example, take on gendered dimensions by
preventing births or rape within an overarching group. Such arguments appear when we turn to
historical genocides. For instance, the notion that the Tutsi or Bosnian Muslim groups were partly
destroyed through rape because the rape victims (who were women) would be excluded from the
collective appears to crystallize traits which undoubtedly oppress women inside the group. The
assumption is the dissolution of the target group is, in part, the result of an internal process where
group members take part in their own destruction. This is achieved through the belief of a gender
vis-à-vis gender antagonism that augments the scheme of the génocidaires. To hold such traits as
natural truths of ethnicity render them invisible and makes them harder to contest, as a consequence
of being incorporated into the narrative of victimization. The incorporation may oversimplify, and
even caricature, ethnicity and gender alike, through constructing Bosnian Muslim and Tutsi men
as inherently prone to excluding rape victims.
Drawing from this analysis, it could be argued that the current scheme of the convention
is disparate with the commitment “to promote social progress” as a cardinal value and specific
purpose for the UN as an institution, especially since it is through legal instruments this value
is to be realized.62 If the UN’s underlying engagement to “international social justice,” argued to
form the “essence of public international law in the second half of the 20th century,”63 is to be
taken seriously, there is an urgent need to consider how groups defined by gender fit within this
structure. The analysis shows gender collectives are of a similar kind to the existing protected
groups. Consequently, it would not be out of place to extend similar treatment to groups defined
by gender in the context of genocide.
Groups defined by gender have been subject to genocidal acts like few other collectives. There
is a plethora of historical examples of gender-specific genocides. Witch-hunts in Early Modern
Europe, widow burning (sati), female feticide, dowry deaths, the Massacre of Bangladesh men
in 1971, and maternal mortality are all examples of where gender-specific elements have been
highly prevalent in situations of mass killings.64 Gender-specific genocides are thus a historical
reality and seem to cry out for the application of the Genocide Convention. Such an assertion
does not mean other, non-enumerated groups are subordinate to such groups. Other collectives
may fit the theoretical underpinnings of protecting certain human groups from genocide as well.
Surely, the political realities of reopening the convention would be difficult. Although, the fact that
other human groups may be equally appropriate candidates should not hamper the overarching
discussion as it relates to groups defined by gender, which is the focal point here. Ascertaining
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eligibility for other groups is a different question and is not relevant for the issue of gender in
relation to genocide.
Crimes against Humanity – an Adequate Proxy?
The following section asks whether gender-specific genocides have been appropriately responded
to under existing substantive crimes under international law. In this regard, Schabas argues that
atrocities committed “against groups not covered by Article II of the Genocide Convention are
adequately addressed by other legal norms, in particular [...] crimes against humanity.”65
Genocide and crimes against humanity can be perceived as sister crimes. Both infractions were
construed against the historical backdrop of the Nazi acts of extermination during the Holocaust.
The two crimes currently have diverging raisons d’être and protect different values. A widespread
or systematic attack on a gender group, because the members belong to that group, amounts to
crimes against humanity. That is very different from an attack on a gender group because the
members belong to that group paired with the intent to destroy the gender group “as such.”66
National, ethnical, racial, and, religious groups are all protected from crimes against humanity, as
well as the crime of genocide. In case groups defined by gender are subject to genocidal acts, only
crimes against humanity can be applied, since there is no parallel crime for genocide committed
based on gender. Making references to crimes against humanity as a surrogate for a genderspecific genocide risks an inadequate reflection on the content of the criminal categories. The
socially constructed label of a crime, to which the criminal conduct is attached, ought to mirror
the culpability and seriousness of the offence appropriately. Genocides will often satisfy the
requirements for crimes against humanity. The same cannot be said for the reverse, because of the
dolus specialis of genocide. Constructing a gender-specific genocide as a crime against humanity
does not demarcate the perpetrator’s overarching and specialized intent to destroy a specific group
“as such,” which really is far more culpable. A perpetrator of crimes against humanity aims to
murder, whereas a génocidiare aims to destroy a certain group. The construction of genocide is
thus more specific in terms of mens rea in comparison to crimes against humanity. The same can
be said for the prohibited acts of genocide. Only five specific acts can be qualified as genocide.
Crimes against humanity could surely encompass those acts but would not be limited to them. The
specificity which the legal label of genocide offers is thus far more complete in describing genderspecific genocidal conduct.
From a different perspective, labeling gender-specific genocide as crimes against humanity
confuses the personal scope of the crimes. While crimes against humanity are prohibited as a type
of persecution against the individual attacked, genocide is the opposite. Genocide is fundamentally
an infraction directed towards groups, and the criminalization thereof ascertains protection for
certain groups from physical and biological destruction. Crimes against humanity encompass
violations of fundamental rights on an individual basis. In the case a “group” is covered by crimes
against humanity, is purely ancillary to the individual. Therefore, crimes against humanity are
unable to adequately describe attacks against groups.67
The way we label crimes has a deeper meaning than solely relating to parameters of
culpability of the crime. It also expresses a form of hierarchy between the core international crimes,
communicating the severity of one crime in relation to the others. Genocide stands at the “apex
of international criminality.”68 It is imagined to be the most heinous crime possible. The moral
condemnation implied with the locution “genocide” is far more serious than any other international
crime. The hierarchy among the international core crimes is less acute for national, ethnical,
racial, and religious groups. Both criminal constructions can be applied in a parallel manner. As
a matter of criminal cumulation, a perpetrator can be sentenced for genocide as well as crimes
against humanity. This renders courts capable of distinguishing between attacks directed towards
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individuals on a widespread and systematic scale, and conduct intended to exterminate groups of
individuals. They can, therefore, pass judgments that more accurately describe the nature of the
conduct, when directed towards any of the enumerated groups. Genocidal acts directed towards
groups defined by gender, however, either are constructed as the inferior transgression crimes
against humanity or fall outside the ambit of ICL completely. At their core, genocide and crimes
against humanity are two separate offences dealing with different issues. The current scheme of
the protected groups in the Genocide Convention communicates a value-based signal regarding
which groups are worthier of protection from the worst kind of criminality. Dialectically, it
expresses the worth of groups defined by gender in relation to the four enumerated collectives
in Article II. Essentially, the Genocide Convention is a bearer of symbolic values. As such, the
way we construct legal categorizations is of paramount importance. It is possible to describe
the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust as episodes of “mass killings.” That categorization,
however, would be unsuccessful in capturing the whole picture of the atrocities. The same applies
to gender-specific genocides. There is wisdom in communicating a total recognition of criminal
conduct. A similar rationale spurred international society to construct genocide in the first place.
Given gender-specific genocides have existed historically, the omission to cover gender-specific
genocides from genocide has factual ramifications. As a matter of de lege lata, there is no specific
expression that groups defined by gender are warranted protection from physical and biological
destruction “as such.”
The omission to protect from gender-specific genocides in the Genocide Convention entails
a strange systemic application of ICL. Returning to the narrative in the introduction, through a
formalist interpretation of Article II, the murdered daughters are, at best, currently labeled victims
of crimes against humanity. If the imagined community instead adopted a policy of infanticide
towards babies who bear certain “hereditary physical characteristics,” we label the babies killed
victims of genocide, since they would be constructed as a part of a racial group.69 The labels convey
for us, the international society, and the future, that the babies of the racial group symbolize
something bigger, namely genocide directed towards the “racial group” itself. The murdered
daughters, on the other hand, do not qualify for that symbolic treatment. The destruction of women
more broadly is left unnoticed by ICL.
A Space for Gender in the Genocide Convention?
The continued omission of gender-specific genocides within the ambit of the Genocide Convention
ought to, from today’s perspective, be characterized as a choice. Ultimately, the current construction,
the “choice,” relates to the junction between formalism and instrumentalism. Instrumentalism and
formalism signify two opposite sensibilities of what it means to be an international lawyer, and
two cultures of professional practice in the ICL sphere; which relates to the question of whether
legal philosophy should assimilate ethical standards or confine itself to an analysis of black letter
law. Systemically, the Genocide Convention’s construction of the protected groups in Article II
is “formalist” in the sense of proposing a certain a priori formal matrix of social space; it leans
on a token ahistorical formal framework defining the legal terrain within which an open and
endless game of contingent inclusions and exclusions occur.70 Yet, the notion of genocide is not
predetermined; what it will mean, what this term will include, and what it will exclude (that
is, to which extent women, gays, trans people, and so forth, are included or excluded within its
structure) will always be the result of contingent hegemonic struggle.71 This highlights that the
Genocide Convention, in reality, is an empty signifier which emerges as a battlefield for hegemonic
interests, that does not seek to reach some fixed content as its ultimate point of arrival, but only
has itself as an objective, demarcated by the empty signifier that is genocide. While the formalist
jurisprudential culture in the Genocide Convention may not be adverse per se, it risks giving the
appearance of the content in the instrument, that is, the Genocide Convention, as determinate and
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ahistorical when it is not so. Rather, an empty signifier with no determinate meaning signifies
only the existence of meaning in itself, instead of absence thereof.72 Seen from this perspective, the
crime of genocide is an institution that has no definite, determinate function, but only a negative
one of expressing the actuality of the institution as such, instead of its non-existence. Following
a Hegelian logic, such a rationale can be characterized as a direct embodiment of the ideological
function of painting a “neutral” picture within which all social antagonism has been wiped out.
The current construction of the protected groups therefore appears to express a position of which
groups that are politically warranted protection “as such.” Thus, the interest of protecting groups
defined by gender from physical and biological destruction is not considered politically motivated.
This is, however, not a static position, but instead, politically changeable. After having analyzed
this, potential ramifications emanating from the current construction of the crime of genocide can
now be discussed. The underlying premise is that the issues emerge as problematic in the sense
they provide support for the claim that the Convention is unnecessarily narrow concerning the
groups it grants protection; in particular with groups defined by gender. Thereby, by virtue of their
existence, the problems enable a hypothetical inclusion of groups defined by gender as protected
to appear theoretically plausible. This approach does not carry the pretense that what is needed is
to construct additional policies and rules. Rather, it seeks to contribute to a better understanding
of what transpires beneath the façade of the implementation and application of Article II of the
Genocide Convention.73
Simply expanding the Genocide Convention is problematic. Indeed, “[d]iluting the definition,
either by formal amendment of its terms or by extravagant interpretation of the existing text, risks
trivializing the horror of the real crime when it is committed.”74 This is a legitimate apprehension.
Stuart Stein opines that the analysis of scholars probing “other-cides” “is often directed toward,
or ends with, establishing that the mass killing cluster under consideration meets the definitional
parameters of genocide, however defined.”75
As indicated above, the article does not seek merely to establish such genocidal credentials.
The backdrop produced here attempts to highlight that the omission of protect groups defined
by gender under the Genocide Convention is an unreasonable restriction. The definition of a
gender-specific genocide elaborated herein deviates from the definition of the crime of genocide
in only one aspect; in terms of the protected groups. The analysis is faithful to the core concept of
genocide and advocates the application of genocide only in its prototypical meaning, to cover acts
intended to destroy a human group “as such.” The article thereby joins the scholars, arguing that
the failure to encompass groups other than the four enumerated has caused the Convention to
become “conceptually confused.”76
It is a common argument that too wide a conceptualization of genocide may diminish the
value-based signals the crime sends. However, the very same danger to the legitimacy may emerge
if the construction is too narrow in its scope. If that is the case, the construction runs a risk of
undermining, what Dianne Marie Amann calls, the expressivist function of criminalizing genocide,
given that legal constructions reflect the broader social and political discourses in which they
operate.77 As such, it is of paramount importance that the way genocide is judicially constructed
corroborates with the social and political reality in which it exists. Should there be a discord, the
crime risks losing legitimacy as it may be viewed as outdated and arbitrary. Thereby, the argument
that the drafters of the Genocide Convention wanted to encompass “national minorities,” and the
enumerated groups are different faces of that concept, must be disregarded. Even if the drafters
wanted to protect national minorities, the intention of the drafters almost seventy years ago cannot
justify the choices we make concerning the crime of genocide today. Referring to intellectual
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distinctions on a theoretical level obscures the fact that the question of which groups to protect
is, essentially, a political one. Genocide instrumentalizes values and interests sustained by beliefs
about the world. It is problematic when the values and interests allowed to permeate the Genocide
Convention are in divergence with those expressed in the contemporary world.
Notably, as times change, “reality” and discourses regarding what is worth protecting change
too. It is understandable why groups defined by gender were not included at the drafting of
the Convention. Post-World War II, the concepts of gender equality, gender discrimination, and
gender per se were not widely regarded as interests worthy of protection within the international
society. However, current discourses in international law are not equally lethargic towards gender
issues. As stated previously, all major human rights treaties cover sex and/or gender. The current
construction of the protected groups can therefore be said to be incompatible with the international
human rights system. The important point to draw here is the inclusion of groups defined by
gender in the international human rights system which underlines political ambition to combat
gender-based discrimination. It is reasonable to assume that such political will to protect such
groups from genocide also exists. There is thus a clash between the interest of combating genderbased discrimination on a genocidal level and the interest of states to limit the erga omnes obligation
of genocide. The solution to this clash between political impetus and the state reluctance, because
of the erga omnes obligation, lies in the “expressivist” function of genocide. For the crime to retain
its legitimacy, it must fit changing social and political trajectories. Thereby, it is necessary to
calibrate the crime of genocide in relation to changing discourses, so they corroborate, inasmuch
it is possible, to ensure the credibility of the judicial construct is preserved. There is reason to
believe that the inclusion of groups defined by gender as protected under Article II could support
such an undertaking. Against this background, we can now turn away from the more overarching
questions and discuss the current state of affairs of the protected groups as it concerns groups
defined by gender more concretely.
The current construction of the protected groups provides support for the claim that the ICL
system is substantively gendered. Fundamentally, the issue of gender-specific genocide often
concerns women’s rights and women’s right to existence.78 The contemporary genocide discourse
thus renders this “women’s issue” unworthy of protection. Thereby, it brushes aside the narratives
of atrocities suffered by women. In that, it provides proof that the ICL system is gendered by
being based on the realities of male lives.79 The groups worthy of protection in the Genocide
Convention are gendered to suit atrocities that have befallen men. The ICL system, and the canon
of protected groups in the Convention, is the creation of human beings, with its ultimate concern
being individual behavior. It is thought of in terms of a neutral construction that is to be equitably
applied, or as a rational institute, but it is not so. ICL is imbued by the choices between contesting
values and policy interpretations. The absence of women in genocide law produces a narrow and
insufficient jurisprudence that legitimizes the unequal position of, for instance, women worldwide
rather than facing it. In consequence, the experiences of women are denied access to the continued
shaping of ICL, its aims, and its content. If one believes such an order is politically and morally
cumbersome, constructing groups defined by gender, as a protected group within the Genocide
Convention, could serve as a first step in combating such structures. Resolving these issues should
not be faced with overconfidence to the effects of policy changes. A legal construction which
accounts for the experiences of women facing such atrocities does not automatically mean that
marginalized groups defined by gender have gained access to the ICL system on a larger scale.
Rather, a more acute perception would be which interests are allowed to permeate the types of
people regarded as worthy of protection in a legal discourse. These problems go beyond how
policies are phrased.
As touched upon previously, the current legal architecture of the protected groups in the
Genocide Convention highlights the tension between formalism and instrumentalism within ICL.
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The schism is important in answering what the crime of genocide, and more broadly ICL, is for. In
this regard, Martti Koskenniemi notes,
[f]rom the instrumental perspective, international law exists to realise objectives of some
dominant part of the [international society]; from the formalist perspective, it provides a
platform to evaluate behaviour, including the behaviour of those in dominant positions. The
instrumental perspective highlights the role of law as social engineering; formalism views it
as an interpretative scheme.80

The current order in the international society “is not one of pre-established harmony or struggle
but of both cooperation and conflict simultaneously.”81 Thereby, “[a] form and a process is needed
that channels interpretative conflicts into peaceful avenues.”82 There are substantial problems
inherent in pragmatic instrumentalism. There is the extreme case of the “war against terrorism
to canvas the slippery slope from anti-formal reasoning to human rights violation.”83 As such, it
seems appropriate to opt for a prevailing view of legal formalism instead of an instrumental ditto.
The prevalent formalist conceptualization of the crime of genocide can thereby be understood
as a form of protection from the imposition of objectives of some dominant part of the international
society. However, a too formalist approach is a recipe for indifference and may risk making the
judicial construction outdated. Formalism needs to be followed with a waking appreciation of
its political underpinnings. There is, thus, reason to move beyond the dichotomy of formalism
vis-à-vis instrumentalism to strike a balance between the different interests that ICL represent.84
A starting point for such a quest could be to recognize ICL as a political project, acknowledging
openly the battle for hegemony.85 Inherent is thereby the realization that there is no fixed set of
objectives, purposes, or principles that can be unearthed externally from ICL in itself.86 Instead,
these objectives cannot be anything than those of different legal actors with different hegemonic
quests. ICL, and particularly the crime of genocide in international law, is an instrument; yet, as
an instrument it cannot be considered in isolation, set apart from the political processes of which
it is a complex part. That is why the objectives of ICL and its criminal constructions, moreover, is
ICL in itself; and as a promise of “justice.” ICL and justice are connected in the conduct of legal
actors, “paradigmatically in the legal judgment.”87 The judgment, however, is insufficient to bridge
positive law and justice. Therefore, in the rift between ICL and justice lies the inevitable realm of
politics law. It must be so, or else law becomes sheer positivity. That is why the question whether
including groups defined by gender under the Genocide Convention is theoretically plausible
should be addressed for what it is. It is not about objectives from diplomatic instruments, it is a
question of political struggle. Hence, the true inquiry becomes, is it politically motivated to protect
groups defined by gender from genocide?
Concluding Remarks
The Genocide Convention acknowledges some facets of collective life are constitutional for human
identity to the extent freedom from physical and biological destruction is warranted to ensure their
existence “as such.” At its core, ICL is a consent-based system. Its survival is dependent upon states
accepting not only its jurisprudence, but also the moral and political ramifications thereof. The
concept of a gender-specific genocide, and its interconnectivity with genocide, ostensibly emerge
as problematic for international society as a whole and ICL in a systemic manner. The complexities
80
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surfaced here are of a wholly political character. That is not inherently detrimental, but ICL should
be responsive enough to handle contemporary challenges. If it does not, it runs the risk of throwing
a shade of illegitimacy over the entire system. In the same way the criminal label “murder” cannot
accurately communicate the atrocities of the Holocaust, it cannot accurately describe a genderspecific genocide. This should not be interpreted that introducing a “new” crime of gender-specific
genocide would be a panacea for such dilemmas. Even though a gender-specific genocide fits the
theoretical underpinnings of international criminal regulation, these issues should not be tackled
with over-confidence to the effects of policy changes. A construction that accounts for the reality
of such conduct does not automatically render the issue of gender-specific genocides resolved. ICL
is an insufficient system to cure all the woes in the world. Nor should it be expected to be able to
do so. The law, and perhaps especially ICL, will always provide inadequate tools for dealing with
genocide. Indeed, in the words of Arendt, “for these crimes, no punishment is severe enough. It
may as well be essential to hang Göring, but it is totally inadequate. That is, this guilt, in contrast
to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems.”88
Notwithstanding the imperfections of ICL, there is reason to do something rather than nothing.
Apathy, too, takes its toll. The omission to protect groups defined by gender from genocide is a
choice. This political choice is purchased at the cost of lost legitimacy of ICL. That, as it stands
today, is a price it cannot afford to pay. Returning to the narrative in the introduction, legal
terminology of inclusion and exclusion transforms and renders the victim group less worthy of
protection than national, ethnical, racial, and religious groups. The attack on the group, the girls
of the community, remains unseen. In the end, the omission to protect such groups from genocide
represents a lacuna within ICL. If one believes this lacuna ought to be filled, an inclusion of groups
defined by gender as protected in the Genocide Convention appears theoretically plausible. After
all, to quote Lemkin, “if the destruction of human groups is a problem of international concern,
then such acts should be treated as crimes under the law of nations.”89
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Introduction
Avram Noam Chomsky (1928–) may be the most prominent and significant public intellectual of
the post-World War Two period. His contributions to linguistic theory continue to generate debate
and controversy. But two generations know him primarily for his political writings, public talks,
and other activism, voicing a left-radical, humanist critique of US foreign policy and other subjects.
Works such as American Power and the New Mandarins (1969, on Vietnam and US imperialism more
generally), The Fateful Triangle: Israel, the US, and the Palestinians (1983), James Peck’s edited The
Chomsky Reader (1987), and 1988’s Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media
(co-authored with Edward S. Herman) hold a venerated status for leftist/progressive readers. His
mini-book 9/11, published in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington,
became a surprise bestseller (over 115,000 copies shipped in the first six months).1 A handful of
widely-seen documentaries have further spread his renown.2
Given the centrality of a human-rights and mass-violence critique in Chomsky’s political
output, as well as its voluminous quantity over fully half a century, it is appropriate to inquire
about the place of “genocide”3 in his analysis. After encountering some scattered mentions in
his books and published interviews over the years, I resolved to undertake such an inquiry. My
interest was further piqued when I realized that genocide, though marginal to Chomsky’s critique,
is touched upon in literally dozens of his books, as well as other writings and interviews available
(and searchable) online. Its treatment is usually passing and fragmentary, but from these fragments,
a composite portrait can be assembled of the deployment of “genocide” in Chomsky’s extensive
canon.
I approached my task by searching for appearances of “genocide” and “genocidal” in the digital
texts of 61 books by or featuring Chomsky (sometimes edited by others). At least one of these terms
appeared in roughly two-thirds of the volumes, though some of these were repeated/reprinted
materials. I also conducted a separate search for “holocaust,” to arrive at an understanding of how
Chomsky deploys both the Jewish Holocaust and the generic label “holocaust” in other contexts.
With the exception of the Chomsky/Herman pamphlet, Counter-Revolutionary Violence: Bloodbaths in
Fact and Propaganda (1973, subsequently withdrawn and suppressed by the publisher),4 all quotes
from digital sources that were not facsimiles of a printed edition were cross-checked against the
printed versions, and the latter are the page references supplied. Some additional comments were
found in online sources, especially interviews with Chomsky, and these are cited in the notes.
The key questions to be addressed here include: How does Chomsky define, understand,
and criticize “genocide”? How does his interpretation compare with the legal definition in the
UN Genocide Convention, and framings in comparative genocide studies? Which historical
and contemporary cases does he consider to be emblematic or paradigmatic of genocide? Are
ambiguities, hesitations, and inconsistencies evident in his use of the term? And how does the
language of “H/holocaust” figure in his discourse?
Several caveats are in order. First, although I have delved deeply into Chomsky’s published
output on political themes, this study does not constitute a formal, statistically-guided content
1
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2015, available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wp6Rbgv1MLg).
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in_Fact_%26_Propaganda.
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analysis. Rather, my approach is qualitative, seeking to discern a range of regularities (and some
irregularities) in Chomsky’s references to “genocide,” from his earliest essays to recent times. The
intention is to provide an overview of how an iconic public intellectual has engaged with one of the
iconic concepts and issues of the age.
Second, some of Chomsky’s output is coauthored, most notably with Edward S. Herman (to
whose separately coauthored volume, The Politics of Genocide, Chomsky contributed a highly relevant
foreword) and the Israeli scholar Ilan Pappé. Importantly, both these authors seem substantially
more disposed than Chomsky himself to use the “genocide” term and framework. In the latter
case, I have excluded passages from coauthored volumes where the usage clearly originates
with Pappé. Such distinctions are harder to draw with the Chomsky/Herman coauthored works,
notably the two-volume Political Economy of Human Rights (comprising The Washington Connection
and Third World Fascism and After the Cataclysm) and the book that, probably more than any other,
is associated with Chomsky: Manufacturing Consent.
Third, Chomsky has over the years been the subject of controversy for stances taken with
regard to Holocaust denialists’ right to free speech (most notably in the “Faurisson affair”),5 the
Khmer Rouge genocide in Cambodia,6 and the genocide of Rwandan Tutsis in 1994. I played a
part in the last of these,7 but in the present context, I am interested in them only insofar as they
generated statements and written passages by Chomsky that are directly pertinent to this analysis.
Lastly, I should acknowledge a longstanding personal relationship with Chomsky, extending
back to my first reading of his work in the mid-1980s and subsequent correspondence with the
author. My first published book, Beyond the Barricades,8 was dedicated to him, and I have regularly
acknowledged him in print as a formative intellectual and moral influence.9 My correspondence
with him lasted for roughly a quarter-century, including dozens of exchanges. (There is nothing very
unusual about this: Chomsky is famous for engaging in written exchanges with mostly ordinary
individuals worldwide.) In 1990, I met and interviewed him at his office at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and was invited to a meeting of activists at his home in Lexington,
Massachusetts, where I also met his late wife Carol. I worked alongside Chomsky’s daughter,
Diane, in Managua while conducting research at the offices of the Sandinista paper Barricada for
my M.A. and Ph.D. theses, which formed the basis of the Beyond the Barricades volume.
This article is therefore unlikely to be a hit-piece of the kind that others have regularly crafted
to attack Chomsky10—but neither is it a hagiography. In strongly criticizing Edward Herman’s
coauthored The Politics of Genocide for its reprehensible denial of the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, I
have also decried Chomsky’s decision to attach a foreword to that book, and I offered advice and
guidance to two critics (Roland Moerland and George Monbiot) in their extended correspondence
with him on the subject.11 I hope a critical approach will be evident in my observations here, but if I
have overlooked any notable elements – whether because of my political and personal sympathies
for Chomsky, or through deficiencies of insight and observation – I welcome contributions and
corrections by others. My thanks to Melanie O'Brien and Jo Jones for feedback and proofreading.
See, e.g., Richard Eder, “Chomsky Stirs French Storm in a Demitasse,” The New York Times, January 1, 1981, accessed
March 23, 2019, http://www.nytimes.com/1981/01/01/world/chomsky-stirs-french-storm-in-a-demitasse.html.
6
See, e.g., Donald W. Beachler, “Arguing about Cambodia: Genocide and Political Interest,” in The Genocide Debate:
Politicians, Academics, and Victims by Donald W. Beachler (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 35-58.
7
See Adam Jones, “Denying Rwanda,” in The Scourge of Genocide: Essays and Reflections by Adam Jones (London:
Routledge, 2012), 346-359, available online at http://jonestream.blogspot.ca/2010/11/denying-rwanda-response-toherman.html.
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Press, 2002).

9
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Defining “Genocide”
Given that the term appears regularly in his output, with both support and criticism for its usage,
Chomsky has engaged with the “genocide” concept surprisingly rarely – perhaps mainly when
prodded to do so by interviewers such as David Barsamian, or by a collaborator’s solicitation (I am
thinking of Chomsky’s foreword to The Politics of Genocide). Given the ambiguities and (as I will
show) inconsistencies that arise in his deployment of “genocide,” his definition and understanding
of the concept must be inferred rather than simply cited.
Some of his most detailed and intriguing comments on the subject came in an interview with
Barsamian, a community-radio figure whose conversations with Chomsky have formed the basis
of numerous books. The relevant passages appear in the UK edition of Class Warfare:
Barsamian: I know on Bosnia you received many requests for support of intervention to stop
what people called “genocide.” Was it genocide?
Chomsky: “Genocide” is a term that I myself don’t use even in cases where it might well be
appropriate.
Barsamian: Why not?
Chomsky: I just think the term is way overused. Hitler carried out genocide. That’s true. It
was in the case of the Nazis—a determined and explicit effort to essentially wipe out populations
that they wanted to disappear from the face of the earth. That’s genocide. [Note: all emphases are
added.] The Jews and the Gypsies were the primary victims. There were other cases where
there has been mass killing. The highest per capita death rate in the world since the 1970s
has been East Timor. In the late 1970s it was by far in the lead. Nevertheless, I wouldn’t
call it genocide. I don’t think it was a planned effort to wipe out the entire population, though
it may well have killed off a quarter or so of the population. In the case of Bosnia – where
the proportions killed are far less – it was horrifying, but it was certainly far less than that,
whatever judgment one makes, even the more extreme judgments. I just am reluctant to
use the term. I don’t think it’s an appropriate one. So I don’t use it myself. But if people
want to use it, fine. It’s like most of the other terms of political discourse. It has whatever
meaning you decide to give it. So the question is basically unanswerable. It depends what
your criteria are for calling something genocide.12

A number of insights can be gleaned from this exchange. The first is Chomsky’s obvious
hesitation and skepticism with regard to the “genocide” label – not least because of its vagueness
and imprecision (“It has whatever meaning you decide to give it”), as well as its politicization, a
subject I explore in detail later.
To highlight some key vocabulary in Chomsky’s comments, he appears to assert that genocide
represents a “planned,” “determined,” and “explicit effort” to exterminate (“wipe out”) given
“populations” whose “disappear[ance] from the face of the earth” perpetrators hold to be desirable
and/or necessary. His deployment of Nazi genocide grants it primacy, perhaps uniqueness in the
historical record, though as we will see, one other clear-cut case of genocide is regularly mentioned
in Chomsky’s work, and others are cited with qualifications.
Notable as well in the passage is Chomsky’s distinction between “genocide” and “mass
killing,” with East Timor and Bosnia cited as examples of the latter. What distinguishes them,
apparently, is the quantitative scale and totalizing exterminatory character of the genocidal enterprise.
Chomsky’s framing is thus in line with the “hardest,” meaning most restrictive and exclusionary,
of genocide definitions in the existing scholarship.
To flesh out Chomsky’s understanding, it is worth citing statements included in a CityTVToronto news report on protests by Cambodian refugees against one of his speaking appearances.
Chomsky referred to “the standard picture in the media” that the Khmer Rouge, under Pol Pot’s
leadership, “had taken credit for – had boasted, in fact – of having killed two million people in

12
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a unified, mass genocide campaign.”13 In Chomsky’s framing, the word “unified” seems to buttress
the “planned”/centrally-directed aspect of true or full genocide, while the “mass” also hints
at its totalizing, or at least extremely largescale character. In this context, note also Chomsky’s
qualification of the East Timor atrocities in Turning the Tide. As we will see, Chomsky cites the
Indonesian mass killing in Timor as perhaps the closest post-World War Two parallel to Nazi
genocide, but adds that “some barriers were placed in the way of the consummation of genocide”
– again suggesting that genocide, to qualify as such, must be “consummated,” i.e. fully or nearlyfully exterminatory.14
In addition to meshing with more limited and exclusionary framings of “genocide,” Chomsky’s
totalizing emphasis is at odds with the definition advanced in the 1948 United Nations Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, with its well-known but imprecise
phrasing of “destruction … in whole or in part.” On at least one occasion, in For Reasons of State,
Chomsky has acknowledged the distinction. Stating that “some may be reluctant (as I have been
personally) to use such terms as ‘genocide’” with regard to US crimes in Indochina, he added in
a footnote: “The question whether the term is technically appropriate, in the light of the United Nations
Convention of 1948, is a different matter.”15
What of the distinguishing characteristics of the “populations” targeted by (genuine/full-scale)
genocide – especially regarding the four protected groups in the Genocide Convention? I am not
aware of a specific comment on this subject, but based on my general survey of Chomsky’s usage,
they seem parallel with the “national,” “ethnic,” and “racial” groups – though not religious groups
– protected under the Convention. Chomsky’s references to genocide as a possible consummation
of structural and institutional forms of violence might lead us to add a class component to the mix,
that is, the mass extermination of the poor by the privileged. I consider this aspect in greater detail
below. Likewise, Chomsky’s attention to the mass killings in Indonesia in 1965-66—targeting actual
or alleged members and supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)—and in Central
America during the 1970s and 1980s (El Salvador and Nicaragua, as distinct from Guatemala)
suggest an openness to including political targets of proto-genocidal or quasi-genocidal violence
(overlapping, I sense, with social class/underprivilege). I know of no reference, however, to gender
groups as targets of such violence.
Genocide: Paradigmatic Cases
In all of Chomsky’s work that I have consulted, I find only one modern (post-Columbian) historical
case that he has consistently and without qualification cited as “genocide,” and another for which
near-consistency and a nearly-complete absence of qualifications are hallmarks.
“The Nazi Holocaust”
I quote this phrasing16 to convey that Chomsky’s understanding of Nazi policy and mass atrocities
extends beyond the attempted destruction of European Jews. Chomsky is regularly at pains not to
portray the Jewish Holocaust as unique. In particular, he has regularly stressed the comparable and
contemporary genocide of the Roma/Gypsies and has referred to the Nazis’ multiple “genocidal
projects,”17 though without specifying them beyond the destruction of the Roma (Porajmos, or
Devouring). In particular, I am unaware of any reference in this context to the Nazis’ targeting for
destruction of the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe.
Nonetheless, Chomsky emphatically considers the “Nazi genocide”18 to be unique in the
historical record. This is evident, and perhaps most explicit, in the lengthy passage from his
conversation with David Barsamian, cited earlier (see note 12).

16

Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: Israel, the United States, and the Palestinians (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1984), 94.

17

Noam Chomsky, The Culture of Terrorism (Boston: South End Press, 1988), 255.

18

Noam Chomsky, Year 501: The Conquest Continues (Boston: South End Press, 1993), 71.
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His best-known (because frequently self-cited) description of the Nazi Holocaust, in Peace in the
Middle East?, portrays it as “the most fantastic outburst of collective insanity in human history.”19 In
The Culture of Terrorism, Chomsky describes “the Nazi atrocities, needless to say,” as “vastly beyond
any comparison even to what we have been considering here” (i.e., various atrocities perpetrated
by or with the complicity of the United States).20 Consider also this exchange with Barsamian:
Barsamian: I think, and I hope you’ll agree, that what was radically different between what
the Nazis did and what we [the US] did in Vietnam was the intent. The Nazis intended to
exterminate the Jewish population of Europe. The intent in Vietnam was not genocide.
Chomsky: I’d never call what happened in Vietnam genocide. That’s not the right term for
it. I agree, it was totally different. I can’t recall anyone suggesting otherwise.21 Actually, it’s
different in all sorts of respects. The Nazis really are historically unique. There have been a lot of
atrocities in human history, but industrialized mass extermination of the style that the Nazis carried
out is off the spectrum. There’s just nothing that compares to it. The Jews and the Roma, the
people we call Gypsies, were treated about the same way, and some other groups [n.b.]. That
was unique.22

Note that in this passage, the verdict of the Nazis’ “historical uniqueness” and incomparability
is based primarily on the unique strategy employed (“industrialized mass extermination”), rather
than the elements of massive scale and near-total extermination (or intended extermination). But
elsewhere, Chomsky has described Nazi genocide in more general moral terms as “probably the
world’s most horrifying atrocity.”23 In his controversial foreword to Herman and Peterson’s The
Politics of Genocide, Chomsky quotes approvingly the authors’ description of the Nazi genocide
as “the crime of the 20th Century for which the term originally was coined,” and of applications of
“genocide” to subsequent cases as excessively “frequent,” “reckless,” and “often … debased.”24
The effect of the authors’ argument, Chomsky claimed, is to show that such usage “is an insult to
the memory of victims of the Nazis.”25 Similar language is deployed in A New Generation Draws the
Line, to dismiss applications of the “genocide” discourse to the Kosovo case. Such “propaganda,”
in Chomsky’s view, constitutes “a form of Holocaust revisionism … a bitter insult to the memory
of Hitler’s victims.”26
Chomsky’s assertion of the specifically anti-Jewish component of the Nazi genocide is
accompanied by biting critiques of the way the Shoah, in his view, has been exploited shamefully
for political (especially pro-Israel) ends. This is considered in a separate section below (“The
Holocaust: Memory and Propaganda”), where I point out Chomsky’s regular pairing of the Shoah
with the Porajmos, in which he emphasizes the distinct and highly politicized disparity in the
attention accorded to each. What merits attention here is Chomsky’s citing of the two atrocities in
a way that stresses their essential comparability. “The Gypsies were treated just like the Jews in
the Holocaust,” he tells Barsamian in How the World Works, “but nobody’s batting an eyelash about
that because nobody gives a damn about the Gypsies.”27 A comment included in the companion
volume to the Manufacturing Consent documentary refers to “the Gypsies, who were killed at the
same time, in the same manner, for the same reasons, and in about the same proportions” as the
Jews.28 A slightly more extended version of the argument is found in another conversation with
Barsamian:
Take the gypsies. Nobody supports the gypsies. You don’t have to worry about alienating
anyone. There isn’t much study of the gypsies because nobody cares about them, and you
know how everybody hates them anyhow, so they don’t study it. But there is a Romani
intelligentsia that’s done research on the treatment of the Romani people by the Nazis and
it looks pretty parallel to the way the Jews were treated. There are people who just flat out
deny that in the most vulgar fashion.29

Thus, in contrast to some genocide scholars (e.g. Steven Katz, Yehuda Bauer) who favor a
Holocaust uniqueness framework, Chomsky deploys something like a Nazi uniqueness framing, one
that stresses the morally abysmal nature and systematically/industrially exterminatory strategy of
Nazi crimes against Jews, Gypsies, and unspecified “other groups.”
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Indigenous Peoples of the Americas
Only slightly less emphatically a case (or set of cases) of genocide, for Chomsky, is the destruction
of the Americas’ indigenous populations by both Anglo-American and Iberian invaders. Indeed,
this is probably the context in which Chomsky most frequently and explicitly deploys the “genocide” concept.
Typical references to this “notable chapter in the history of genocide”30 include the following:
Here in the United States, we just committed genocide. Period. Pure genocide. And it wasn’t
just in the United States, it was all up and down the Hemisphere. … Throughout American
history this genocide has been accepted as perfectly legitimate.31
[The indigenous population was] slaughtered, decimated, and dispersed in the course of one
of the greatest exercises in genocide in human history. ... In short, mass genocide [occurred], on a
colossal scale, which we celebrate each October when we honor Columbus – a notable mass
murderer himself – on Columbus Day.32
Spanish explorers set about what Tzvetan Todorov calls “the greatest genocide in human
history” after they “discovered America” 500 years ago.33
In the Andean region and Mexico there were very extensive Indian societies, and they’re
mostly gone. Many of them were just totally murdered or wiped out, others succumbed
to European-brought diseases. This is massive genocide, long before the emergence of
thetwentieth century nation-state. It may be one of the most, if not the most extreme example from
history, but far from the only one. These are facts that we don’t recognize.34

As these passages suggest, Chomsky’s emphasis on genocide in the Americas, and particularly
in the United States,35 reflects his conviction that not only do these atrocities not arouse the same
revulsion as Nazi genocide, but they are standardly suppressed and denied in mainstream
discourse,36 addressed in a qualified or ambivalent fashion, and even positively commemorated
and openly celebrated.37 In this sense, their contemporary political significance and the moral
lessons to be drawn from them may surpass the Nazi Holocaust. Indeed, as the final indented quote
suggests, the genocides may be even more “extreme” than Nazi genocide (in their more “massive”
exterminatory impact, for example), even if the Nazis’ recourse to industrialized extermination
heightens their genocides’ uniqueness.
30

Chomsky, Turning the Tide, 39.
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The New Press, 2002), 135-136.
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exploits we celebrate each October” (Chomsky, Turning the Tide, 146).
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Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (London: Verso, 1991), 360.
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Chomsky, Chronicles of Dissent, 10.
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In the US context, he also notes genocidal attacks against specific indigenous nations, e.g. in his reference to “the Native
American Montauketts, who were destroyed in the US genocide” (Noam Chomsky and Ilan Pappé, Gaza in Crisis:
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See, e.g., Chomsky’s critique of the “liberal political analyst Russell Baker,” whom he quotes as describing North
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Of particular relevance to Chomsky’s broader understanding of genocide, and to current
scholarly debates over genocide and modernity, is an exchange with David Barsamian, who asked
him: “Could you talk about the twentieth century nation-state? … What is it in its makeup that
permits … genocide?” Chomsky demurred in his response:
I don’t entirely [agree]. I think there’s some truth to it, simply because the modern nationstate and the European model, that is, including the United States, happened to be by
historical standards enormously powerful. The degree of power in the hands of a modern
nation-state is something with no historical parallel. This power is centrally controlled to a
very high extent with a very limited degree of popular participation in how that power is
exercised. Also, we have an awesome increase in the level of power in the hands of the state,
and as a result we have an enormous amount of violence. However, it’s very misleading to think
of, say, genocide as being a twentieth century phenomenon.38

Genocide: Secondary Cases
A range of additional cases of “genocide” may be held to occupy a secondary tier in Chomsky’s
analysis, on the grounds that (1) he cites them less regularly and spontaneously than he does
the Nazi and indigenous-American examples; and/or (2) the “genocide” descriptor is more
likely to be quoted from other sources; and/or (3) Chomsky hedges the cases with qualifications,
circumlocutions, and ambiguities/inconsistencies of terminology.
Biblical Genocide
Though he touches on this subject only in passing, Chomsky’s framing of the mass violence
depicted in the core Judeo-Christian texts is emphatic. “Probably the extremes of savagery –
recorded savagery, at least – are in the earliest histories, in the Bible,” he declares in Rogue States:
I suppose that in the entire literary canon there is nothing that exalts genocide with such
fervor and dedication and enthusiasm as the commandments of the warrior God to his
chosen people – for example, his commandments delivered to King Saul by the prophet
Samuel, who was the most just of the judges, and who conveyed the commandment to Saul
to attack Amalek and spare nothing, killing all men, women, infants, and sucklings, oxen
and sheep, camels and asses – the reason being that centuries earlier the Amalekites had
stood in the way of the Hebrews conquering their Holy Land. Saul, as you may remember,
spared one person, the king of Amalek, and some of the cattle. Samuel, when he discovered
this, was enraged and cut down the captured prisoner before the Lord at Gilgal. And so the
story continues.39

Likewise, in The Fateful Triangle, Chomsky cited “the genocidal texts that appear in the book
of Joshua and elsewhere [in the Hebrew Bible].”40 In Imperial Ambitions, he described “massacres,
like the Pequot massacre” of indigenous peoples in North America as “just like chapters out of the
most genocidal parts of the Bible, which in fact the settlers quoted liberally.”41
The Armenian Genocide
Without exception in my sample of dozens of his works, Chomsky’s comments on the Ottoman
destruction of the Armenian population occur in response to questions put to him by David
Barsamian, who is of Armenian descent. Chomsky is straightforward in referring to it as “the
Armenian genocide,” as in an exchange printed in Stenographers to Power, and deploring “our casual
attitude towards [it].”42 Nonetheless, it is worth noting the instrumental use to which Chomsky
puts this recognition: pivoting off the “genocide” to emphasize the politicization of the term and
concept, and the obfuscation or outright denial of this and other genocides. “For example, I would
39
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wager that more people are aware of the Armenian genocide during the First World War than are
aware of the Indonesian genocide in 1965,” he tells Barsamian in the same conversation.43
Of special relevance, for Chomsky, is Israel’s longstanding refusal to recognize the Armenian
genocide, and its attempts to suppress domestic discussion of it. “Israel has been very strongly
opposed to efforts to bring the Armenian genocide into consideration,” he tells Barsamian in
Chronicles of Dissent. “The extent of this is really astonishing.”44 Then there is this exchange in
Power Systems:
Barsamian: And now there’s a report that Israel, which has long denied the Armenian
genocide, is considering a resolution condemning it, primarily to irritate the Turks, who
they know are hypersensitive to any mention of the Armenian genocide.
Chomsky: It cuts both ways. Israel and Turkey were pretty close allies. In fact, Turkey was
Israel’s closest ally, apart from the United States. Their connection was kept under cover,
but it was perfectly clear from the late 1950s on. It was very important for Israel to have
a powerful non-Arab state ally. Turkey and Iran under the shah were very close to Israel.
At that time, Israel refused to allow any discussion of the Armenian genocide. … At that
time, Turkey was an ally, so you didn’t talk about the Armenian genocide. Now, as you say,
relations are frayed, so you can sort of stick it to the Turks. You can talk about it now.45

Genocide scholars may be interested, even a little amused, to see Chomsky’s multiple references
in this context to his personal relationship with one of the pioneers of our field – someone who,
at least in communications with me, has been harshly critical of Chomsky. As Chomsky relates to
Barsamian,
In 1982, Israel Charny, somebody I knew as a kid in Hebrew camp, organized a Holocaust
conference in Israel. He wanted to invite someone to talk about the Armenian atrocities, and
the government tried to block it. In fact, they pressured Elie Wiesel, who was supposed to
be the honorary chair, to resign. The conference organizers went ahead with it anyway, over
strong government opposition.46

Note also the similar comments in World Orders, Old and New:
I keep learning new things about [Israeli opposition] all the time. For example, in 1982 there
was a conference on genocide in Israel. It was organized by a childhood friend of mine. He
is a psychologist there. The conference was dealing with all kinds of genocide. The Israeli
government put pressure upon it to drop the Armenian genocide. They allowed the others,
but not the Armenian one. The honorary chairman was to have been Elie Wiesel, and he
was pressured by the government to withdraw, and being a loyal commissar as he is, he
withdrew from the conference because the Israeli government had said they didn’t want
[the] Armenian genocide brought up.47

These intriguing references aside, we should link Chomsky’s comments on this genocide to his
broader critique of Israeli/Zionist manipulations of a Holocaust (Shoah) discourse, designed among
other things to preserve it as a unique historical crime. This is examined in greater detail below.
With this incorporation of the Armenian and Biblical cases, I believe we have exhausted those
to which Chomsky has unhesitatingly and consistently applied the “genocide” appellation. The
43
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remaining cases in this section are ones in which Chomsky has deployed a genocide framing,
while sometimes offsetting a clear verdict with more qualified ones or limiting the “genocide”
references to quoted passages. They still merit discussion here, though, since the ambiguities and
inconsistencies are substantially less pronounced than for cases noted in the subsequent section of
the article.
Indonesia in 1965-66
I have already cited Chomsky’s “wager” comparing awareness of “the Armenian genocide” to that
of “the Indonesian genocide of 1965.” The passage continues by citing a death toll of “700,000 people
… massacred within a couple of months” (an understatement of the duration of the killing).48 Note
Chomsky’s comment, immediately following: “That genocide was used, including by American
liberals, I should say, as justification for our war in Indochina.” Notable, too, is a pair of references
to the Indonesian “holocaust,” in the first work that Chomsky coauthored with Edward S. Herman,
the pamphlet Counter-Revolutionary Violence: Bloodbaths in Fact and Propaganda. “The [Indonesian]
army played a key role in this holocaust, doing a large part of the killing directly … and actively
stimulating an anti-Communist hysteria that contributed greatly to wholesale mass murder,” and “…
The American response to the holocaust proper was restrained.”49
It is rare for “holocaust” to be deployed in this manner in Chomsky’s sole-authored writings
and spoken declarations. As with the much more extensive and substantial critique of Indonesian
mass atrocities in East Timor, explored next, one suspects that the terminology reflects his coauthor
Herman’s preferred phrasing more than his own.
East Timor
Aside from the contemporary Cambodian case with which it is generally paired, it is possible that
no other genocide or quasi-genocide receives such extensive attention and detailed exploration in
Chomsky’s writings as that of East Timor. Whatever reservations and furious accusations have been
directed at Chomsky and his co-author, Edward S. Herman, for their treatment of genocide under
the Khmer Rouge (see “Cambodia: ‘Allegations of Genocide,’” below), one must acknowledge
that their meticulous documentation and ringing condemnation of Indonesian atrocities in Timor
were crucial in drawing activist and, eventually, mainstream attention to those crimes. This, in
turn, helped to pave the way for the worldwide outpouring of protest during the final Indonesian
crackdown in 1999, at the time of the UN-supervised plebiscite on Timorese independence.
Incorporating the Timorese case in our analysis is somewhat complicated by the uncertain
authorship of passages in Chomsky’s key coauthored work with Herman, The Washington Connection
and Third World Fascism (volume one of their seminal two-volume study, The Political Economy of
Human Rights). Section 3.4.4 of this book is titled “East Timor: Genocide on the Sly”50 – the only
time, to my knowledge, that “genocide” has appeared in the section heading of a work authored
or coauthored by Chomsky. One senses, nonetheless, that this was more at Herman’s behest than
Chomsky’s, given the former’s demonstrably greater interest in the subject and readiness to deploy
the term in some depth. (As noted, this culminated in Herman’s disgracefully denialist 2010 screed,
The Politics of Genocide, coauthored with David Peterson and featuring Chomsky’s foreword.)
Chomsky’s own verdict on Indonesian crimes in East Timor has been both equally trenchant
and more varied in its language. At times, a “genocide” framing seems straightforward, as in
comments quoted in Mark Achbar’s Manufacturing Consent documentary companion. Media
silence about atrocities in Timor, Chomsky claimed, extends
way beyond just demonstrating the subservience of the media to power. I mean, they have
real complicity in genocide in this case. The reason that the atrocities can go on is because
Barsamian, Stenographers to Power, 77-78.
Chomsky and Herman, Counter-Revolutionary Violence, unpaginated.
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nobody knows about them. If anyone knew about them there would be protests and
pressures to stop them. So therefore, by suppressing the facts, the media are making a major
contribution to some of the – probably the worst act of genocide since the Holocaust.51

“… Genocide in East Timor [is something] we [i.e., the US] can support,” Chomsky declares
in Understanding Power.52 Elsewhere in the volume, which compiles spoken presentations over
the years, he states: “And this is genocide, if you want to use the term, for which the United States
continues to be directly responsible.”53 The “if you want …” phrasing here points again to
Chomsky’s ambivalence toward “genocide.” I will explore some of his hesitations and reservations
with regard to East Timor as an illustrative case in the section on “Quasi-Genocide,” below.
Guatemala
On several occasions, Chomsky has directly applied a genocide framing to the Guatemalan genocide
of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In Rogue States, he cites the UN-sponsored Historical Clarification
Commission’s “attribut[ion of] virtually all of the atrocities – and they are monstrous, up to
genocide – to the government.”54 He refers to “the genocide in Guatemala” in Understanding Power,
condemning Israeli “support” for the genocide.55 In The Fateful Triangle, and in conversation with
Barsamian in Chronicles of Dissent, he again focuses on Israel’s role as “a militarized dependency”
of the US - “technologically advanced and ready to undertake tasks that few are willing to endure
– support for Guatemalan genocide, for example”56 or as a “dependable, reliable ally … [who] will
do what we [the US] want, like, say, support genocide in Guatemala or whatever.”57 He accused Elie
Wiesel of ignoring “ongoing genocide in Guatemala, with tens of thousands of Indians slaughtered,”58
and of playing up the more politically convenient case of the Miskito Indians of Nicaragua (see
further discussion in “Genocide: Politicization and Misrepresentation,” below).
On other occasions, Chomsky has chosen to cite others’ applications of “genocide” to this case,
as when he speaks of “massacres that the conservative [Guatemalan] Church hierarchy calls ‘genocide’”;59
or to qualify his language significantly, as when he states that “Despite all the terror in Guatemala
– you could even call it something like genocide – the working-class unions are reconstituting, they’re
still there.”60 I likewise cite other examples of these qualified phrasings in the section on “QuasiGenocide.”
El Salvador
As with the Guatemalan case, Chomsky has been forceful in applying a “genocide” framing to the
mass atrocities of the 1980s in neighboring El Salvador. But to my knowledge, he has always done
so indirectly, that is, by supportively citing commentators who use the term. An apparent exception
is his comment in Necessary Illusions, noting the assumption of US “hawks and doves alike that
it would have been a major crime to provide the defenseless [Salvadoran] civilian population
with means to defend themselves against a war of extermination and genocide – at least, when the
war is conducted by US clients, with US support and, as it reached its climax, direct organization
Achbar, Manufacturing Consent, 116. To an extent that I think is unmatched by any other case, Chomsky has regularly
attached the “worst since the Holocaust” designation to Indonesian crimes in Timor, but generally with the
qualification that this judgment is merited “relative to the population” (e.g. Chomsky, Understanding Power, 295, using
the term “slaughter”; see also Noam Chomsky, Powers and Prospects: Reflections on Human Nature and the Social Order
(Boston: South End Press, 1996), 174, and Chomsky, Chronicles of Dissent, 261, referring to the “worst massacre ...”).
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and participation.”61 However, the italicized phrase is repeated from the verdict of Salvadoran
Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas cited in the preceding paragraph (and regularly elsewhere in
Chomsky’s corpus).62
Other sources deployed to buttress the genocide framing for El Salvador include the French
journalist Édouard Bailby, who in Chomsky’s account
gives a detailed report of massacres, brutality, mutilation, and terror on the part of the
[Salvadoran] armed forces that are “a true repetition of the methods utilized by the SS during
the second world war,” since the Sumpul River massacre [May 1980], when “the genocide
began,” at times with the assistance of the Honduran army.63

– and a report from the Costa Rican journal Mesoamerica about the visit of Salvadorean president
José Napoleón Duarte to Brazil, during which “Duarte’s daughter broke into tears … amidst boos
and hisses by angry crowds waving signs saying ‘Duarte is a murderer, a genocide’” (i.e. a génocidaire;
presumably in Mesoamerica’s Spanish rendering, un genocidio).64
Iraq: The Kurds, Sanctions, Fallujah
In highlighting US support for the Saddam Hussein regime in its war against Iran, during which it
also inflicted mass extermination upon Iraqi Kurds, Chomsky avoided passing a personal verdict
of “genocide,” but supportively quoted a US government delegation that did:
An investigative team sent by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1988 found
“overwhelming evidence of extensive use of chemical weapons against civilians,” charging
that Western acquiescence in Iraqi use of such weapons against Iran had emboldened
Saddam to believe – correctly – that he could use them against his own people with impunity
– actually against Kurds, hardly “the people” of this tribal-based thug. The chair of the
committee, Claiborne Pell, introduced the Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988, denouncing
silence “while people are gassed” as “complicity,” much as when “the world was silent as
Hitler began a campaign that culminated in the near extermination of Europe’s Jews,” and
warning that “we cannot be silent to genocide again.”65

Chomsky adopted a similar strategy, perhaps more cautiously but much more frequently, in
condemning the system of sanctions imposed on the Iraqi regime and population following the
Gulf War of 1990-91. As is frequently the case in his writings and interviews, his intent was often
to highlight the politicization of “genocide,” and the reluctance of the US in particular to apply
the term to atrocities that it perpetrated or supported. Thus, in Hopes and Prospects, he cites the
conclusion of the erstwhile director of the UN’s Oil-for-Food program, Hans von Sponeck, “that
the sanctions violated the Genocide Convention.”66
“None of this can ever be mentioned, even in passing, by those who strike heroic poses about
the alleged ‘genocides’ perpetrated by official enemies,” Chomsky wrote, “while scrupulously
avoiding or denying our own crimes, a form of depravity that is not unusual among sectors of
educated opinion.”67 Again reflecting both his readiness to cite the “genocide” charge, and his
hesitation about the concept, Chomsky wrote in Middle East Illusions, “The only serious question
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about the UN sanctions is whether they are simply terrible crimes or whether they are literally genocidal,
as charged by those who have the most intimate acquaintance with the situation …”68
Lastly with regard to Iraq, as a scholar who has written extensively about the gender dimension
of genocidal strategies, I was intrigued to come across Chomsky’s comments, in Imperial Ambitions,
about the siege and battle for Fallujah/Falluja following the 2003 overthrow of the Ba’thist regime
and the rise of Sunni resistance to the US occupiers. “If civilians managed to flee Falluja, they were
allowed out – except for men,” Chomsky noted:
Men of roughly military age were turned back. That’s what happened in Srebrenica in 1995.
The only difference is the United States bombed the Iraqis out of the city, they didn’t truck
them out. Women and children were allowed to leave; men were stopped, if they were found,
and sent back. They were supposed to be killed. That’s universally called genocide, when the
Serbs do it. When we do it, it’s liberation.69

Structural and Economic Violence: The “Silent Genocide”
The bulk of Chomsky’s enormous published output on political themes focuses on imperial
violence in countries and regions of the Global South, most notably Latin America, the Middle
East, and Southeast Asia (he has had notably little to say about Sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia).
More global and structural themes have not escaped his notice, however, as is evident in his regular
commentary about poverty and inequality, climate change and environmental degradation, and
corporate depredations fuelled by capitalist and neoliberal ideologies.
What role has a “genocide” framing played here? Of particular relevance is Chomsky’s repeated
citing of a mid-1990s claim by Hiroshi Nakajima, director of the World Health Organization, that
a “silent genocide” was inherent in the deaths of an estimated 11 million children annually from
preventable diseases, “because the developed world lacks the will to provide the meagre resources
needed to overcome” it.70 The “‘silent genocide’ could be brought to a quick end,” Chomsky argued,
“if resources were directed to human needs rather than enrichment of a few.”71 “We would not
hesitate to describe these policies as genocidal if they were implemented by some official enemy,”
he added in Powers and Prospects.72
In World Orders, Old and New, Chomsky cited “chronic starvation” and declining “food
consumption … while food exports boom” in both Latin America and India, quoting allegations
that this constituted “economic genocide.”73 Corporate complicity in genocide is noted in the
context of news media, as in this pithy exchange with David Barsamian in Power and Terror:
Noam Chomsky, Middle East Illusions (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 200.
Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions, 27. Lest this passage be taken as suggesting that Chomsky is sympathetic to a “genocide”
framing for the Fallujah events, see the comments in his correspondence with George Monbiot, “Correspondence
with Noam Chomsky,” May 21, 2012, accessed March 31, 2019, https://www.monbiot.com/2012/05/21/2181/. “Take
a concrete case: the murder of thousands of men and boys after women and children are allowed to flee if they can
get away. I’m referring to Fallujah, different from Srebrenica in many ways, among them that in the latter case the
women and children were trucked out, and in the former case the destruction and slaughter was so extreme that
current studies in medical journals estimate the scale of radiation-related deaths and diseases at beyond the level
of Hiroshima. I would not however call it ‘genocide,’ nor would you, and if the word were used, the more extreme apologists
for western crimes … would go utterly berserk.” The massacre cited alongside Fallujah—Srebrenica in 1995—Chomsky
called a “mass slaughter … certainly a horror story and major crime, but to call it ‘genocide’ so cheapens the word as to
constitute virtual Holocaust denial, in my opinion. It amazes me that intelligent people cannot see that.”
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Barsamian: So what prevents something like East Timor or other issues from arising [in media
coverage]? Why isn’t there more dissent in the media? Is it just that people don’t want to hear
it, so they’re not going to make money?
Chomsky: Why should a major corporation be interested in exposing the fact that they’re
involved in genocide?
Barsamian: They’re not. It’s the US government.
Chomsky: They’re part of the system that runs the US government.74

Readers of Chomsky’s Deterring Democracy are unlikely to forget his brilliant polemic against
the global tobacco industry, which he likened to the Opium Wars of the 19th century, with poisonous
products being pushed on populations – via marketing – in the Global South. In this context,
Chomsky wrote, “it might be fair to warn of the blurring of the boundary between narcotrafficking and
genocide.”75
In recent years in particular, environmental destruction and anthropogenic climate change
have moved to the forefront of both global concerns and Chomsky’s.76 “… We are moving toward
what may in fact be the ultimate genocide – the destruction of the environment,” Chomsky claimed
in On Western Terrorism. “And this is barely being addressed; in fact, the United States is going
backwards on it.”77
In light of Chomsky’s anarchist political sympathies, I find a final example of (potential)
structural/economic “genocide” to be especially intriguing, perhaps unexpected. In an exchange
reprinted in the collection Chomsky on Anarchism, Barry Pateman asked Chomsky for his thoughts
on those who argue that societies need to “step back, or forward in their eyes, to a more natural,
organic world of nature. Is that possible?” Chomsky’s response:
You know, I sympathize with people who say that, but I do not think that they are realizing
that what they are calling for is the mass genocide of millions of people because of the way society
is now structured and organized, urban life and so forth. If you eliminate these structures
everybody dies. For example, I can’t grow my own food. It’s a nice idea, but it’s not going to
work, not in this world. And, in fact, none of us want to live a hunter-gatherer life. There are
just too many things in life that the modern world offers us. In just plain terms of survival,
what they are calling for is the worst mass genocide in human history. And, unless one thinks
through these things, it’s not really serious.78

Cambodia: “Allegations of Genocide”
The Cambodian genocide of 1975-78 is certainly the most contentious and complex case in
Chomsky’s oeuvre, and deserves a section to itself. It underpinned the second (chronologically)
of the three substantial genocide-related controversies in which Chomsky has been embroiled
during his career. The first of these – the “Faurisson affair,” beginning in the late 1970s – is not
addressed here.79 The most recent controversy, over Herman and Peterson’s The Politics of Genocide,
is likewise not explored beyond a citation from Chomsky’s foreword. In neither of these cases was
Chomsky’s presentation of the mass atrocities – in the Nazi and Rwandan genocides, respectively
– at the heart of the dispute. Indeed, in the sample set of his writings consulted here, and to my
knowledge outside it, Chomsky has had surprisingly little to say about either genocide as such – he
has displayed greater interest in the way the Holocaust has been used for political purposes than in
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how it unfolded historically. And he has written and said virtually nothing about the 1994 genocide
in Rwanda; the shocking misrepresentation of this case in The Politics of Genocide is Herman and
Peterson’s. (I will have a little more to say about Chomsky’s cursory presentation of the Rwandan
case in the section on “Genocide and Humanitarian Intervention,” below.)
The Cambodian/Khmer Rouge case is notably different, in that Chomsky, mostly in work
coauthored with Herman, passed judgment on both the political use and representation of Khmer
Rouge atrocities, and the empirical characteristics and appropriate contextual framing of the events
themselves. Some brief notes on the background are thus required before we turn to Chomsky’s
written and spoken declarations on the subject.
Chomsky rose to public prominence through his writings on the US attacks on Indochina
in the 1960s and 1970s, and the role he played in the antiwar movement from the mid-sixties
onward. In June 1977, just over two years after the Khmer Rouge vanquished the Lon Nol regime
in Cambodia, seized power, and renamed the country “Democratic Kampuchea,” Chomsky and
Herman published an article, “Distortions at Fourth Hand,” which addressed media coverage
and intellectual commentary about both postwar Vietnam and Cambodia.80 The article challenged
mainstream US reportage on Vietnam, contrasting it with more favorable but obscurely-published
evaluations. Much of the same approach featured in the authors’ treatment of Cambodia. The
prevalent inattention to the country prior to the Khmer Rouge seizure of power was contrasted with
the widespread allegations of mass atrocities thereafter, when “useful lessons [could] be drawn and
public opinion mobilized in directions advantageous to the established order.” This “didacticism,”
Chomsky and Herman wrote in The Nation, “often plays fast and loose with the truth.”
Their review of “sharply conflicting assessments” of Khmer Rouge policies between April
1975 and early 1977 included the caveat that “We do not pretend to know where the truth lies
…” Nonetheless, they criticized the prevailing/mainstream readiness to accept as fact “evidence”
that they argued was fabricated or highly dubious, and condemned “extreme anti-Khmer
Rouge distortions” in, for example, John Barron and Anthony Paul’s Murder in a Gentle Land: The
Untold Story of Communist Genocide in Cambodia. This work, which assigned to the Khmer Rouge
responsibility for over a million excess deaths during the period, they described as “a third-rate
propaganda tract” featuring “scholarship [that] collapses under the barest scrutiny.”
With regard to the claimed death toll in Cambodia during the first two years of Khmer Rouge
rule, Chomsky and Herman assigned primary responsibility to “the enormous destruction and
murder resulting directly from the American [aerial-bombing] attack on Cambodia, the starvation
and epidemics as the population was driven from their countryside by American military terror
and the US-incited civil war.” They also cited reports running counter to the mainstream portrayal,
which
concluded that executions have numbered at most in the thousands; [and] that these were
localized in areas of limited Khmer Rouge influence and unusual peasant discontent,
where brutal revenge killings were aggravated by the threat of starvation resulting from
the American destruction and killing. These reports also emphasize both the extraordinary
brutality on both sides during the civil war (provoked by the American attack) and repeated
discoveries that massacre reports were false. They also testify to the extreme unreliability of
refugee reports, and the need to treat them with great caution ...81

Chomsky and Herman suggested that available evidence did not support comparisons of the
Khmer Rouge with the Nazis (including the claim in an April 1977 United Press International (UPI)
press report that 1.2 million people “have been killed or have died as a result of the Communist
regime since April 17, 1975”). A “more nearly correct” assessment, they stated, could be that
“Cambodia is more similar to France after liberation, where many thousands of people were
massacred within a few months under far less rigorous conditions than those left by the American
80
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war.” Evidence had been “seriously distorted,” they claimed, “emphasizing alleged Khmer Rouge
atrocities and downplaying or ignoring the crucial US role, direct and indirect, in the torment
that Cambodia has suffered.” Critiques focusing on “the American role,” they wrote, were being
“ignored, not on the basis of truthfulness or scholarship but because the message is unpalatable.”
I quote at length from this earliest published commentary by Chomsky on Cambodia because
its core themes and arguments have underpinned his references to “genocide” under the Khmer
Rouge. These include:
• Skepticism toward “state-directed genocide.” Writing again with Herman, in After the
Cataclysm, Chomsky argued “there may be a good deal of local variation rather than the coordinated
campaign of state-directed genocide that the media and their main sources prefer.”82 A “crucial
element” in the prevailing propaganda portrait, they argue, is “that the Khmer Rouge leadership
was committed to systematic massacre and starvation of the population it held in its grip, that is, to
‘autogenocide.’ It would be of little use to contemporary Western ideology if it were to be shown that
peasant revenge, undisciplined troops and similar factors (still worse, the legacy of the US attack)
were responsible for deaths and killings in Cambodia.”83
Note also the distinctions drawn in the following two, very similar passages:
By mid-1977, according to US intelligence, the death toll [in Cambodia] had reached “tens
if not hundreds of thousands,” mostly from disease, malnutrition, and overwork, the result
primarily of “brutal, rapid change,” not “mass genocide” …; this assessment, ignored at the
time since it did not satisfy the current propaganda requirements, is now quite generally
confirmed by subsequent scholarship.84
… The chorus of protest over Khmer Rouge “genocide” or “autogenocide” reached its peak
of outrage in early 1977, at a time when State Department intelligence – the only source with
substantial information – estimated the toll at “tens if not hundreds of thousands” from
all causes, primarily “disease, malnutrition or other factors” rather than outright killing – an
estimate that stands up rather well in the light of subsequent scholarship.85

We see again Chomsky’s understanding that a verdict of “mass genocide” – the phrase is
quoted from a US State Department source (Timothy Carney) first cited in After the Cataclysm86 – is
undermined if the killing is not “outright” and monocausal, but rather indirect and multicausal.
• Highlighting the US role in perpetrating mass atrocities in the pre-1975 and Khmer Rougeera mass atrocities. On various occasions, alone or with Herman, Chomsky deploys the framing
of a “decade of genocide” in Cambodia, as advanced in an issue of the journal Inside Asia. The
phrase is always placed in quotation marks, as here in a 1985 article for Inside Asia, reprinted in The
Chomsky Reader:
The torture of Cambodia during the “decade of genocide” is one of the horror stories of the
modern period, one that is far from ended. ... The “decade of the genocide” had two phases:
the 1970-75 war and the Khmer Rouge atrocities of 1975-78 (and the subsequent famine). The
two are not unrelated.87

Does this constitute a “relativizing” of Khmer Rouge “genocide”? That seems to be the intent
of the following comment by Chomsky during an exchange at a teach-in in Rove, Mass., in April
1989, published in Understanding Power:
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[Unidentified] Man: But we may be heading for another genocide [if the Khmer Rouge return
to power].
Chomsky: Well, look, the business about “genocide” you’ve got to be a little careful about. Pol
Pot was obviously a major mass murderer, but it’s not clear that Pol Pot killed very many
more people – or even [any] more people – than the United States killed in Cambodia in the
first half of the 1970s. We only talk about “genocide” when other people do the killing. …
If we were honest about the term “genocide,” we would divide up the deaths in the Pol Pot
period into a major part which is our responsibility, which is the responsibility of the United
States.88

• Uncertainty of the death toll and unreliability of estimates. In Manufacturing Consent,
Herman and Chomsky contend that “the actual scale of the slaughter and destruction during the
two authentic phases of large-scale killings during the ‘decade of the genocide’ (phases I and II
[i.e. 1970-78]) would be difficult to estimate at best, and the problems have been compounded by a
virtual orgy of falsification serving political ends that are all too obvious.” Estimates by the Finnish
Commission of Inquiry and by the scholar Michael Vickery, they argue, “suggest that the toll under
phase II of ‘the genocide’ [under the Khmer Rouge] is somewhat greater than that under phase I
[the American war], although not radically different in scale. But before accepting these figures at
face value we must bear in mind that part of the death toll under phase II must be attributed to the
conditions left by the US war.”89
In this context, Chomsky has regularly cited an order by Henry Kissinger “to the Pentagon to
carry out a ‘massive bombing campaign in Cambodia. Anything that flies on anything that moves.’
That is the most explicit call for what we call genocide when other people do it that I’ve ever seen in
the historical record.”90 In a 2010 interview published in The Phnom Penh Post, Chomsky describes
it as having “clear genocidal intent.”91 This “phase I of ‘the decade of the genocide,’” Herman and
Chomsky declare in Manufacturing Consent, is notably not “designated a period of ‘holocaust’ or
‘genocide’ in mainstream literature. Phase I elicited no calls for international intervention or trials
for crimes against humanity, and it has since been largely expunged from the record.”92
In summary, Chomsky has (1) devoted greater critical attention to the validity of a “genocide”
framing for Cambodia than for any other case or alleged case of genocide; (2) challenged the
application of a “genocide” framing to the Khmer Rouge period, at least the 1975-77 period; and
(3) stressed the need to include the United States among the culprits of mass atrocity. One senses,
however, a certain evolution in his writing and speaking on the subject over the years. For example,
his citing of “subsequent scholarship” in the two indented passages immediately above reflects
the state of research as of the later 1980s. A great deal has appeared since, and Chomsky, perhaps
grudgingly, seems to have grown more forthright in his terminology, for example in referring to “Pol
Pot’s genocide”93 and citing Ben Kiernan and Taylor Owen’s reference to “the Cambodian genocide.”94
He has also spoken in straightforward support of trials of Khmer Rouge perpetrators, while
expressing a preference that the proceedings be “left to the Cambodian people” and incorporate
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US crimes.95 The trajectory bears a limited comparison with that of Ben Kiernan, the leading scholar
of the genocide, who acknowledged that he was initially “sympathetic to [the Khmer Rouge’s]
purported reforms and nationalism,” but in 1979 issued a formal retraction.96 Chomsky, however –
in his political writings at least – does not “do” formal retractions, to my knowledge.
Quasi-Genocide
I use this term to encompass a range of vocabulary that Chomsky has employed to suggest that
certain severe atrocities fall somewhat short of genocide. These qualifications provide further
evidence of Chomsky’s “hard” understanding of genocide, as explored at the outset of this essay.
That is, for the threshold to be crossed in his framing, the atrocities should be fully exterminatory
or nearly so, direct rather than indirect, and centrally planned – mirroring Nazi genocide in
particular. As well, the phrasings here buttress the earlier contention that despite his hesitations
and reservations about the “genocide” label, Chomsky has regularly sought to activate its special
rhetorical and political power, to provoke concern and convey the seriousness and severity of the
atrocities in question.
• “Near-genocide.” In How the World Works, Chomsky describes “positively ecstatic” US
support for “near-genocide in Guatemala” during the 1980s.97
• “Virtual genocide.” According to Chomsky, Andrew Jackson’s proclamation of the Indian
Removal Act “set off a virtual genocide” of Native nations in the southern US.98 He also accuses
Italy under Mussolini of “carrying out virtual genocide” in Libya.99 In Guatemala “during Reagan’s
terrorist wars of the 1980s,” he asserted that “one of the world’s most brutal and vicious regimes …
extended its criminality to virtual genocide in the highlands.”100 In Year 501, a further qualification is
added: the policies of the 1980s “approached virtual genocide.”101
• “Approach[ing] genocide.” In his earliest collection of political essays, American Power and
the New Mandarins, Chomsky quotes supportively a “letter in Science magazine [stating]: ‘There
can be no doubt that the DOD [US Department of Defense] is, in the short run, going beyond mere
genocide to biocide.”102 Two pages later, he comments sardonically: “If it is necessary to approach
genocide in Vietnam … then this is the price we must pay in defense of freedom and the rights
of man.”103 With regard to Bosnia, Chomsky likewise declared at the time that “the slaughter is
approaching genocide.”104
• “Genocidal” vs. “genocide.” Chomsky sometimes employs the construction of “genocidal
X” in preference to “genocide,” in which the X is a further qualifier: “activities,” “assaults,”
“method[s].” Somewhat speculatively, I venture that this reflects his understanding of genocide
as a fully or nearly fully consummated enterprise, and his reservations about using the term. Thus he
95
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refers to “the genocidal activities” of Washington’s allies in Guatemala,105 and in the same volume
describes “the long-suffering Mayans” as “subjected to near-genocidal assaults”106 (see also the
references to “the genocidal uses to which the military aid was put” and “genocidal acts”).107 In
collaboration with Edward Herman, he describes US policy in Indochina as “from the beginning
semi-genocidal in purpose and method, resting in large part on the fact that the civilian population has
been regarded as enemy or, at best, of no account.”108
To see these reservations and hesitations at play in his treatment of a particular case, consider again
Chomsky’s pronouncements on East Timor. In conversation with David Barsamian, Chomsky’s
verdict is both straightforward and slightly hedged, moving from “genocide” to “genocidal” to
“near-genocidal”:
Barsamian: You talk extensively about the events in 1965 in Indonesia and then the events in
1975, in East Timor ...
Chomsky: Which are still going on, incidentally. There’s a case of genocide that’s going on right
today and is continuing precisely because the United States supports it. That’s what blocks
any possible termination of that genocidal attack. … It’s quite improper for people in the United
States to know that their own government is involved in a genocidal massacre which is quite
comparable to Pol Pot. … That whole near-genocidal attack, the term is not exaggerated in this case,
was almost entirely suppressed for over four years. Even today it’s barely discussed, and
when it is discussed, the American role is suppressed.109

In Understanding Power, Chomsky similarly alternates “genocide,” “genocidal,” and “virtually
genocidal”;110 “virtual genocide” is referenced in Year 501.111 In Towards a New Cold War, some of
his earliest writing on East Timor, he cited “actions that verge on genocide.”112 In The Washington
Connection, he and Herman report that “the massacre advanced to a point that some feel amounts to
genocide.”113 The same text includes mentions of “impending genocide” (referencing the concerns of
Timorese Catholic priests), and “possible genocide.”114
“Prelude to Genocide”
We have seen that on occasion, Chomsky has warned of possibly impending genocide – notably
in the context of environmental destruction; his warnings about nuclear “holocaust” (see note 133)
can also be noted in this regard. These are global issues. But in one case that has featured in his
writings since the early 1970s – Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian territories – Chomsky
again employs the strategy of quoting another authority’s use of the “genocide” term. In the Gaza
Strip, Chomsky asserted in an interview for Gaza in Crisis, the US and Israel “now have a pretext for
tightening the stranglehold on the people of Gaza, cheerfully pursuing policies that the prominent
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international law scholar Richard Falk describes as a prelude to genocide that ‘should remind the
world of the famous post-Nazi pledge of never again."'"115 In Making the Future, Chomsky again
quotes Falk’s accusation that “to persist with such an approach under present circumstances is
indeed genocidal, and risks destroying an entire Palestinian [Gazan] community that is an integral
part of an ethnic whole”116 – the only oblique reference I have seen in Chomsky’s work to the “in
whole or in part” language of the UN Genocide Convention.
Genocide: Politicization and Misrepresentation
The extended discussion of Cambodia, above, made it clear that Chomsky often explores a
“genocide” framing in the context of perceived distortions and cynical misapplications of the
term by US leaders and commentators. Its discursive power, in such cases, is co-opted to serve an
imperial political agenda.
• Nicaragua/The Miskito Indians. In the early 1980s, the new Sandinista government of
Nicaragua undertook repressive measures, including localized atrocities, against Miskito Indians
on the country’s Atlantic coast, some of whom had taken up arms with Contra forces mobilized and
armed by the CIA. In June 1985, President Reagan (Chomsky writes) “chimed in with the news that
the Sandinistas are conducting a ‘campaign of virtual genocide against the Miskito Indians.’” There
were “major atrocities, no doubt,” Chomsky states, “but [they were] undetectable in the context
of the behavior of the United States and its clients in the region.”117 He scornfully notes that “Elie
Wiesel flew down to witness their plight and evoke the conscience of the nation over it; in contrast,
the revered moralist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate found himself unable to manage even a private
communication to the government of Israel to ask that they cease their contribution to ongoing
genocide in Guatemala, with tens of thousands of Indians slaughtered.”118 Elsewhere, Chomsky,
quoting the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, declares the accusations against the Sandinistas
to be part of “a steady stream of calumny directed at Managua, charging the ruling Sandinistas
with everything vile: drugrunning, genocide, subverting their neighbors, and now international
terrorism.” The charges, Chomsky notes, “have not ‘been burdened with evidence’ [again quoting
the Council], but are reported with only rare attempts at evaluation.”119
• Another example of politicized accusation, according to Chomsky, centers on the claims
issued by supporters of Israel to fend off criticisms of the state’s policies. “Since the Six-Day War,
critics of one or another aspect of Israeli policy have been subjected to ridiculous accusations and
childish distortion. They have been portrayed as supporters of terrorism or even genocide, or as
opponents of democracy.” “To deal seriously with the issues was not easy,” he writes later in the
same text. “It was much more convenient to denounce one’s enemies as totalitarians, radical-chic
suburbanites, anti-Semites, or backers of Arab genocide.”120
• During the 1990s, while striking a faintly accommodating stance toward claims of genocide
in Bosnia (see note 12), Chomsky ridiculed them in the case of Kosovo, arguing that they were
spuriously advanced in order to justify “humanitarian” (actually, he claimed, imperial) intervention
in the territory. To the assertion by Timothy Garton Ash that the Kosovo intervention of 1999 was
“‘absolutely right,’ because it passed the ‘very high … threshold for such humanitarian intervention,
…. Something approaching genocide, by the killing or “ethnic cleansing” of large numbers of its
people’ by the Serbian government,” Chomsky responded mockingly: “Surely this establishes the
115
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case and justifies the praise for the altruistic leaders opening a new era of enlightenment. And so
it might, if the claims had any relation to the facts.”121 In A New Generation Draws the Line, he cited
and lauded “a rare exception” in media coverage, The Wall Street Journal,
which devoted its lead story on December 31 to an in-depth analysis of what had taken
place. The headline reads: “War in Kosovo Was Cruel, Bitter, Savage; Genocide It Wasn’t.”
The conclusion contrasts rather sharply with wartime propaganda. A database search of
references to “genocide” in Kosovo for the first week of bombing alone was interrupted when
it reached its limit of 1,000 documents. Hysterical exaggeration of the enemy’s unfathomable
evil is a classic feature of propaganda, particularly when it is recognized, at some level of
awareness, that the case for resort to force is weak.122

• Perhaps this is also the place to note Chomsky’s commentary on Darfur, likely the case that
has attracted the greatest attention in the genocide-prevention community since the turn of the
millennium. Prompted on the subject by David Barsamian, Chomsky responded ambivalently, but
in ways that highlight the utility and convenience of the accusations for the political and intellectual
powers-that-be:
… Darfur is a big issue in the United States and the West now, and a very convenient one.
It’s convenient because there are major atrocities undoubtedly being carried out by an official
enemy. You can attribute the atrocities to Arabs, so it’s perfect. Just the kind of atrocities
we love. Of course, there are no serious proposals to do anything about them. ... It’s also a
complicated issue, not simply an issue of evil Arabs, a terrible tyrant carrying out genocide,
the sort of standard story here, which has some element of truth to it but is by no means the
whole story.123

In keeping with these skeptical and critical assessments are Chomsky’s statements in probably
the most extended genocide-specific commentary he has published, and to my mind the most
noteworthy. I refer to his relatively recent (2010) foreword to Herman and Peterson’s The Politics
of Genocide. Here Chomsky decries “the vulgar politicization of the concept of genocide,” and links it
to the “emerging international norm” – Condoleeza Rice’s words – of military intervention on
“humanitarian” grounds. Both the “vulgar politicization” and the “emerging … norm,” Chomsky
writes, “appear to be products of the fading of the Cold War, which removed the standard pretexts
for intervention while leaving intact the institutional and ideological framework for its regular
practice …”124 The norm is exclusively the province of “the traditional imperial powers,” he
contends, something “that should hardly come as much of a surprise.” He then concludes the
foreword with a sentence that merits printing in bold type:
As for the term “genocide,” perhaps the most honorable course would be to expunge
it from the vocabulary until the day, if it ever comes, when honesty and integrity can
become an “emerging norm.”125
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There could hardly be a more distilled articulation of Chomsky’s deep distrust of the
“genocide” concept than this call to “expunge” it from contemporary political discourse. And yet,
we have seen throughout this article that Chomsky has regularly deployed the term, albeit often
in quoted or qualified form, to bolster the political and polemical force of his own critique. Does
the verdict rendered in the Politics of Genocide foreword indicate that he is abandoning it as too
hopelessly compromised for further use?
Genocide and Humanitarian Intervention
The preceding discussion may suggest that Chomsky considers military interventions on
“humanitarian” grounds to be ruled out by their inherently imperial character. This does not quite
do justice to his pronouncements on the subject, however. Consider the following arguments, in
which what is not said, or is implicit, is as interesting as what is stated outright.
• Impunity vs. principle. In discussing the 1999 US bombing of Kosovo in On Western Terrorism,
Chomsky noted
the trial where Yugoslavia brought a case against NATO for the bombing to the International
Court of Justice … the United States excluded itself from the case and the Tribunal agreed
because one of the charges mentioned was that it was a genocide, and when the United States
signed the Genocide Convention after 40 years, it had a reservation saying it was ‘inapplicable
to the United States,’ and so therefore the Court rightly excused the United States from
prosecution.

For Chomsky, this shows “there are literally legal barriers established just in case anyone
dares to try to bring some charge against the powerful.”126 This does not constitute a judgment on
military interventions in genocide and other mass atrocities, however – rather on the hypocrisy and
impunity that govern those interventions.
In Power and Terror, Chomsky delivered some of his few recorded comments on the Rwandan
genocide. He was responding to a questioner at the Berkeley Community Theatre in March 2002,
who described attending a talk by General Roméo Dallaire, in which the leader of the UN’s “Blue
Helmets” in Rwanda recounted “how frustrated he was to watch genocide happen all around him
when no one seemed to care, none of the world powers seemed to be doing anything. And his basic
conclusion was that to him the world was just inherently a racist place …” Chomsky responded:
First of all, I don’t think what happened was racism, particularly. It’s just that this didn’t
matter much. Remember, he was talking about what happened in Rwanda in 1994, but that’s
been going on in Burundi and Rwanda for years. Ed Herman and I wrote a book more
than twenty-three years ago in which we discussed the Hutu/Tutsi atrocities in Burundi and
Rwanda, in which hundreds of thousands of people were killed. Nobody cared then, and
nobody cares now. Just like in the last two or three years, probably several million people
have been killed in the Congo, and it doesn’t really matter, it doesn’t affect Western interests,
so you don’t try to do anything about it.
But they can be any color, any religion, it doesn’t really matter. The principle is, does it
affect US interests? … [Dallaire is] talking about something bad, namely our unwillingness
to do anything to stop atrocities. But much worse than that, incomparably worse, is our
willingness to participate in atrocities. It would have been much worse if we had not only
done nothing about that, but in fact had gone ahead and continued to put the guns in the
hands of the murderers as they were committing murder.
I’d be a little cautious. The kind of statement he’s making is correct, but that’s the kind
that’s tolerable. So, for example, if you take a look at the New York Review of Books this week,
there’s a passionate article by the executive director of the Carr Center for Human Rights
Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Samantha Power, which discusses
our tragic failure to pay attention to atrocities that other people are committing and to do
something about them. It’s some profound flaw in our character. Okay, it’s a problem. But a
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much more serious problem, orders of magnitude more serious – which is not mentioned in
the article and which would be unintelligible if it were mentioned – is the fact that we pay
very close attention to atrocities and intervene to escalate them, and often even applaud them.
… Yeah, it’s bad to overlook the crimes that are committed by others and not to do enough
about them, but it’s far more important to look into the mirror and look at what you’re doing
yourself and do something about that. So I kind of agree with Dallaire. It seems to me a bad
problem, but small on the scale of moral responsibilities or human consequences.127

Note first the frankly flippant and misleading reference to “the Hutu/Tutsi atrocities in
Burundi and Rwanda” that have “been going on for years,” as ostensibly described in Chomsky
and Herman’s book The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism. Section 3.4.2 of that volume,
all of two pages long, addresses Burundi and alleged US complicity in the 1972 genocide of Hutus
by the Tutsi regime. “Rwanda” does not appear in the section, or elsewhere in the book.
Relevant is Chomsky’s contrasting of failure to intervene in mass atrocities with complicity in
the perpetration and “escalat[ion]” of mass atrocities. One can contest the claim that withholding
intervention is “orders of magnitude more serious” than direct perpetration. But Chomsky’s
acknowledgments here – that Dallaire’s critique is at least partially “correct” and attests to “a bad
problem”; that “it’s bad to overlook the crimes that are committed by others and not to do enough
about them” – render somewhat more complicated his thinking about the so-called “Responsibility
to Protect” (R2P) and “Will to Intervene” (W2I).
The picture is complicated further when we consult Chomsky’s rather nuanced article on
“Humanitarian Intervention” for the Boston Review. There, he argued that “a rational person will
recognize that policy flows from institutions, institutions remain stable, and thus intervention is
likely to be undertaken, when deemed necessary, for much the same reasons as before” – that is,
for reasons of national self-interest. He urged proponents of intervention to recognize that “the
leader of such intervention [i.e. the United States] will be a state that is remarkable not only for its
violence, impudence, and moral cowardice, but also for its lawlessness, not only in recent years.”
He nonetheless offered a qualification: that “intervention undertaken on the normal grounds of
power interests might, by accident, be helpful to the targeted population. Such examples exist.
The most obvious recent one is Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 after years of
murderous Khmer Rouge attacks on Vietnamese border areas …” He also pointed to “the protection
zone that the Bush Administration reluctantly extended to the Kurds in northern Iraq, after tacitly
supporting Saddam Hussein as he crushed the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings. Here, public opinion
played a decisive role, overcoming the Administration’s commitment to the rule of a unified Iraq
by an ‘iron fist,’ whether wielded by Saddam or some clone …” He ended by asking whether
the conclusions that a rational observer will draw about US-led ‘humanitarian intervention’
do not answer the question whether such intervention should nevertheless be undertaken. That is a
separate matter, to be faced without illusions about our unique nobility. We can, in short,
ask whether the pursuit of self-interest might happen to benefit others in particular cases,
or whether unremitting public pressure might overcome the demands of the ‘principal
architects’ of policy and the interests they serve.128

• Available alternatives. In the following comments from Rogue States about Kosovo, and
the supposed unavoidability of the 1999 military intervention, Chomsky’s focus is not on military
interventions as such, but the cynically politicized manner in which the presumed option-set is
reduced to them:
A standard argument is that we had to do something: we could not simply stand by as
atrocities continued. The argument is so absurd that it is rather surprising to hear it voiced.
Suppose you see a crime in the streets, and feel that you can’t just stand by silently, so you
127
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pick up an assault rifle and kill everyone involved: criminal, victim, bystanders. Are we to
understand that to be the rational and moral response?
One choice, always available, is to follow the Hippocratic principle: “First, do no harm.”
If you can think of no way to adhere to that elementary principle, then do nothing; at least
that is preferable to causing harm. But there are always other ways that can be considered.
Diplomacy and negotiations are never at an end. …129

To pursue Chomsky’s analogy, one option in confronting a serious crime in progress – let us
say an attempted murder – would indeed be to use a weapon to kill or incapacitate the criminal
alone. Nothing in Chomsky’s call for consideration of the full range of options would necessarily
rule this out.
• Moral obligations. I have never forgotten one of Chomsky’s arguments during the Central
American wars and genocides of the 1980s – the spur for my own earliest political activism, and
for my initial encounter with Chomsky’s work. Addressing US government and media allegations
of support by Nicaragua’s Sandinista government for the leftist rebels in El Salvador, Chomsky
opined: “Everybody should be sending arms [to the rebels] … It’s perfectly legitimate to send arms
to people who finally try to use violence in self-defense against a gang of mass murderers installed
by a foreign power.”130 The argument is also implicit in the following passage from an appendix
to Necessary Illusions. Chomsky first contested whether largescale arms shipments from Nicaragua
across the Gulf of Fonseca to El Salvador were conceivable, given that the Gulf “is thirty kilometers
wide, heavily patrolled by US naval vessels and SEAL teams and covered by a radar facility on
Tiger Island in the Gulf that is able to locate and track boats not only in that area but far beyond.”
But he then turned the question on its head, declaring it “interesting” that
it is taken for granted by hawks and doves alike that it would have been a major crime to
provide the defenseless civilian population [of El Salvador] with means to defend themselves
against a war of extermination and genocide [again referencing the comments by Archbishop
Rivera y Damas, cited earlier] – at least, when the war is conducted by US clients, with US
support and, as it reached its climax, direct organization and participation. To have provided
victims of Pol Pot with arms to defend themselves, had this been possible, would have been
considered a sign of true nobility. It is enlightening that such simple observations as these,
and their obvious import, are next to unintelligible.131

Likewise, in addressing the UN-sanctioned, Australian-led military intervention in East
Timor in September 1999, Chomsky hardly denounces it as an imperialist aggression cloaked in
“humanitarian” guise, à la Kosovo. Instead, he limits himself to pointing out how rapidly the
Indonesian military shifted from supporting atrocities to permitting the intervention, once the Clinton
administration delivered a threat to cut off American military aid. Once again, more pertinent than
what he says is what he does not say. He does not criticize the motives of the intervening actors
and forces, but limits himself to noting the relative ease with which the intervention was brought
about by a simple shift in US policy towards Indonesia’s military power-wielders. It is notable,
perhaps, that in the Timor case, the US did not lead the military intervention itself, and that its own
interventionist strategy was limited to the threat of a cutoff in military support (viz. the alternative
strategies discussed above).
Note also the unexpected tone of the following comments regarding Somalia and Bosnia, in
the 1996 book Power and Prospects:
President Clinton agrees that the US must lower its contributions to UN peacekeeping
operations while his right-wing adversaries want to go much further, shackling or even
ending them. In contrast, they are favoured by over 80 per cent of the public. Half consistently
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support US participation, 88 per cent if there are fair prospects of success. Only 5-10 per cent
consistently oppose such operations, the remainder varying with circumstances. The effect
of fatalities in Somalia [on respondents] was slight, contrary to much pretence. Two-thirds
favour contributing US troops to a UN operation to protect “safe havens” or to stop atrocities
in Bosnia; 80 per cent take the same position with regard to Rwanda, if the UN were to
conclude that genocide is underway. Nevertheless, 60 per cent of the population think the US
has “done enough to stop the war in Bosnia” – namely, nothing.132

Chomsky here appears to be on the side of the US public that favors UN peacekeeping
operations – certainly a form of humanitarian, indeed military, intervention – and supports the
involvement of US troops in such operations to suppress “genocide.” His critique is instead directed
against the US for having done “nothing” to stop the Bosnian war. An intriguing contrast seems
evident with his post-Kosovo and post-9/11 stances.
The Holocaust: Memory and Propaganda
We saw near the outset of this article that the Nazi genocide is one of two “paradigmatic” genocides
in Chomsky’s framings. I also noted that Chomsky has stressed the Roma/Gypsy dimension of the
Nazis’ extermination campaigns, together with (unspecified) other targets. The systematic, direct,
industrialized element of the death camps makes this genocide unique, in Chomsky’s understanding
– but this falls short of an argument for Holocaust (i.e. Shoah) uniqueness.
I have also shown, in considering Chomsky’s statements about the Armenian genocide, that
he is attentive to the alleged politicization and manipulation of Holocaust memory.133 This guides
his commentary on the Jewish Holocaust – rather more than do the events and atrocities of the
Holocaust themselves. With regard to the Roma specifically, Chomsky in a discussion with David
Barsamian cites an article from the American Jewish Congress Weekly (“a pretty liberal part of the
Jewish community”) by “some guy named Edward Alexander, from Americans for a Safe Israel,
quasi-[Meir] Kahane, right-wing nuts,” whom he likens to deniers of the Shoah:
He simply had a phrase: The Nazi genocide of the gypsies is an “exploded fiction.” These
gypsy stories are just fairy tales. That’s exactly like the people who say the Nazis never did
anything to the Jews. It’s just fairy tales. If people say that about the Jews, we react with
contempt, but if you say it about the gypsies, it’s just fine, because who cares about them
anyhow? I don’t know much about him, but I suspect the motive there is to monopolize the
Nazi genocide [i.e. limit it conceptually to the Shoah] because you can use it as a weapon for
Israel. People like Elie Wiesel go along with this all the time. That shows us how much they
actually care about the Holocaust.134
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Overseas Jewish organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, he alleges,
“don’t ultimately care about anti-Semitism, what they care about is opposition to the policies of
Israel – in fact, opposition to their own hawkish version of the policies of Israel. They’re Israeli
government lobbies, essentially …”135 Hence they readily, even eagerly engage in a “vulgar
exploitation of the Holocaust … to justify oppressive control over others.”136 The Shoah is “very
consciously manipulated,” Chomsky tells Barsamian in Chronicles of Dissent. “I mean, it’s quite
certainly real, there’s no question about that, but it is also undoubted that they manipulate it, in fact
they say so. … That kind of manipulation is really sick.”137
Probably the most frequent example he cites of such Holocaust “manipulation” is the first, in
a historical sense: the Zionist exploitation of both the Holocaust and its “wretched survivors”138
in the immediate postwar period, to bolster Jewish immigration to Palestine at the expense of
other possible destinations. “… It is likely that many – perhaps most – [survivors] would have
chosen to come to the United States had this opportunity been offered, but the Zionist movement,
including American Zionists, preferred that they settle in a Jewish state, a story being relived
today [in the 1980s] with Jewish emigrants from the USSR.”139 In Propaganda and the Public Mind,
he describes “people dying in displaced persons camps. The Jewish community made virtually
no effort to try to have them admitted to the United States,” with the exception of “the American
Council for Judaism, which is off the main spectrum and was anti-Zionist. But the major Jewish
organizations didn’t do much. In fact, they did very little, and very few Holocaust victims made
it to the US.”140 Anti-Semitism is part of the explanation, and Chomsky describes contemporary
personal experiences of it in these passages and elsewhere. But he clearly considers the influence
of “Zionist emissaries [who] took over the camps,” and their supporters in diaspora communities,
to have been the primary factor.141
The stance of successive US governments toward the Holocaust has been similarly unprincipled,
in Chomsky’s view. Only after the Six-Day War, with the forging of an alliance with Israel as an
American proxy in the Middle East, did
you start getting concern about the Holocaust. Before that, when people [in the US] could
have actually done something for Holocaust victims – say, in the late 1940s – they didn’t do
anything. That changed after 1967. Now you have Holocaust museums all over the country.
It’s the biggest issue, and you have to study it everywhere, mourn it. But not when you could
have done something about it.142

genocide which was in fact quite comparable to the Holocaust. If they want to publish their disgraceful lies, they
should have the right to do so. If they were brought to court, I would defend their right to say what they want. People
who are opposed to freedom of speech, or who have their own motives for trying to silence critics, will naturally turn
this into whatever they want to.” Chomsky, Chronicles of Dissent, 261-262.
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Common Good, 97) with more honorable Jewish/Zionist voices, such as Nahum Goldmann, a “very conservative
and very honest Zionist leader” (Chomsky, Chronicles of Dissent, 70) who served as “President of the World Zionist
Organization from 1956 to 1968” (Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, 98). “At the beginning of the Jewish New Year, in
October 1981, he wrote: ‘We will have to understand that Jewish suffering during the Holocaust no longer will serve
as a protection, and we certainly must refrain from using the argument of the Holocaust to justify whatever we may
do. To use the Holocaust as an excuse for the bombing of Lebanon, for instance, as Menachem Begin does, is a kind of
“Hillul Hashem” [sacrilege], a banalization of the sacred tragedy of the Shoah, which must not be misused to justify
politically doubtful and morally indefensible policies’” (Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, 98).
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He allows that “a kind of guilt feeling [could also be] involved, because the role of the United
States during the Holocaust was awful, before and during. They didn’t act to save Jews, and they
could have in many respects.”143
Thus, as throughout his voluminous writings, interviews, and public talks on diverse subjects,
Chomsky emphasizes self-interest, intellectual inconsistency, and moral hypocrisy and cowardice.
In this case as in others, it leads him to focus on the political manipulation of Holocaust memory,
rather than the facts of the Holocaust. The latter, however, he does not dispute, whatever the
insinuations of his many detractors.
Conclusion
Noam Chomsky’s approach to the discourse of “genocide” may best be described as conflicted. On
one hand, he is justifiably cynical about the manipulative and politicized ways in which the term
has often been employed, notably by those in positions of political power and media prominence.
This is intensified by the term’s deployment against designated enemies (frequently in the context
of “humanitarian” interventions); and, contrastingly but correspondingly, the resolute avoidance of
“genocide” to inure great powers and their allies to condemnation, and to evade a moral reckoning
with the consequences of their own actions, past and present. In one of his most recent comments
on the subject, in the foreword to Herman & Peterson’s The Politics of Genocide, Chomsky even
suggests that the term should be “expunge[d] … from the vocabulary,” until these self-serving
manipulations can be addressed and rectified.
No-one would expect the modern era’s most renowned linguistic scholar to be inattentive to
language, and Chomsky’s critique displays a profound concern with the way political language can
be twisted and abused. At the same time, his activist sensibility, combined with the extraordinary
rhetorical power of “genocide,” leads him to a passing – but cumulatively significant – deployment
of the term in his huge corpus of work. By referencing a few key statements and assembling
numerous fragments, it is possible to discern a framing that favors a totalized or near-totalized
understanding of the concept. However, with the exception of Nazi genocide, the destruction of
indigenous peoples in the Americas, and possible future genocides, Chomsky’s use of “genocide”
is hedged with key reservations and qualifications: one is much more likely to find references to
“near-genocide,” “virtual genocide,” or “approaching genocide,” and he is readier to cite others’
claims of genocide, albeit supportively, than to advance them without the attendant quotation
marks.
Chomsky, then, offers a reasonably coherent and often forceful critique of the misuse of
“genocide,” and he also uses it for rhetorical and political effect, with the caveats noted. But this
is as far as he has been interested and prepared to go. Unlike a couple of his coauthors (Herman
and Pappé), Chomsky displays no particular desire to engage meaningfully or systematically with
the genocide framing, or to analyze its applications and possible utility. For the most part, one
explores this aspect of his writing and speaking not to understand genocide as a concept, but to
better understand Chomsky.
But this would be an unsatisfactory note to end on. Chomsky is hardly the first or the only
political critic to evince skepticism toward “genocide,” and to downplay or avoid it in his own
work. To the extent that Chomsky has addressed it, he has provided some useful insights into how,
like the other politically-loaded terminology he analyzes, it has been prone to misrepresentation,
evasion, and obfuscation, often for nefarious reasons. Much more significant is the formative value
of his decades of critique in helping generations of questing, activist-inclined minds – including
my own – to penetrate the layers of lies and propaganda that envelop us. Many of us would be less
hesitant to label as “genocide” atrocities for which Chomsky generally adopts different terms, or to
which he assigns a “genocide” framing only with qualifications. In so doing, though, we would be
well advised to draw on Chomsky’s painstaking, exhaustive documentation and dissection of such
mass crimes – from East Timor to Guatemala and El Salvador, and to varied forms of structural
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and environmental violence. His is a major, even unparalleled contribution to the study of mass
atrocities worldwide, and for this he merits recognition and gratitude.
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Visions of Greater Serbia: Local Dynamics and the Prijedor Genocide
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When the academic community, media, or policy experts mention the Bosnian genocide, it is
unclear what they are referring to. Their reference to the event is often twofold. First, the term
focuses on the macro-level, failing to disaggregate the intensity, location, and timing of violence. In
other words, the term is used unwittingly to lump various events into a single, coherent story. The
problem is that by lumping events into a unified story, the idiosyncrasies that define the various
localities are lost in exchange for a simplified understanding of a rather complex and dynamic
phenomenon. Second, the term is commonly used in reference to the atrocities committed in
Srebrenica. Though this event is noteworthy and stands as the quintessential example of the type
of violence the international community vowed would never again happen, it does not give a full
account of what occurred during the war.
By taking a closer look at the meso-level, we see that the genocide in Bosnia was a coordinated
campaign that extended across numerous municipalities, varying in time of execution and severity.
The meso-level is a tool that studies violence at an analytical level below the nation-state.1 Aside
from offering insights into subnational regions and localities, the meso-level is also “the least
developed among the three prongs of genocide research.”2 For the purposes of this paper, I utilize
the meso-level to investigate the episode of genocide that unfolded in the municipality of Prijedor
in the spring and summer of 1992.3 The case of Prijedor is important for several reasons. First,
Prijedor accounted for the most deaths in northwestern Bosnia, and the third most deaths out
of any municipality during the war.4 Second, Prijedor was situated in the strategically important
location known as the Serbian Arc, where the Bosnian Serbs sought to link the Bosnian Serb
populations of Serbia proper, eastern Bosnia, northwestern Bosnia, and Croatia, under the Greater
Serbia umbrella.5 Third, Prijedor accounted for a total of twenty-eight concentration camps – a
significantly high number that included the notorious camps of Keraterm and Omarska.6
I argue that structural control and agent collaboration highlight the factors that contributed
to the escalation and radicalization of violence to genocide in Prijedor. This causal argument
Charles King, “The Micropolitics of Social Violence,” World Politics 56, no. 1 (2004), 431-455, accessed March 27, 2019,
https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2004.0016.
2
Evgeny Finkel and Scott Straus, “Macro, Meso, and Micro Research on Genocide: Gains, Shortcomings, and Future
Areas of Inquiry,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 7, no. 1 (2012), 59, accessed February
1, 2019, https://doi/.org/10.3138/gsp.7.1.56. Although this analytical level is underdeveloped, crucial research
relating to genocide in Rwanda and civil war violence in Bosnia has been conducted. On the importance of local
elites in the Bosnian civil war, see Fotini Christia, “Following the Money: Muslims versus Muslims in Bosnia’s
Civil War,” Comparative Politics 40, no. 4 (2008), 461-480, accessed March 25, 2019, https://doi.org/10.5129/00104150
8X12911362383390. On the patterns of mass violence in Eastern Bosnia, see Edina Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014). On subnational violence and genocide in Rwanda, see Lee Ann Fujii,
Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Scott Straus, The Order of
Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
3
It is important to note that there have been many prosecutions for crimes committed in Prijedor by the ICTY, most
notably the cases of Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, but the court has deemed these crimes short of genocide. In
fact, from an international legal perspective, only the case of Srebrenica was deemed genocide.
4
Patrick Ball et al., The Bosnian Book of the Dead: Assessment of the Database (Full Report) (Falmer, United Kingdom: The
Institute of Development Studies, 2007), accessed March 27, 2019, http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/
uploads/2012/07/rdn5.pdf.
5
Guido Acquaviva, “Robert Donia, From the Republika Srpska Assembly 1991-1996: Excerpts from Delegates’ Speeches at
the Republika Srpska Assembly as Body of Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague,” Journal of
International Criminal Justice 11, no. 1 (September 2013), 931-951, accessed March 25, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/
mqt049.
6
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), The Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780, December 28, 1994 (UN Doc. S/1994/674/Annex VIII, Prison Camps), 22; 185-267. The report
lists 36 total camps, but only 28 that can be corroborated. It is also important to note that there were vast differences
between concentration camps. Some were larger in size, whereas others were garages and smaller spaces. Pages 185267 of the report include a more detailed account of the concentration camps.
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emphasizes why Bosnian Serb elites – national, local, military, and paramilitary – were able to
achieve the goals of Greater Serbia by combining their efforts through effective political and
territorial dominance of Prijedor. This theoretical contribution is critical for several reasons. First,
it builds on the existing literature in the strategic and ideological paradigms proposed by secondgeneration genocide scholars. However, it deviates on causal grounds. War (as proposed by the
strategic paradigm) and exclusionary ideology are important to the story, but not as explanatory
variables. War and exclusionary ideology set the stage for which cases are more likely to intensify,
but to explain how and why violence ultimately escalates to genocide, we need to consider the
dynamic relationship between structural factors and agents. Second, it suggests that previously
established causal mechanisms pertinent to the national level may not apply to the local level.
Thus, I intend to highlight how political authority, territorial bases, and the participation of local
elites, are more suitable for explaining genocide at the subnational level.
Genocide: A Multi-Dimensional Conceptualization
Genocide has attracted considerable scholarly attention across the humanities, legal studies,
and social sciences. Unpacking the various conceptual disagreements is beyond the focus of this
paper, but it is an area that deserves development, if scholars want to speak to each other across
and within disciplines.7 For this paper, I employ Scott Straus’ definition of genocide. Genocide
is “large-scale, organized, group-destructive violence that targets a specific social group in a
territory.”8 This definition distinguishes genocide from other forms of political violence based on
two characteristics: group-selectivity and group-destructiveness.9
Moreover, I conceptualize genocide as part of a multi-dimensional political violence
framework where different tiers of intensity and group-targeting are possible. The purpose of such
a dimension is to illustrate that genocide is a process of violence that perpetrators may escalate to
over time. It can occur in the early stages of violence, later into the fighting, and in some instances,
we may even see a de-escalation of violence. By understanding genocide as a process, we can move
beyond the notion that it is a fixed event, or an isolated incident that can be studied independently
of the greater political violence context. Perpetrators have an array of strategies in the political
violence process, and my goal is to understand how and why the most extreme strategy unfolds.
One dimension of the political violence framework includes the level of intensity. Limited violence
represents the lowest level of intensity, while a full-scale war represents the highest level of
intensity. The second dimension includes levels of group-targeting. In cases where groups are not
targeted, we should see regular, combatant-targeted violence ranging in levels of intensity, while
cases of group-targeting should range anywhere from discriminatory and exclusionary social
policies directed at a specific group to mass killings or genocide.

7

For an interdisciplinary review of genocide, see: Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, The Oxford Handbook of Genocide
Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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Scott Straus, “Retreating from the Brink: Theorizing Mass Violence and the Dynamics of Restraint,” Perspectives on
Politics 10, no. 2 (2012), 345, accessed March 25, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712000709.
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Scott Straus, who has pioneered the study of subnational variation in genocide studies identifies genocide along the lines
of group-selectivity and group-destructiveness. For further reading, see Scott Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations:
War Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2015), 20-24.

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1686

Visions of Greater Serbia: Local Dynamics and the Prijedor Genocide

107

Figure 1. Political Violence Framework
This framework establishes four quadrants applicable to the universe of political violence
cases. For this paper, I am specifically interested in Quadrant C. I focus on why the case of Prijedor
was not Quadrant D violence, like the siege of Sarajevo, for instance, which represents a case of
civil war violence between combatant groups.10 Relatedly, I focus on the factors that account for
escalation and radicalization of violence in Prijedor, whereby the perpetrators engaged in highintensity violence, but rather than confining their violence to the traditional theater of warfare, they
committed genocide against an ethno-religious group.11
Strategy, Ideology, and Shortcomings
The development of genocide literature within the discipline of political science has evolved from
traditional explanations focusing on ancient hatreds, authoritarian regimes, and scapegoating, to
the dominant camps centered on the strategic and ideological paradigm.12 The strategic paradigm
views policies of genocide and mass violence developing in response to real or perceived threats
and generally occurring during times of internal instability or warfare.13 Benjamin Valentino
10

UNSC, The Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, December 28,
1994 (UN Doc. S/1994/674/Annex V, The Prijedor Report), 101.

For other helpful frameworks, see Anthony W. Marx, “The Nation-State and Its Exclusions,” Political Science Quarterly
17, no. 1 (2002), 103-126, accessed March 27, 2019, https://doi.org/10.2307/798096; and Straus, Retreating from the Brink,
343-362, accessed March 25, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712000709.
Marx examines cases of exclusionary nationalism but leaves out “ultimate exclusion” or genocide from his framework
and argues it deserves a distinct analysis. Straus provides a “Ladder of Violence,” which shows the factors of
escalation and restraint. Leaders can move down the ladder and increase levels of violence or move up the ladder and
decrease levels of violence.
11
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For first-generation research on intergroup prejudices and divisions, see Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide: National
Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979); Leo Kuper, Genocide:
Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). For first-generation literature
on authoritarian regimes, see Irving Louis Horowitz, Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder (New Brunswick:
Transaction, 1976). For first-generation literature on scapegoating, see Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of
Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder
since 1955,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003), 57-73, accessed March 27, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1017/
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posits that genocide is more likely to occur during war because of the uncertainty and threats
perceived by elites. Therefore, elites – both military and political – are critical for organizing mass
violence because of their own beliefs, fears, hatreds, or interests, and are driven by instrumental,
strategic calculations in pursuit of their goals.14 Manus Midlarsky argues that elites will perpetrate
genocide in the context of loss, especially territorial. The presence of war leads to instability and
vulnerability amongst groups, and when these groups suffer losses during wartime, they are more
likely to engage in “imprudent realpolitik” by framing civilian groups as enemies and threats.
Thus, the strategic paradigm draws several conclusions linking war to genocide: war creates threat
and uncertainty, and threat and uncertainty increase the likelihood that violence will be used in
response. Also, war increases the likelihood that members of the opposing group will be labeled
as enemies, which will prompt the use of military violence against the perceived or real enemy.15
On the other hand, scholars situated within the ideological paradigm argue that to understand
genocide, one needs to understand the ideologies that manifest in the thought process of elites. Elites
possess certain ideological visions that constitute a legitimate form of the state. Certain groups fit
this standard, while other groups pose a threat to the purity or utopia of an ethnically or religiously
homogeneous society. Jacques Sémelin posits that leaders seek to exterminate social groups from
certain territories to purify their own group and society. To accomplish this, elites will seek to unify
in-groups to create fear and hostility toward out-groups, or enemies. By stressing unity, efforts to
create purity lead to desires to eliminate these out-groups.16 Eric Weitz argues that leaders have
grand ideological quests for utopian societies based on common group characteristics. The leaders
see themselves as revolutionaries seeking a better future based on extreme exclusionary policies.17
These themes are also present in Ben Kiernan’s historical account of genocide from ancient Sparta
to modern-day Darfur. Kiernan establishes four salient features and patterns that are present in
nearly every case of mass violence: cults of antiquity, agrarianism, racism or religious prejudice,
and territorial expansion.18
So, what is missing? What is it about ideology and strategy that fails to explain the onset and
process of genocide? For one, both include explanatory variables that occur more often than genocide.
Although the strategic paradigm has made significant strides in emphasizing the importance of
warfare as the backdrop for genocide, wars are still more common than genocide. How do we
account for the non-cases of genocide that had similar patterns of warfare present? Additionally,
the strategic paradigm fails to address two other important questions: Why are civilian groups
targeted and why is the goal to eradicate these groups from the specific territory?19 The ideological
paradigm seems to answer these questions partially. Civilian groups are targeted because they are
seen as part of an illegitimate out-group, threatening the existence of the in-group and prospects
for a homogenized society. However, just like the presence of warfare, extreme ideologies are also
more common than genocide. What about those cases where elites possess extreme notions of ingroup and out-group dynamics but do not or cannot initiate genocidal violence?
S0003055403000522; Matthew Krain, “State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and
Politicides,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 3 (1997), 331-360, accessed March 27, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1177%
2F0022002797041003001; Manus Midlarsky, The Killing Trip: Genocide in the Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005); Martin Shaw, War and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society (Cambridge: Polity,
2003); Jay Ulfelder and Benjamin Valentino, Assessing Risks of State-Sponsored Mass Killing (Washington, DC: Political
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It is likely, as Straus argues, that these paradigms should complement one another in seeking
to explain genocide.20 Although I do not disagree that these paradigms do a better job explaining
such a rare event together rather than independently, I argue that they do not present the causal
mechanisms for explaining how and why genocide was executed completely. To do this, I turn to
the discussion of the meso-level before presenting two additional factors, structural control and
agent collaboration, in explaining the escalation and radicalization to genocide.
Meso-Level Analysis
The aforementioned literature almost exclusively focuses on the national level of analysis to
explain genocide. A common theme is to select major twentieth-century cases and compare them.
Although this has increased our empirical and theoretical understandings of this dynamic type
of violence, it has also led to what Barbara Geddes refers to as “the selection bias in comparative
politics.”21 By selecting on the dependent variable, scholars are justifying their case selection
strategies on cases that share a common outcome, rather than common features that may have led
to differing outcomes. One way to remedy this is to study negative cases, a solution proposed to
scholars working in the comparative genocide literature.22 By studying the non-cases of genocide,
scholars can determine which conditions are more likely to lead to genocide through careful, and
methodologically strong, controlled-comparisons.
Another issue that arises is the neglect of the local level. Referring to an event as the Armenian,
Bosnian, or Rwandan genocide does not account for variation within those specific cases. Where
in Bosnia did genocide occur? What was the timing and severity of the violence in a specific
municipality? What local actors played a crucial role? How did they interact with national actors
and various state institutions to carry out this violence? To answer these questions, another strategy,
as argued on the onset of this paper, is to narrow the focus to a more intimate level of analysis.
Therefore, a subnational analysis serves as another remedy. As argued by Charles King,
episodes of social violence, whether riots or atrocities committed during civil wars, may well
be patterned, but they do not occur uniformly across time or space. There are lulls and peaks.
Violence comes to different cities, towns, and neighborhoods at different times. It plays out
differently in various social contexts, even with a series of violent events that are lumped
together as a single ethnic conflict or civil war.23

Rather than simply referring to the violence in Bosnia as the Bosnian genocide or equating it with
the event at Srebrenica, I seek to examine the episode of Prijedor to better understand how and
why violence escalated. Particularly, I want to know why violence reached high-levels of intensity
and group-targeting, making Prijedor one of the deadliest municipalities during the war, with a
significantly high number of concentration camps. By doing so, national level factors – government
institutions, national leaders, and presence of internal instability and war – remain constant, and
the importance of locality, and particularly the role of local elites can be examined. By bringing in
the role of local elites and how they interact with national elites and institutions, we can begin to
understand the phenomenon of genocide more holistically.
Scholars working in the tradition of political violence have employed such a technique to
gain new empirical and theoretical insights into civil war violence, intercommunal rioting, and
genocide.24 My goal is to use a similar methodological technique to gain additional empirical and
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theoretical insights into an underdeveloped case. Although my analysis is a single-case study, I
propose that the “micro-political turn,” to quote King, allows me to account for causal mechanisms
missing when simply looking at the national level. This preliminary theoretical exploration can
serve as a step for future comparative subnational analyses across other municipalities in Bosnia,
and even other countries and regions.25
Argument
Before delving into the argument, it is important to emphasize the role the ideological and strategic
paradigms have in explaining the phenomenon of genocide. Their complementary nature is a step
forward, not as explanatory variables, but rather as scope conditions. As scope conditions, both the
strategic and ideological paradigms specify the parameters to which the causal argument applies.
In other words, by identifying cases of internal instability and/or war, whereby elites exhibit
exclusionary ideologies of in-group and out-group dynamics, researchers can establish a proper
universe of “at-risk” cases. These cases should be alarming and should signal to the researcher or
policymaker that certain conditions are in place for what could be a future case of genocide.
Wars favor genocide because they justify killings as a policy. The perpetrators of the violence
see out-groups as enemies, leading to fear and uncertainty, and ultimately a legitimization to use
violence to eliminate the perceived or real threat. The empirical reality confirms this: genocide
most always exists in the context of warfare.26 That being said, the presence of war still greatly
exceeds the presence of genocide. War does not effectively explain cases under similar conditions
that never led to genocide.
Additionally, exclusionary ideology is the “totalizing system of meaning based on pronounced
in-group and out-group distinctions permitting no shared forms of identification between groups
and premised on a radical devaluation of the out-group.”27 The dangers of elites harboring
exclusionary ideologies are twofold. First, these ideologies create immense divides between
different social groups. The in-group is seen as a legitimate part of the envisioned state and the
out-group is seen as illegitimate. Second, exclusivist ideologies seek to target and dehumanize outgroups through various methods ranging from discrimination to forced assimilation or expulsion.
As Verdeja notes, exclusivist ideology “achieves its greatest resonance when it exaggerates, and
perverts already recognized differences between groups.”28 But if elites harbor exclusionary and
fanatical ideas, and wish to act on these, what allows them to achieve their goals of eliminating the
out-group? And if the presence of war overdetermines genocide, what other factors are necessary
to explain a rare, but extraordinary phenomenon?
To build on these scope conditions, I posit that the presence of structural control and agent
collaboration help us understand which “at-risk” cases could spiral into genocidal violence.
Structural control refers to adequate political authority and territorial bases. Adequate political
authority may include effective political institutions, weak state capacity, total collapse of an
effective central government, and support from neighboring states or other international allies
to mobilize against possible suppression from the state.29 If elites within a group are the main
perpetrator of the violence, then we should expect them to establish effective political institutions
that rival the state or are in place of a failing or failed state government. The group may also be
supported by a nearby ally that offers military power and resources to thwart the current regime.
Genocide; Fujii, Killing Neighbors.
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If the state is the main perpetrator of violence, then we should expect a lack of effective opposition
since the state is already in power and more dominant than any potential opposing group. In this
case, the state will have control of political institutions and might also be supported by neighboring
states. By perpetrating the violence, we would expect a functioning central government capable of
exerting force against targeted groups with little to no resistance.
Elites within a groups must also have territorial bases to effectively mobilize, whether within
the state or in a neighboring country.30 Again, if the state is the main perpetrator of the violence,
then it will not have an issue with establishing territorial bases since the state’s entire territory
should be the base. But for elites in groups seeking to perpetrate violence, it is crucial that they
have effective military positions to mobilize personnel and escalate their violence against the outgroup.
Thus, structural control – political authority and territorial base(s) – increases the likelihood
that wars will escalate to genocide. If elites do not possess effective political authority and territorial
bases, they will most likely be in several disadvantageous positions. It could be that the group or
state is overpowered and their goals of executing more extreme violence are upended. It could
also be that the group or state is in a two-sided combatant battle, which would be a civil or ethnic
war. In such an instance, genocide is unlikely to occur since the perpetrators must allocate their
personnel and resources for fighting an effective resistance. Thus, for genocide to be executed, the
perpetrators need unmatched, one-sided political authority and territorial control.
But how much structural control is necessary for genocide to occur? In Kalyvas’ seminal
work on civil war violence, he argues that “selective violence can only take place in those areas
where control is complete enough for denouncers to denounce, but not so complete that defectors
have either fled or simply ceased to be of concern to the political actor.”31 In other words, Kalyvas
argues that we should expect civil war violence under areas of dominant control.32 Establishing
dominant control in civil wars is useful for two reasons: First, civil wars are armed conflicts
between groups within a state. The actors involved, as noted by Kalyvas, may involve combatants
and noncombatants. However, the main purpose of the violence is not the physical extermination
of a group from a specified territory, but rather their compliance. Second, in civil wars, the actors
– incumbents or insurgents – who have dominant control have already placed the target group
under their authority. Their goals have been effectively met and the escalation of violence is less
likely to occur.
In genocide, the presence of dominant control is not enough. To escalate and radicalize violence,
perpetrators need to establish complete control. If perpetrators seek to physically exterminate an
out-group from a specified territory, then they will need to display more control than needed in civil
wars to achieve their goals. Unlike civil wars, placing the out-group under your authority does not
achieve the goals in mind. The goal is purity, a utopian society that can rid itself of an illegitimate
group altogether, and complete control increases the likelihood of exclusionary ideologies coming
to fruition.
Kalyvas argues that violence during civil wars may be perpetrated under instances of
complete control if rival actors are engaged in indiscriminate rather than selective violence. I argue
that complete control is also more likely when perpetrators engage in extreme selective violence,
or genocide.33 What makes genocide selective is not the private information actors receive about
individuals, the basis for civil war violence, but rather two important factors: the identification
30
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of members belonging to the out-group based on ethnic, national, racial, or religious differences
and the identification of individuals within those groups – often community leaders and men of
military age – who perpetrators especially want to eliminate due to their prestigious or threatening
status.
Likewise, agent collaboration is equally important for violence to escalate to genocide.
Genocide is a radical and cumulative process, so it is crucial to understand the behavior and
policies of agents at different levels of the state. The types of agents include key decision-makers
in positions of power, such as national elites, local elites, the military, paramilitary groups, and so
on. Everyday civilians can and do certainly participate, but such a systematic event cannot occur
without effective leadership. Thus, national elites are important because genocide is destructive,
organized, and sustained violence over a particular territory that requires the participation of
various actors and institutions.34 The state or group must have considerable administrative force
to execute systematic massacres across a country or region. Additionally, national elites often
implement strategic goals they wish to achieve. By outlining clear objectives, national elites are
at the top of the chain of command and their orders are directed down to military commanders,
paramilitary groups, police forces, and local civilian leadership across the country or region.
Because genocide is a systematically organized event, national elites must present clear goals at
various stages of the process, namely, preplanning and coordination, execution of violence over
groups in specified territories, and the expulsion phase through ethnic cleansing and mass killing.
Local elites are important because they can identify the out-group members living in villages,
cities, and various other localities that national elites have identified for execution.35 Local elites
are also important because their participation is crucial, especially since they often live in the same
territory as members of the out-group. To participate in the violence, local elites must effectively
gather information on members of the group by identifying important community members –
academics, business leaders, medical professionals, politicians, and religious figures – that must
be eliminated. By eliminating leaders of the community, the consciousness of the out-group is
depleted. Moreover, local elites need to identify whether members of the out-group have attempted
to flee or gone into hiding in nearby villages. Because local elites are familiar with their specified
localities, the ability to capture and place members of the out-group into concentration camps is
very useful before ultimately deciding whether to forcibly remove or kill them. Lastly, local elites
are tasked with national policies, but their responsibility to execute these policies may vary as
they see appropriate for their localities. Thus, genocide requires the persistent interaction between
agents at different levels of the state. Agent collaboration also accounts for the overemphasis on
the national level as seen in previous studies. National elites are crucial to understanding genocide,
but the dynamic nature of genocide, especially variation in intensity and timing, indicates that a
greater emphasis must be placed on the local level and local actors.
In sum, my theory is a two-step approach that can be used to account for meso-level dynamics
of genocide. The previous literature offers important insights into why genocide occurs; however,
two points are worth noting. First, exclusively, neither has the explanatory power to account
for the multifaceted nature of genocide. Genocide is far too complicated to be reduced to either
strategic or ideological arguments. Second, mutually, both contribute to the absence or presence
of genocide by effectively establishing scope conditions for “at-risk” cases. These scope conditions
give scholars a realistic universe of cases to examine. By examining these cases, the presence of
structural control and agent collaboration offers insight into how and why violence escalates and
radicalizes to genocide. Once elites have political authority, territorial bases, and are coordinating
their efforts at different levels of the state, then the likelihood of genocide increases. Together, these
variables establish a feedback loop, whereby agent collaboration helps establish structural control
and greater structural control incentivizes agents to collaborate.

illustrates that genocide is highly selective, but also extremely violent and one-sided. Therefore, to achieve such
extreme violence, actors need to be completely in control.
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Figure 2. Meso-Level Dynamics
Methods, Sources, and Case Selection
I employ a within-case analysis of the municipality of Prijedor. The case study approach is a
thorough study of a single unit or a small number of units.36 Since my analysis is focused on a
single-case, I do not have the advantage of randomization afforded to large-n scholars. Instead,
I rely on the selection procedures available to small-n scholars. I employ what Jack Levy calls
the Theory-Guided Case Study. This case study “aims to explain and/or interpret a single historical
episode rather than to generalize beyond the data.”37 Additionally, theory-guided case studies are
“explicitly structured by a well-developed conceptual framework that focuses attention on some
theoretically specified aspects of reality and neglects others.”38
I use both secondary and primary sources, particularly, court documents provided by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The archives are extensive and include
evidence, testimonies, and judgements from cases over two decades. Furthermore, reports prepared
by the United Nations Security Council, newspaper clippings, speeches, and secondary sources are
used to complement the court documents.
I seek to apply the theoretical insights previously mentioned to a significant, but underexplored
historical case. This allows for greater in-depth understanding, a key benefit of the qualitative
approach in the social sciences. In the case study approach, there are nine selection techniques
identified: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, crucial, pathway, most-similar, and
most-different cases. I employ the extreme case selection technique, which identifies cases for
their extreme value on the independent or dependent variable.39 Within the political violence
universe, genocide would be an extreme outcome as highlighted by both its intensity and level of
group-targeting. Relatedly, the positioning of Prijedor in Quadrant C makes it an appropriate and
important case for investigation.
Prijedor
Prijedor is a municipality located in northwestern Bosnia in the Bosanska Krajina region. It is
situated between the town of Sanski Most to the south, the Bosnian-Croatian border towns of
36

John Gerring, “The Case Study: What It Is and What It Does,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Science, ed. Robert E.
Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 7.

37

Jack Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, no. 1
(2008), 4, accessed July 30, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940701860318.

38

Ibid., 4.

39

John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 89, 101-105.
One could make the argument that cases could fall into multiple types, but the extreme case is the most relevant for
this analysis.

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1686

Kovačević

114

Bosanski Novi to the west and Bosanska Dubica to the north, and the regional capital of Banja
Luka to the east. Prior to the 1992 referendum – declaring Bosnian independence from Yugoslavia
– the census of 1991 accounted for a total population of 112,740. The population was ethnically
intermixed; Bosnian Muslims made up 44 percent of the population, while Bosnian Serbs made
up 42.5 percent of the population.40 This drastically changed as a result of the Greater Serbia
campaign. By June 1993, the total population was 65,551. Bosnian Serbs made up 82 percent of the
total population, while the Bosnian Muslim population was reduced to just under 10 percent.41
Scope Conditions
Tensions between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs escalated with the ascension of Radovan
Karadžić to political power. If Slobodan Milošević was the mastermind behind the Yugoslav Wars,
then Karadžić can be credited for bringing the Greater Serbia campaign to fruition within Bosnia.
With a resounding speech to the Bosnian Assembly on October 14, 1991, Karadžić used his political
grandeur to threaten the Bosnian Muslim goal of independence.
Do not think that you will not lead Bosnia and Herzegovina into hell, and do not think that
you will not perhaps lead the Muslim people into annihilation, because the Muslims cannot
defend themselves if there is war – How will you prevent everyone from being killed in
Bosnia and Herzegovina?42

Karadžić gave a harrowing account of the consequences of possible secession, but he echoed more
xenophobic sentiments in private in the lead up to the war. Around the time he gave his speech,
Karadžić also met with Warren Zimmerman, the last Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and blamed the
“chronic dishonesty” of the Muslims on their leader Izetbegović’s Islamic faith. Stating, “they’re
prone to oriental despotism. They’re always cheating us. We can’t stand it anymore.” Ambassador
Zimmerman noted that the most startling takeaway he had from that conversation was Karadžić’s
portrayal of Izetbegović as a secessionist, even though he was responsible for the creation of a
Serbian autonomous region prior to any Bosnian secession.43
Following Karadžić’s speech, the Bosnian Parliament passed a resolution on independence
the following day. Immediately after, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) discussed the steps needed
to achieve the “homogenization of Serb people and territories.”44 The top priorities included
establishing a separate Bosnian Serb Assembly and holding a plebiscite exclusively for Serbs to
determine whether they wanted to remain in Yugoslavia. By October 24, 1991, the Assembly of the
Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established, and by January 9, 1992, the Serbs created
the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina (later renamed Republika Srpska).45
In Prijedor, the Bosnian Serb leadership established local measures by effectively creating
parallel governing institutions. This signaled that the Bosnian Serb leadership was not supportive
of the Bosnian independence movement, and therefore, on January 17, 1992, the newly established
Prijedor Serb Assembly unanimously voted to join the greater Serbian Autonomous Oblast of
Bosanska Krajina (ARK).46 Following the declaration of Bosnian independence on March 1, 1992,
three crucial factors made Prijedor an “at-risk” case.
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First, the Croatian War was a precursor for the type of violence that would unfold in Bosnia.
The Yugoslavia National Army (JNA) needed conscripts, but many Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats chose not to respond to the call in the neighboring country. This created a situation where
most of the national Yugoslav military was composed of soldiers of Bosnian Serb descent, creating
insecurity among the non-Serb population of Prijedor.47 Second, a rise in propaganda produced fear
among the non-Serb community. Radio and TV broadcasts blocked content coming in from Croatia
and Sarajevo, and only permitted broadcasts from Serbia or the Bosnian Serb hub of Banja Luka.
At the direction of the Bosnian Serb leadership, Radio Prijedor accused Bosnian Muslim doctors
of seeking to reduce the Bosnian Serb birth rate by either sterilizing women or giving pregnant
women “special injections” so they would be limited to only giving birth to girls. Relatedly,
Bosnian Serb citizens were encouraged to accept a policy of discrimination and exclusion against
their non-Serb neighbors or fear the consequence of being labeled “traitors.”48 Third, by the time
war erupted in the cosmopolitan capital of Sarajevo on April 6, 1992, the JNA, now predominately
Serb, deployed nearly 55,000 troops to Bosnia.49 Around the same time, the Bosnian Serbs ramped
up their offensive in strategic locations across eastern Bosnia, including Bijeljina, Bratunac, Foča,
and Zvornik. War officially commenced in Bosnia, and the stage was set for the violence that would
follow in Prijedor a few weeks later.
Structural Control
The Bosnian Serb leadership took notable steps in establishing overwhelming political authority
and territorial bases throughout the municipality. Politically, the Bosnian Serbs effectively rivaled
and ultimately replaced, the original governing institutions with the creation of two bodies: The
Bosnian Serb Assembly of Prijedor and the Prijedor Crisis Staff.
The Bosnian Serb Assembly of Prijedor was the local equivalent to the declaration of
Republika Srpska. By forming the Assembly, the local Bosnian Serb leadership joined the greater
ARK, composed of Bosnian Serb districts throughout northwest Bosnia. These districts were selfproclaimed and were formed as a response to the Bosnian declaration for independence. With
the command and structure established nationally – Republika Srpska – and the creation of the
Assembly in Prijedor, the next steps involved linking the various regions across Bosnia under
the unified Greater Serbia objectives. To achieve this, the Bosnian Serb leadership set up similar
institutions called “Crisis Staffs.” Karadžić set guidelines ordering all municipal and regional
committees of the SDS to work undercover in preparation for possible war. The Crisis Staffs were
ordered to cooperate with the commanders of the JNA, members of the SDS, and the Assembly
of the Bosnian Serbs in each locality. According to expert testimony, “the Crisis Staff coordinates
functions of authorities with the objective of defending the territory, securing the safety [of people
and property], establishing the authority and organizing areas of life and work…the Crisis Staff is
obliged to collect information on conditions in the field.”50
Territorially, the Bosnian Serbs outpowered the Bosnian Muslims in Prijedor in three ways:
through the “ethnicization” of the JNA, the arming of Bosnian Serb residents, and the formation of
territorial headquarters for Bosnian Serb operations in Banja Luka.
Nationally, the JNA was relatively multiethnic and composed of soldiers from the various
republics prior to 1991. But, by March 1992, except for a minority of Montenegrin soldiers, the
army was 90 percent Serb.51 With the federal army in complete control by the Bosnian Serbs, the
JNA began to disarm Bosnian troops and argued that peace and stability could only be secured
by handing over weapons. Locally, efforts were then made by the JNA to distribute weapons
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to the Prijedor Territorial Defense units and the Bosnian Serb citizens.52 Their Bosnian Muslim
counterparts received outdated weapons often containing the wrong ammunition, whereas
Bosnian Serb residents were equipped by JNA military helicopters that would land several times
a day in Serb-concentrated villages of Prijedor. Insofar as weapons were concerned, “only four
percent of the Muslims in Prijedor have been licensed to have weapons. Many Muslim and Croats
had their applications for a license to carry turned down without any reason given.”53 The pretext
for weapons distribution was that it was a necessary defense against the “enemies of the people”
or the Muslim extremists and the Croatian fascists – Ustaša.54 The weapon distribution phase
gave Bosnian Serbs two territorial advantages locally. First, it was coupled with the establishment
of checkpoints, which were vital for Bosnian Serb efforts seeking to control the movement
of the Bosnian Muslim population in Prijedor. Second, Prijedor had now contained the largest
concentration of former JNA weapons and the JNA was conducting training programs for Bosnian
Serb residents throughout the municipality.55 Most significantly, the Bosnian Serbs established
their territorial headquarters in Banja Luka – only 55 kilometers east of Prijedor. The region had
a well-organized chain of command, and because of the war in Croatia and the proximity to the
border, many soldiers were already situated in Banja Luka and ready for the offensive in Prijedor.56
Agent Collaboration
Structural control incentivized agent collaboration in the Prijedor municipality, whereby elites at
various levels of the state pooled their efforts for the Greater Serbia objectives. At the same time,
the ability of elites to collaborate helped establish structural control. This feedback loop is evident
when analyzing the actions of Karadžić.
Karadžić was crucial in various stages. During stage one, or the propaganda and nationalist
rhetoric stage, he was the catalyst for a Bosnian Serb state in a time of deep divide and increasing
ethnic tensions. He founded the SDS in Bosnia in 1989 and unified the Bosnian Serb population
in the face of Bosnian secession from Yugoslavia. His rhetoric was stern, signaling to the Bosnian
Muslims that their efforts would lead to bloodshed, disappearance, and ultimately extinction.57 All
this propelled him to the helm as the first President of Republika Srpska. During stage two, the
preplanning and coordination phase, Karadžić assured that the formation of the Crisis Staffs was
executed across the country and that these Crisis Staffs coordinate their efforts with the local civilian
leadership and military units. During stage three, the execution of the Greater Serbia campaign,
Karadžić, along with members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, operated under commander’s intent,
best summed up as
it is unlikely that Milošević or Karadžić could or need have known about or controlled the
details of all operations. Although in some instances direct guidance on what to do was not
available, in many cases, ‘commander’s intent’ was more likely used, whereby the leadership
could set certain policy goals and assume that subordinates would have the latitude to use
virtually any means to achieve them. Subsequent claims by the Serbian and Bosnian Serbian
leadership, that they had no control, seem to have been intended primarily to provide
convenient plausible denial to the outside world without hampering their policy.58
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With Karadžić at the top of the hierarchal structure, it was the responsibility of local leadership to
carry out the command, and in Prijedor this was achieved by the Crisis Staff, Bosnian Serb police,
JNA units, and participation of paramilitary groups. According to UN Reports, efforts by the
JNA and various paramilitary units were “fully synchronized…all the major Serbian operations
started with heavy artillery barrages or the use of tanks as operated by the regular army, and were
immediately followed by the onslaught of paramilitary and irregular units working in tandem
with regular army infantry.” Moreover, the UN investigators concluded that “there is not one
single report to the effect that there was ever a paramilitary or irregular unit working to obstruct or
even slightly hinder the objectives of the regular army.”59
This was made possible due to the highly organized efforts of the Crisis Staffs. In Prijedor,
the Crisis Staff established control over the municipality by arming local Bosnian Serbs, blocking
communications of non-Serbs, destroying multiethnic relations throughout the community by
spreading propaganda, and providing logistical support to the military through the takeover of
industry and production units.60
Most importantly, the Crisis Staff implemented the takeover of Prijedor on April 30, 1992.
Along with brigades from the JNA forces stationed in Banja Luka and members of the Bosnian
Serb police, the Crisis Staff initiated a coup d’état with little to no resistance. By early morning,
the Bosnian Serb soldiers established complete control over the Municipal Assembly building, the
police station, courthouse, bank, post office, and radio station. That same day, Bosnian flags were
removed from all municipal buildings and replaced with Serbian flags. Non-Serb policemen were
disarmed and asked to pledge loyalty to secure their employment or face termination.61
In the weeks following the takeover, the Crisis Staff, JNA, and paramilitary units increased
exclusivist measures against Bosnian Muslims and other non-Serbs by firing them from work,
prohibiting children from attending school, and restricting the freedom of movement throughout
the municipality. These measures extended to the local media too, specifically Radio Prijedor and
the local newspaper Kozarski Vjesnik. Both served as vehicles of propaganda for the new Bosnian
Serb leadership. Radio Prijedor broadcasted Serbian nationalist or Četnik songs, attacked members
of the Party of Democratic Action (the Bosnian Muslim political party), and issued statements
comparing Bosnian Muslims to Islamic fundamentalists who were seeking to establish control in
the area to wage genocide against Bosnian Serb citizens.62
The most haunting measure came on May 30, when Radio Prijedor demanded that all Bosnian
Muslims and other non-Serbs mark their homes with white flags and themselves with white
armbands; a sign of surrender.63 It was the first time since 1939 – when the Nazis ordered Polish
Jews to wear the Star of David on their sleeve – that individuals of an ethnic or religious group
were marked for mass deportation and mass killing. With overwhelming structural control, and
coordination at all levels of the state, the Bosnian Serb leadership escalated their offensive that day.
Some of these individuals were taken to notorious concentration camps like Keraterm, Omarska, and
Trnopolje, while the remaining victims were subject to harassment and beatings. The beginning of
the Greater Serbia campaign in Prijedor was underway.
Genocide
Prijedor, along with other strategic municipalities extending across eastern and northwestern
Bosnia, was part of the Serbian Arc. The goals were twofold. From a political standpoint, the
objective was to unite Serbs living in Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia under a common government.
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From a territorial standpoint, this would be achieved by physically linking territories throughout
Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia into a common region; Greater Serbia. Hence, resembling an arc shape.
These two strategic goals were part of six goals emphasized by Karadžić at the 16th session of the
Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The first goal is separation from the other two national communities – separation of states.
Separation from those who are our enemies and who have used every opportunity, especially
in this century, to attack us, and who would continue with such practices if we were to
continue to stay together in the same state.
The second strategic goal…is a corridor between Semberija and Krajina. That is something
for which we may be forced to sacrifice something here and there, but is of the utmost
importance for the Serbian people, because it integrates the Serbian lands…which will
integrate us, which will provide us unimpeded flow from one part of our state to another.64

Greater Serbia represented the so-called utopia, or at least the desire to purify what is historically
and rightfully Serbian from threatening enemies; Bosnian Muslims and other non-Serbs. This
exclusionary, irredentist ideology was the goal in Prijedor, but to achieve it, the Bosnian Serbs had
to go beyond the traditional theater of warfare. This required the Bosnian Serbs to enter the groupselective and group-destructive phase of genocide.
The process to genocide escalated after the takeover of Prijedor and the subsequent exclusionary
targeting of Bosnian Muslims and other non-Serb residents. Once the Bosnian Serbs were able
to disrupt everyday life, without any means of an effective counter-resistance, they shifted their
efforts to the surrounding villages and the creation of concentration camps.
The Bosnian Serb leadership attacked the predominantly Bosnian Muslim village of Hambarine
on May 22. An ultimatum was issued over Radio Prijedor ordering several individuals to surrender
themselves and all their weapons or face possible consequences. The ultimatum was not met, and
the attack commenced the next day. The units responsible for the attack included the 1st Krajina
Corps, the 6th Krajina Brigade, the 43rd Motorized Brigade, the Bosnian Serb police, and members
from various paramilitary groups under the direction of the Crisis Staff.65 Following the attack
on Hambarine, similar events unfolded in the town of Kozarac – encompassing the villages of
Kamičani, Kozaruša, Sušići, Brdjani, and Babići. The Bosnian Serb leadership issued an ultimatum
for weapons surrender and soon thereafter, an attack was initiated consisting of approximately
5,000 perpetrators. Among the group of perpetrators were the infamous paramilitary units led by
Željko Ražnatović (Arkan) and Vojislav Šešelj.66
The attack on Kozarac lasted until May 26 and the Bosnian Serbs achieved their ethnic
purification of the mostly Bosnian Muslim enclave of 25,000 residents. On that same day, Bosnian
Serb aggressors moved their tanks and loudspeakers into town and began crying out, “Muslims
get out! Muslims get out! Surrender and everyone will be safe!” Homes were destroyed, some even
set on fire with residents still in them, and Bosnian Muslims agreed to terms of surrender: If they
wished to evacuate Kozarac and accept surrender, they would need to form a column. What they did
not know at that time was that they were being subjected to a “carefully planned and coordinated
attack designed not only to remove the population, but to liquidate its leaders and destroy homes
so that the ‘cleansing’ would be irreversible.”67 Thousands of Bosnian Muslims emerged from the
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forest waving white flags of surrender. Additionally, the town’s elite was identified, including
judges, politicians, police officers, restaurant owners, factory managers, and local sports heroes, for
removal and transportation to the established concentration camps.
Whether in Hambarine, Kozarac, Prijedor proper, or other Bosnian Muslim enclaves, the
same pattern unfolded in late May and early June. The men were brought to concentration camps
to be detained, and in many cases, tortured and killed. The women, children, and elderly men
were transported to Trnopolje, for immediate deportation or prolonged captivity. To sum up, “In
Prijedor town, Stari Grad [Old Town] and adjacent areas were ‘ethnically cleansed’ first, that is
already on May 30, 1992. Other parts of the town were ‘cleansed’ in raids or in connection with
ransacking the following days.”68 By this point, the Bosnian Serb leadership moved onto the last
phase of the Greater Serbia objectives – mass deportation and mass killing. The former was largely
the responsibility of the camp at Trnopolje, while camps Keraterm and Omarska were primarily used
for detention, subjugation, expulsion, and in extreme cases, death.
The detainees at Keraterm and Omarska were subject to serious mistreatment and abuse,
including lack of food and medical care, poor hygiene and overcrowding, physical abuse and
interrogations, and death. Both camps were established by the Crisis Staff and were under the
command of the Bosnian Serb military and police officers. Although records at Omarska were
inadequate, estimates indicated that around 700 people were killed.69 The camp was eventually
shut down on August 7, following a visit from international journalist Roy Gutman. Gutman was
the first to break the story by reporting on the maltreatment and killings of detainees. Following
Gutman’s reporting, Ed Vulliamy, a British journalist, described what he saw at Omarska.
The men are at various stages of human decay and affliction; the bones of their elbows and
wrists protrude like pieces of jagged stone from the pencil thin stalks to which their arms
have been reduced…There is nothing quite like the sight of the prisoner desperate to talk
and to convey some terrible truth that is so near yet so far, but who dares not. Their stares
burn, they speak only with their terrified silence, and eyes inflamed with the articulation of
stark, undiluted, desolate fear-without-hope.70

Keraterm was reported to have held as many as 1,500 detainees at any given time, primarily in
four separate rooms. Keraterm was also the site of the July 24 massacres. Leading up to the event,
detainees originally in Room 3 were moved to Rooms 2 and 4, clearing the room for Bosnian Muslim
men who arrived from the Brdo area on July 20 or 21. Other witnesses indicated that the detainees
were stripped of their documents and forbidden from interacting with detainees in other rooms.71
On the night of July 24, Armed guards entered the camp and placed a machine-gun on top of the
table facing Room 3, resulting in the massacre of nearly 200 Bosnian Muslim men.72 According to
a Bosnian Muslim witness, he was in Room 2 when the massacre had occurred, and the following
day, several survivors at the camp were instructed to pile dead and wounded bodies into a truck
that was never seen again.73
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As for Trnopolje, it was initially established for the mass deportation of women, children,
and the elderly. But, after the closing of Keraterm and Omarska, Bosnian Muslim men were also
transferred to the camp. Conditions improved slightly in late August due to the international
outcry, but the situation as a whole remained dire. For example, on August 21, some detainees
were even subject to mass killing. A convoy stopped at Trnopolje, where mostly male detainees
but also some women and children were loaded on for transfer. As the convoy made its way to
the town of Skender Vakuf, men of military age were separated from the women and children and
ordered to get on two empty buses. The buses, which included some 250 detainees, stopped at a
nearby cliff facing a deep gorge. It was reported that approximately 200 dead bodies were found
near Mount Vlašić after the August 21 massacre.74
Conclusion
By the end 1992, the goals of genocide had been achieved due to the effective deportation and
extermination of Bosnian Muslims and non-Serbs. By June 1993, the Bosnian Muslim population
accounted for just under 10 percent of the total population in Prijedor. By 1995, this number was
down to 5 percent, a drastic demographic change when compared to 44 percent in 1991.75 As
the international community was fixated on the events occurring in Sarajevo, the Bosnian Serb
leadership effectively established dominance in strategic territory for purposes of securing a
homogenous Serb population. What occurred in the Prijedor municipality over the spring and
summer of 1992 can best be characterized as the following:
The ‘ethnic cleansing’ is the core of the Serbian military operations in Bosnia. It may even be
argued, as some observers do, that the events in Sarajevo – where there is a more traditional
theatre of war with all its horrors – are staged, in part at least, to take away international
attention from the eradication of entire ethnic groups in areas where there has not even been
any real war, only tremendous abuses of military power – such as in Opstina Prijedor.76

By focusing on the meso-level, a more in-depth understanding of Prijedor was elucidated.
Particularly, the presence of structural control and agent collaboration were crucial for explaining
the events that unfolded in Prijedor. War and exclusivist ideology created a hostile situation. After
the siege of Sarajevo and the onset of violence in eastern Bosnia, it was only a matter of time until
violence reached Prijedor. But these were scope conditions, or “at-risk” factors. To account for
the escalation and radicalization of violence to genocide, the following variables were necessary:
overwhelming political authority, territorial presence, and a highly coordinated effort between
national and local elites. These factors brought the Greater Serbia goals to life, an accounted for the
high-level of intensity and group-targeting witnessed in Prijedor. Moving forward, two questions
remain: Were these same patterns present across other municipalities of the Serbian arc? And if
so, what municipalities were able to overcome or avoid genocide and why? These questions are
a logical next step I plan to unpack in future studies to account for cross-case comparisons at the
subnational level.
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Individual nations, as well as the United Nations (UN), have been historically reluctant to label
and frame a situation genocide.1 Terms such as “ethnic cleansing” or “genocidal acts,” are common
euphemisms for genocide, used to avoid the legally mandated obligation to intervene, to prevent or
halt genocides.2 The continued diplomatic contention regarding the application of the genocide label
is exemplified with respect to the 1915 Armenian genocide. This dispute perpetuates a normalcy to
debates over claims of genocide, creating a discourse of denial and divisive politics which becomes
synonymous with the application of the genocide label. This historical reluctance to label an act as
genocide is also evident in the treatment of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The Clinton administration
in the United States (US) specifically avoided the use of the word genocide in a semantic charade to
negate the perceived obligation to “actually do something.”3 Although New Zealand and the Czech
Republic entertained the notion of labeling the situation in Rwanda a genocide, the US strongly
opposed the use of such strong rhetoric, a position which received significant support among other
Security Council members.4 Not only does this speak to the historical reluctance to label a genocide
as such, but also the influential power ascribed to the UN Security Council Permanent Five (P5)
members in shaping broader international discourses concerning such labeling.
The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide notes a
finding of genocide requires member-states and competent organs of the UN to prevent and
punish such acts.5 However, despite this obligation, and the fact that the Convention provides
a detailed definition of what acts constitute genocide, the use of euphemisms in referring to
situations involving the apparent commission of genocide remains widespread. When an atrocity
is not recognized as a genocide, a dangerous precedent is set for future acts of semantic avoidance,
and the ability of areas affected by genocide to recover is severely hampered.6 The UN Framework
of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes asserts that past acts of genocide, serious human rights violations,
and crimes against humanity are prominent indicators of a heightened risk of future genocides.7
This claim is supported by research demonstrating that a history of violence and aggression
makes the engagement in future violent acts as a means of responding to conflict and hostility
more likely.8 Given that governments which deny genocide are three times more likely to commit
another genocide, international recognition is central to maintaining peace and security.9 It was not
until Winston Churchill’s 1941 speech in which he stated “we are in the presence of a crime without
a name,” that the absence of a label to describe the systematic mass murder of a group of people
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became apparent.10 Despite the pioneering efforts of Raphael Lemkin to fill this void by coining the
term “genocide,” the term continues to be avoided to this day.
This article explores the ways in which language is used by P5 nations in the Security Council
to avoid genocide recognition using the Srebrenica genocide as a case study. Srebrenica is an ideal
case study to examine such rhetorical positioning for a number of reasons. First, the atrocities that
occurred in Srebrenica constitute the largest genocide in Europe since the Holocaust and symbolize
a failure of intelligence collection during peacekeeping operations, thereby undermining the
credibility of western governments and the UN.11 Second, Srebrenica occurred on the heels of the
Rwandan genocide a year earlier, and thus the discussion at the UN, concerning Srebrenica, arose
in an environment where the UN P5 and the international community more generally, were all
coming to terms with the consequences of their inaction in Rwanda. Third, in recent years, there
has been a turn towards formal recognition of Srebrenica as a genocide by the UN, providing
an interesting opportunity to consider the historical context of the use of the term genocide by
the P5 over time. As noted above, genocide recognition has important consequences in reducing
the likelihood of future violence. In the case of Srebrenica, Prosecutor Serge Brammertz of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) expressed concern regarding the
repercussions of the continued denial of the Srebrenica genocide with respect to both individual
harm to victims and families, and also the inhibition of reconciliation and the reinforcement of
communal divisions within the former Yugoslavia.12 Such concerns highlight the significance of
genocide recognition and the ongoing timeliness of considering the Srebrenica case.
Through an analysis of diplomatic language utilized by UN P5 nations concerning how and
whether to label Srebrenica a genocide, this article explores the intersections of language, power,
and politics by examining how P5 nations choose to frame the genocide in Srebrenica in public
UN Security Council debates. To do so, this article first considers the significance of an attention to
language and its use by P5 members in particular, before introducing the specific case of Srebrenica
while focusing on the history and context of the use—or avoidance—of the term “genocide.” After
establishing this context, the article turns to an examination of the language used by P5 members
in debates concerning Srebrenica. This language is analyzed through the lens of framing theory,
an approach adopted from its common use in mass-media communications theory to serve as a
method of analyzing how particular nations frame and represent narratives around the genocide
label. This analysis proceeds in two parts. The first part involves an exploration of the explicit
use of the term “genocide” by P5 nations. The second part then considers situations where P5
nations employ euphemisms to avoid using the term. Together, an analysis of these discourses
demonstrates how UN Security Council P5 members use language as a mechanism to frame a
conflict in a particular way that aligns with their own national political interests. Through this
analysis, this article reaffirms the importance of explicit semantic genocide recognition, not only as
an important legal determination, but one that also affects acknowledgment of the significance of
a given atrocity event, and post-conflict growth and mediation processes.
Diplomatic Language and Genocide Recognition
Language is commonly used as a method for framing a particular interpretation of an act or event.
Language used within international relations represents a culmination of dominant ideologies
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from social, political, and academic discourses.13 The construction of language does not always aim
to perpetuate a single reality and can be used both as a form of communication and strategically to
perpetuate certain “realities.”14 The language used within international political arenas is calculated
and complex. This complexity is exacerbated when nations must navigate discussions concerning
potential genocides, as within such contexts, language becomes moderated by national interests
and transnational diplomacy.
In 1988, the term ethnic purge (“etnicheskie chistki”) was used by Soviet officials to
describe the ethnic based forced removal of Azerbaijanis from Nagorno-Karabakh.15 Slobodan
Milošević meanwhile, became the first politician to use the term “ethnic cleansing” to describe
Kosovar Albanian commander’s violence towards Serbians.16 The term subsequently became part
of the common vernacular of perpetrators and bystanders of the Srebrenica genocide and is now
commonly referenced in UN documentation, as well as more generally in scholarly and diplomatic
discussions of numerous atrocity situations. Such language remains despite the fact that “ethnic
cleansing” implicitly suggests that massacres may serve as a means of improving hygiene through
the “cleansing” of a region, and lacks any formal definition, legal or otherwise. The term has
been adopted by many politicians and journalists and has penetrated the official language of
international law and diplomacy.17 In Rwanda, avoidance of the term genocide as mass killings
took place, acted as a diplomatic excuse for non-intervention, contributing to the deaths of over
800,000 people. While “ethnic cleansing” is commonly used by the UN and human rights groups
in ways that are undoubtedly well-intentioned, the use of this term has been found to be associated
with denial and delay in bystander intervention.18 The use of “ethnic cleansing” and other similar
terms, especially when such use is part of a concerted effort to avoid the language of genocide,
indicates an unwillingness to take forceful action to prevent imminent atrocities or halt them once
they commence. Based on their analysis of the use of the terms “ethnic cleansing” and genocide in
legal literature, UN press statements, and statements made by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International, Blum, Stanton, Sagi and Richter argue that “the ratio between the terms ‘genocide
and ‘ethnic cleansing’ measures the will for emergency response.”19 It is not until atrocities have
been explicitly labeled as genocide that force has been used to stop them.20 For example, it was not
until the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) won the civil war and ended the genocide that the US State
Department finally acknowledged genocide had occurred. Although the US government referred
to “acts of genocide” occurring in Rwanda in May, 1994, this specific phrasing was a pragmatic
determination used as part of a concerted effort to avoid any legal obligation to intervene and
occurred six weeks after the mass killings began, when denying that a genocide was unfolding in
Rwanda became an untenable position.21 While it has been argued that the genocide label has lost
its normative power in terms of its assumed obligations to prevent and punish acts of genocide,
this article argues its power extends beyond the perceived obligation for intervention.22
While many lamented the absence of civil society mobilization and the avoidance of
genocide recognition in Rwanda, tens of thousands rallied in support of intervention in Darfur,

Karin Marie Fierke, “Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations,” International Studies
Quarterly 46, no. 1 (2002), 351, accessed May 14, 2016, http://www.jstor.org.ezp01.library.qut.edu.au/stable/3096092.
14
Ibid., 349.
15
Blum et al., Ethnic Cleansing, 204
16
Ibid., 205.
17
Ibid., 204.
18
Ibid., 207.
19
Ibid., 205.
20
Ibid., 207.
21
Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 361.
22
Luke Glanville, “Is “Genocide” Still a Powerful Word?” Journal of Genocide Research 11, no. 4 (2009), 468, accessed
November 19, 2018, doi: 10.1080/14623520903309529.
13

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1603

The Politicization of the Genocide Label: Genocide Rhetoric in the UN Security Council

127

in part because of the widespread identification of the conflict as genocide.23 While the debate of
whether or not Darfur was a genocide may have detracted from meaningful action, it is unlikely
Darfur would have gained such widespread support without the power of the genocide frame.24
It is also noteworthy that the Bush administration labeled Darfur a genocide through a morally
unambiguous framing of “saving” Darfur by western powers, with the UN subsequently noting
there was insufficient evidence for a determination of genocide.25 While no actual hierarchy of
international crimes exists in any legal sense, it remains important to recognize the ability of the
genocide label to mobilize international advocacy efforts as well as its role in altering the trajectory
from violence as a means of conflict resolution to one of international recognition and mediation.
Genocide recognition also extends beyond a legal call for intervention, given its ability to
provide victims with acknowledgment of the crimes that have been committed against them.
This acknowledgment is increasingly important as we are now aware of the significant impacts
of genocide denial in the form of transgenerational cultural trauma for descendants of genocide
survivors.26 The narrative of genocide denial has been connected to feelings of resentment and of
one’s personhood being attacked, amongst descendants of genocide victims, both of which have
significant psychological implications.27 The recognition of crimes perpetrated against a group of
people has far-reaching impacts in easing the trauma of victims and, more importantly, in reducing
the likelihood of revenge.28 Acknowledging the culpability for crimes committed also provides a
base for reducing “othering” on the basis of cultural, national, religious or ethnic grounds.29
The Security Council is the peak body in the UN for binding decisions and has the power
to authorize intervention in situations of mass atrocities. As such, the UN Security Council, and
the language used by the P5 members in particular, is of significance when exploring the use of
language and assessing national interests in responses to genocide. Claude notes that in instances
of Security Council engagement with mass atrocities, a myriad of factors influence language use.30
The use of particular phrases and language is commonly challenged by P5 nations in the pursuit
of political goals. For example, some argue that the motivation for the US labeling the atrocities in
Darfur a genocide in 2004 was to create a “philanthropic alibi” for US projection of power, as well
as, to improve the human rights image of the Bush administration prior to an upcoming election.31
Do Monte furthers this notion by asserting that control over language within the Security Council
is a means of projecting power.32
Language in this domain reinforces power hierarchies by giving a stronger voice to privilege,
such as P5 nations. Gifkins postulates that there are three key reasons as to why language used
within the Security Council is of significance in decision-making processes.33 Firstly, language is not
static and is representative of member-states’ political attitudes at a particular time.34 Essentially,
26
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language use is a representative “snapshot,” illustrating the dominant discourse of a particular
period.35 Secondly, drafting resolutions and engaging in debate is “both political and routine”
as promoting an innovative linguistic frame may be profoundly political, however, through the
process of repetition, its use becomes normalized.36 Dunne and Gifkins assert that this dynamic
stems from the value placed upon “previously agreed language” as an indicator of consensus
among Council members.37 Finally, the repetition of particular phrases within the Security Council
is not “simple automation devoid of meaning,” but rather, a process of cognitive reaffirmation
and perpetuation of shared meaning.38 Essentially, member-states may affirm their position on
an atrocity event by continuously associating such events with terms such as “ethnic cleansing,”
and subsequently presenting that particular linguistic frame as previously agreed language.
Werner notes that by recalling language used previously as well as utilizing existing normative
frameworks, decisions made in the Security Council are seen as being a part of a wider history of
international regulation as opposed to random choices.39 The use of language within a discourse of
transnational diplomacy is a calculated amalgamation of a number of variables including; power,
national interest, previously agreed language, and linguistic repetition. The extent to which these
variables moderate the recognition of an act of genocide within the UN Security Council requires
further consideration. This is significant given the importance of such recognition for post-conflict
mediation, the reparation of communal divisions, and the psychological wellbeing of victims and
survivors.
Srebrenica
The Srebrenica genocide occurred only one year after the world said “never again” following
Rwanda. As the largest genocide on European soil since the Holocaust, discussions of the Srebrenica
genocide have been marked by divisive politics and acts of genocide denial, creating the potential
for transgenerational trauma among victims and their families. The genocide in Srebrenica
occurred during the Bosnian war (1992-1995), involving the declaration of independence of the
countries making up the former Yugoslavia. Srebrenica, a town in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH), lies only 15 kilometers from the Serbian border and as such, was of strategic significance to
Serbian forces.40 In 1993, the Security Council passed a resolution declaring, “all parties and others
treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a ‘safe area’ that should be free from armed attack or
any other hostile act.”41 However, on July 11, 1995 the Bosnian Serb army, under the command of
Ratko Mladić, entered Srebrenica, largely uncontested by Dutch peacekeepers. Shortly thereafter,
approximately 8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were systematically murdered, predominantly
through mass executions.42
Although the atrocities in Srebrenica occurred with limited international resistance, the past
two decades have seen political and judicial recognition that the actions of the Bosnian Serb forces
constituted genocide.43 Though some contention does exist within academic literature regarding
labeling Srebrenica a genocide, largely with reference to the ability to prove intent, rulings by the
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ICTY and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) both concluded that the atrocities in Srebrenica
legally constituted genocide.44
Despite the determination of genocide in Srebrenica by the ICTY and the ICJ, this finding
did not penetrate the official language of international law or diplomatic discourses within the
UN for some time. Although Srebrenica is currently referred to as a genocide within UN public
documentation, this has not always been the case. For example, in a 2005 commemorative speech,
former Secretary-General Kofi Annan referred to the Srebrenica genocide as a “massacre.”45 Even
when referring to the ICTY indictments of Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić, which included
genocide charges, Annan did not to refer to genocide.46 This omission may be contrasted with a
commemorative speech delivered in 2015 by former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who openly
referred to Srebrenica as a genocide.47 On July 8, 2015, a draft resolution was introduced which
would formally acknowledge within the Security Council that the atrocities which had occurred
in Srebrenica constituted genocide. France, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US voted in favor
of the resolution; China abstained from voting, and Russia voted against the resolution.48 Within
debates on the draft resolution, Russia declared that the resolution, which was submitted by the
UK, was politically motivated and would only lead to greater tension within BiH. However, the
veto of the resolution by Russia can be seen as a manifestation of the impact of domestic politics on
international policy, as it has been argued that Russia vetoed the resolution due to their political
ties with Serbia.49
In contrast to the UN’s apprehension to label Srebrenica a genocide, advocacy groups used the
language of genocide in reference to the Srebrenica massacres only weeks after the atrocities were
committed.50 For example, Holly Burkhalter, advocacy director of Human Rights Watch at the time,
published a piece in the Washington Post on July 20, 1995, only nine days after the atrocities of
Srebrenica. In the article, titled “what we can do to stop genocide,” Burkhalter argued that the clear
effort by the Serbian Military to eliminate the Bosnian Muslim population “in whole or in part” in
Srebrenica and surrounding areas, constituted a “textbook case of genocide.”51 The emergence of
the genocide label within this discourse, so soon after Srebrenica, demonstrates that it was in the
lexicon of advocacy works and journalists, and as such, was available for diplomats to use. While
civil society groups commonly use language as a tool for framing a conflict, particularly to mobilize
wider public attention for a given cause, the genocide label is not just avoided to circumvent the
mandated obligation for intervention. The use of the genocide label to describe the Holocaust and
the Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia created reference points for an implicit moral weight that
may be absent when referring to crimes against humanity.52 The difficulty in proving specific intent
44
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is also commonly used as an argument to avoid the genocide label. For example, some refute the
application of the genocide label to the Srebrenica massacres, as the killing of military age boys
and men was seen as a tactic of war, as opposed to an act specifically intended to destroy the area’s
Bosnian Muslim population in whole or in part.53 Serbia still refuses to label Srebrenica a genocide
with various political parties in Serbia both disputing both the events surrounding Srebrenica as
well as questioning the evidence of the genocide itself.54 This trend continues with Milorad Dodik,
the former president of Republika Srpska, strongly opposing children in Republika Srpska schools
being taught about the Srebrenica genocide, or the siege of Sarajevo.55 When one considers these
broader discourses surrounding Srebrenica, both within and outside of the Security Council, the
highly divisive and politicized nature of the use of the genocide label becomes apparent.
Methodology
In examining the language used by the P5 around Srebrenica, this article adopts an exploratory,
post-positivist methodological approach, allowing for a focus on the meaning behind a construct,
rather than observable fact. It adopts the use of framing from the mass-media communications
theory, known as framing theory, to consider how particular nations frame and represent narratives
surrounding the label of genocide. The term framing is derived from Goffman’s “schemata of
interpretation” that allows individuals to “locate, perceive, identify and label” occurrences within
their space and the world at large.56 Entman extends this definition by noting that framing is to “select
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such
a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/
or treatment recommendation.”57 Framing within mass media is usually moderated by variables
such as professional norms or organizational/ideological values which are subsequently reflected
in a journalist’s coverage of events.58 Similarly, the use of framing within international relations
and foreign policy refers to the use of political rhetoric and manipulation in an attempt to influence
attitudes and behaviors or influence decision-making.59 While scholars have explored how the
media framed the genocide in Srebrenica, the political response of nation-states to this genocide
has not been considered in terms of framing theory.60 Framing theory posits that the manner in
which something is presented to an audience influences how that information is interpreted and
processed.61 Framing is a central component of politics and policy-making processes given its ability
to shape public opinion.62 Political elites commonly engage in framing processes, with one of the
most notable examples being the declaration of war by US President George W. Bush following
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. While other avenues for framing were available and
other enemies may have been identified, the “war on terror” frame and the necessity of military
intervention in Afghanistan was considered vital in perpetuating an emotionally compelling and
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unambiguous frame to the public.63 By analyzing the political framing of genocide, the use of
rhetorical devices can be examined by highlighting common euphemisms used in lieu of genocide,
and making connections between these and the political discourses behind such euphemisms.
The data used for this project was collected from UNBISNET, a publicly available database
providing bibliographic records, voting records, and meeting records for different organs of the
UN. A key word search was conducted with relevant debates found under the topics “BiH,”
“former Yugoslavia situation,” and “ICTY.” The search was subsequently narrowed by action
body, in this case, the only relevant organ being the Security Council. The dates were also narrowed
temporally, to only encompass debates between 1995 and 2015. This search process yielded a total
of 32 documents in which Srebrenica was referenced by P5 nations. The data for this article was
drawn from these 32 documents, all of which were weighted equally.
As language used within Security Council debates is an area with limited research, the
process of inductive coding was instrumental in identifying unanticipated themes which may
not have been identified through deductive methods. Genocide-related rhetoric was identified
through numerous readings of relevant documents and document search tool functions. Common
euphemisms used to avoid labeling an atrocity as a genocide were identified through both analysis
of relevant literature, and the language employed by P5 members when other nations referred to the
crimes committed at Srebrenica as genocide, in what became clear as semantic avoidance.64 When
a particular theme emerged, the data was coded for discourse as well as for the P5 nations which
engaged with this particular rhetoric. The absence of particular discourses, silences, and other
salient themes within the data were also noted, as what remains unstated, is often as significant as
what is stated.65 The use of discourse analysis allowed for an in-depth analysis of power, politics
and language. To analyze the results of this project, the key themes identified through the open
and axial coding processes were reviewed and attention was paid to textual variation and silences
within a particular theme. An analysis of variation has the ability to highlight discrepancies
regarding the way particular nations framed the Srebrenica genocide through language use. This
process also enabled the evolution of the particular linguistic frame(s) adopted by a particular
nation to be tracked over time, and for comparisons to be made among the P5 nations.
Security Council P5 members were selected as the exclusive focus of this study in order to
narrow the scope of analysis, while focusing on especially powerful actors; however, there would
be merit in similar analyses being conducted on additional document sets, such as ICTY legal
decisions related to Srebrenica, or discussions of P5 debates related to genocide, and Srebrenica in
the press. Studies of these document sets would provide interesting complementary analyses to
that conducted here.
Use of Genocide Label
The following section outlines how the Srebrenica massacres were framed by the P5 members
through explicit references to genocide in Security Council debates. The use of the genocide label
refers to instances in which Srebrenica is explicitly referred to as a genocide without any form of
deflection or qualification. While such explicit use of the genocide label in reference to Srebrenica
was rare in the debates analyzed, this section will discuss in what context the Srebrenica genocide
was recognized as such, and how such recognition was moderated by variables such as domestic
politics, the framing of national image, and coalition preferences in international diplomacy.
Within Security Council debates, the P5 nations that frame Srebrenica as a genocide incite
much stronger linguistic and political rhetoric than the deflective use of euphemisms. Luban
notes that when the public sees an atrocity framed as murder, motivation to intervene is lost.66
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The use of the word genocide implores international action whereas “mere” murder promotes the
discourse as the situation being “their” (i.e. a wholly local) problem.67 Linguistically, genocide has
implications that the use of euphemisms such as mass killing does not.
Srebrenica was framed as a genocide by non-P5 nations such as Morocco and Turkey as early
as November 1995.68 This particular frame coincides with the first indictment by the ICTY against
Dragan Nikolić, a detention camp commander, as well as the indictment of Radovan Karadžić
and Ratko Mladić on genocide charges in July.69 Even with this precedent set by these nations
and the ICTY, the genocide frame was not adopted by a P5 nation until November 2010. It was
the US who first explicitly labeled Srebrenica a genocide in a statement to “condemn denials of
the Srebrenica genocide, which are simply indefensible, [and] undermine respect for the rule of
law, impede reconciliation, and hinder inter-ethnic cooperation.”70 What is notable about this
initial reference and subsequent references by the US, is that their aim appears to have been
focused primarily on condemning other nations, rather than making a clear statement recognizing
Srebrenica as a site of genocide. Among explicit genocide references made by the US, other notable
linguistic features include their descriptive and formal language, and consistent use of collective
pronouns, exemplified by the previously quoted statement. Despite the US referring to Srebrenica
as a genocide in 2010, this initial recognition did not signify a complete shift in US framing of the
Srebrenica genocide, as both the genocide label and various euphemisms continued to be used
interchangeably by the US from 2014 onwards. Upon further analysis of the data, it is evident that
US representatives to the UN who referred to Srebrenica as a genocide were different individuals
than those who engaged in the use of genocidal euphemisms. Explicit US references to Srebrenica
as a genocide occurred in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015, and were made by Rosemary DiCarlo,
Jeffrey DeLaurentis, and Samantha Power. However, statements by US representative David
Pressman used euphemisms when referring to the Srebrenica genocide in 2014 and 2015. All of
these individuals were US representatives to the UN under the Obama administration and as such,
the shifting US rhetoric from 2012 to 2015 cannot be attributed to changes in the US administration.
It is not until 2015 that another P5 nation explicitly framed the Srebrenica massacres as
a genocide. On May 12, 2015, the UK observed “[t]he seventieth anniversary of the end of the
Second World War and the twentieth anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide this year illustrate
that in every generation Bosnians, Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnia Serbs have suffered from
conflict.”71 As is seen in this statement, the manner in which the UK frames Srebrenica is similar to
that of the US, combining a relatively factual depiction of the massacres with the use of collective
pronouns. The US and the UK however, frame Srebrenica using far more emotive rhetoric in July
2015, when a debate was held concerning as to whether the Security Council would officially label
Srebrenica a genocide. As can be seen in the following extract from the US, the language shifts,
becoming more expressive with respect to sentiment and descriptions of the atrocities.
Imagine being the mother of those five sons, killed in the Srebrenica genocide, and being
told that a denial of the genocide would advance reconciliation. It is madness — a madness
motivated by a similar negation of the Bosnian Muslim experience that helped fuel the
slaughter at Srebrenica in the first place. As long as the truth is denied — whether in the
Council or in the region — there can be no meaningful reconciliation. Imagine if this were
us — if those were our families. Would we reconcile when our experience was being denied?
There is no stability in genocide denial. The Council did everything in its power to get Russia
on board with this simple draft resolution, which does not even name the perpetrators, but
facpub/893/.
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Russia had a red line. The draft resolution could not reference the genocide in Srebrenica; it
could not reference a fact.72

The same features are also seen in the way the UK frames Srebrenica in this particular debate. The
language used evokes an emotional response and represents a noticeable shift in rhetoric.
Some said that in submitting this draft resolution, we risked ethnic division in the Balkans.
The emotional responses in the region in the past weeks show that until past actions are
acknowledged and accepted, we cannot move forward. As Adisada Dudic said so poignantly
at the commemorative event last week, “Denial does not make the facts go away. It does not
change the past. And it certainly does not erase memory.” It is denial, and not this draft
resolution, that will cause division. Denial is the final insult to the victims. It undermines
the prospects for a secure, peaceful future for Bosnia and Herzegovina — a future that all
of its citizens deserve. Because, even two decades on, the horrors some choose to deny are
still ongoing for families in Bosnia. The remains of hundreds of the victims of the genocide
— fathers, sons, mothers and daughters — have yet to be found. The suffering of their loved
ones, and their search for truth, continues to this day. Russia’s actions will only exacerbate
their grief.73

There is also a notable shift from collective to individual language by the US, with the
representative, in this case Samantha Power, referring to her own experiences as a journalist in
the former Yugoslavia as well her personal disappointment regarding Russia’s veto of the draft
resolution.74
France did not join the US and the UK in framing Srebrenica as a genocide until the draft
resolution strongly condemning Srebrenica and labeling it a genocide, was presented to the
Council in July 2015. On July 8, 2015, France stated that “[u]nfortunately, the Security Council today
could not adopt a draft resolution to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Srebrenica
genocide and to pay tribute to all the innocent victims on all sides of the conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.”75 Although France explicitly frames the Srebrenica massacres as genocide, the
language employed by France does not incite as strong of an emotive response as that of the UK
and the US. Instead, France’s statement is more reminiscent of the language used by the other P5
nations prior to the labeling debate, with respect to its more formal language, factual emphasis,
and less confrontational tone. In the wake of the veto of the draft resolution by Russia, both France
and the UK have continued to refer to Srebrenica as a genocide.
All told, when deflections and euphemisms are accounted for, explicit references to the
Srebrenica massacres as a genocide in the documents analyzed are quite limited. Although the
US makes the most genocide references out of any P5 nation, it is not the dominant frame the US
employs. Meanwhile, no references to genocide are made by Russia or China from 1995 to 2015;
instead, both nations rely exclusively on the use of euphemisms when referring to the Srebrenica
genocide.
A number of different rationales can explain the manner in which the US, UK, and France
engaged with framing Srebrenica as a genocide. The impetus for the P5 nations to label Srebrenica
a genocide from 2010 onwards was brought about by a variety of factors pertaining to the power
of the P5, the effect of domestic politics on international policy, and political cost-benefit analyses.
Do Monte asserts that in resolutions proposed within the Security Council, permanent members
can linguistically emphasize certain issues in order to construct a “progressive and liberal” image.76
Do Monte’s argument appears applicable with respect to debates held in the Security Council
concerning the Srebrenica genocide. The US has a history of using the UN as a platform to project its
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power through “philanthropic” pursuits with respect to genocide. For example, certain observers
argue that the US labeling of Darfur as a genocide was politically motivated by a desire to enhance
the country’s human rights record in the wake of abuses at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib US
detention sites being uncovered.77 Similar to how Olmastroni notes the Bush government employed
a particular frame in order to legitimize intervention into Iraq, the US is using the genocide frame
to promote their own national interests when referring to the Srebrenica massacres as a genocide.78
By doing so, the US were arguably able to enhance their liberal credentials through the power of
language within the Security Council.
Timing and domestic politics are another factor that likely influenced the framing of the
Srebrenica massacres by the US. The initial reference to the massacres as a genocide by the US
occurred in 2010, shortly after the 2009 inauguration of US President Barack Obama. President
Obama’s philosophic pragmatism and his willingness to deploy American military power on
humanitarian grounds informed his foreign policy decision making.79 During the previous
Republican administration, issues relating to foreign policy were both publicly and politically
less salient, with UN related goals ranking very lowly in the pursuit of multilateralism.80 Despite
increased public interest in cooperative internationalism in the early 2000s, this sentiment was not
echoed by most US Republican politicians and as such became a platform for the Democratic Party
to use to its advantage in the election.81 As the US shifted to a Democratic administration more
concerned with cooperative internationalism, and amidst an environment where political backlash,
especially domestically, for non-intervention in Srebrenica would have been limited, labeling
Srebrenica a genocide was likely viewed as politically advantageous by the US government.
It is likely that similar to the shift which led to the US labeling Srebrenica a genocide,
comparable factors affected the UK’s decision to do the same. Historically, atrocities tend to be
framed as genocide when there would be limited or no costs to a particular nation. For example,
the Rwandan genocide was only framed as such by the P5 after mass troop commitments were
no longer necessary to halt the killings.82 Along these lines, labeling the Srebrenica massacres a
genocide twenty years after they occurred enables nations to promote a liberal discourse whilst
incurring limited political reprisal for inaction.83 Do Monte furthers this argument by noting that
the P5 members commonly place emphasis on issues that are unproblematic to them at a domestic
level through the power ascribed to language within the Security Council.84
The shift towards more emotive language in Council discussions concerning the Srebrenica
massacres, and the framing of such massacres as genocide by France also merits further consideration.
Jackson argues that the use of language which appeals to emotion is a tool for the construction of a
particular reality, having consequences for both social and political structures.85 If one accepts this
proposition, emotive language may be seen as a form of persuasion which adds a layer of moral
weight to a discussion. Within the Security Council, a wide vocabulary is employed to express
member-state’s sentiments regarding a particular issue. Although the works of both Gifkins and
Gruenberg feature language analyses of pre-ambulatory clauses and resolutions, such research can
be extrapolated and applied to language within Security Council debates.86 Gruenberg identifies
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a list of words used within UNSC resolutions that have negative emotional connotations, ranking
them according to their emotional effects, arguing that words such as “concerned” and “grieved,”
are emotionally weak, while words such as “indignant” and “censured” are much stronger in
terms of their emotional impact.87 The words employed by the US and the UK, particularly terms
such as “condemn” and “deplore,” rank approximately half-way on Gruenberg’s proposed list of
negative emotive rhetoric. Again, the use of such emotive rhetoric situates the Western P5 nations
as progressive by “condemning” and “deploring” the actions of others.88 Once again, the manner
in which the Srebrenica genocide is framed by the P5 nations through linguistic features is heavily
influenced by the power associated with such language.
The fact that France only adopts the genocide label within the very debate concerning
whether the Council will collectively officially label Srebrenica a genocide, was likely influenced
by the strong historical preference for the US, UK, and France to act as a coalition representing an
alternative frame to that put forth by Russia and China.89 Do Monte also notes that words used
within the Security Council can create and alter relations between nations and as such, in order
to maintain socio-political relationships in a diplomatic space, common linguistic discourses may
need to be perpetuated at certain junctures.90 The formation of the US-UK-French coalition to
collectively frame Srebrenica as a genocide also further demonstrates the importance of language
in maintaining international political relationships within the Security Council.
Use of Euphemisms
In contrast to the rarity of explicit references to genocide in discussions of the Srebrenica massacres
in the documents analyzed, it was quite common for the P5 members to use alternative, euphemistic
terminology. Due to the legally mandated obligation to intervene once a situation is labeled
genocide, alternative terms are readily adopted. Most commonly, terms such as “ethnic cleansing,”
“mass murder,” or “genocidal acts” are employed in order to avoid the legal implications of
framing an atrocity as genocide.91
All the P5 nations utilized such linguistic avoidance practices in relation to the situation
in Srebrenica from 1995 onwards. The manner in which the US, UK, and France use genocidal
euphemisms within Security Council debates shares a number of similarities. From 1995 to
approximately 2005, all three nations employed similar euphemisms to linguistically distance
themselves from framing Srebrenica as a genocide. The euphemisms predominantly used in this
period include references to “atrocities,” a “humanitarian crisis,” and “mass murder” occurring in
Srebrenica.
The use of euphemisms after 2005 shifts slightly towards words more commonly associated
with avoiding the genocide label, the most common being “massacre.” Similarities are again seen
between the US and the UK, with both placing the killings in Srebrenica in a wider global context
while still avoiding the use of the genocide label. Such practices are exemplified in the following
exchange.
US: He [Radovan Karadžić] stands accused as an architect of the Srebrenica massacre, the
single worst crime committed on European soil since the Second World War.92
UK: I think it is impossible to talk about Bosnia without talking about Srebrenica. I do not
think that anybody can remain unmoved by the fate of the over 7,000 Muslim men and boys
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who were massacred, as several people have said, in the worst atrocity in Europe since the
Second World War. 93

Even when referring to the indictments of Karadžić and Mladić by the ICTY, the UK and the
US engage with euphemistic language, despite the fact that both men were indicted for genocide
predicated on their alleged roles in the Srebrenica killings. Following the 2007 ICJ determination
that these killings legally constitute genocide, euphemisms continued to be employed by all the
P5 nations, with the Srebrenica genocide most commonly framed as a “massacre.”94 The manner
in which France and the UK framed the genocide in Srebrenica also changed after 2010, with
euphemisms no longer employed, but rather, the killings being framed as genocide indirectly,
through reference to decisions of the ICJ or ICTY. The US, the most variable in terms of its use of
euphemisms, continues to frame Srebrenica in such a manner in 2014 and 2015, even though it
makes explicit genocide references over the same time period.
In contrast to the US, the UK, and France, neither Russia nor China rely significantly on the
use of genocide euphemisms in relevant statements. Russia only frames the Srebrenica genocide
using euphemistic rhetoric in five Security Council debates from 1995 to 2015, while China utilizes
such rhetoric in three of these debates. Such euphemisms solely occur in 1995 and during the
debate concerning whether to officially label Srebrenica a genocide in 2015. Unlike the US, the
UK, and France, China does not make reference to Srebrenica as a “massacre,” instead, employing
more formal and impassive linguistic rhetoric, presenting the killings either as a “violation of
international humanitarian law” or as a “tragedy.”95 Unlike China, Russia employs a variety of
euphemisms including references to “monstrous crimes,” “ethnic cleansing,” and referring to the
“tragedy at Srebrenica” as exemplified by the following statement made on July 8, 2015:
when a delegation from Bosnia and Herzegovina first approached us about the need to
commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the tragedy at Srebrenica, we agreed that it
should be done in a solemn manner, given the special sensitivity of the issue for people
living in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region as a whole.96

In contrast to these limited uses of euphemisms with regards to the Srebrenica genocide, for
the most part, silence is the most common discourse within the documents analyzed, as Srebrenica
is only referenced by Russia and China at times in which such rhetoric could not be avoided.
Akin to the genocide label, the use of euphemisms is also highly politicized with a plethora of
variables impacting the way in which nations avoid labeling an atrocity as genocide. With respect to
the use of euphemisms in framing Srebrenica, such variables include historical reluctance, national
political stakes, and Security Council politics. The use of language within the Security Council
is highly political and the use of particular words can have a profound effect on multilateral
diplomacy.97 As noted previously, Dunne and Gifkins assert that this politicization of linguistic
frames stems from the emphasis on adhering to previously agreed language.98 The consistent
use of euphemisms, most commonly by France, the US, and the UK, allows for the continued
presentation and reaffirmation of a particular position. Labeling an act as genocide would not only
have incurred legal and moral responsibilities, but would have been difficult, given the consistent
perpetuation and reaffirmation of euphemisms. Altering this normalized discourse and presenting
an alternative linguistic frame in the case of the Srebrenica genocide would have presented
considerable challenges and offered little in the way of political gain for any of the P5 nations. The
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Rwandan genocide provides a comparable example of a linguistic reluctance to label a genocide
as such. It was not until there were tangible political motivations to explicitly label the Rwandan
genocide as a genocide that the use of previously agreed language became less advantageous and
the genocide label was adopted. This notion of the strong preference for adhering to previously
agreed language also provides an explanation for the aforementioned point regarding the
variability in the use of euphemisms and engagement with the genocide label of the US. Engaging
in such a clear shift in rhetoric within an international organization, where such a discourse has not
yet become normalized, may have presented difficulties for the US. This argument becomes more
clear as the media only reinforced the dominance of previously agreed language, with Velagic
and Velagic finding that journalists most commonly framed Srebrenica as an instance of “ethnic
cleansing,” even after the 2007 ICJ finding that genocide had been committed in Srebrenica.99 If
consensus exists regarding previously agreed language, it is not only between the P5 nations; such
sentiment is also echoed within the media, in that there is little to be gained from altering dominant
linguistic discourses.100 Akin to Gifkins’ assertion that language is not simply words devoid of
meaning, Jackson notes that neutrality in language is not possible, as words have histories and
acquire meaning through discursive settings.101 The word genocide attracts immediate comparisons
to past atrocities, most notably, the Holocaust and Rwandan genocide, and to apply this term to the
killings in Srebrenica would have highlighted yet another international humanitarian failure. Such
an acknowledgment was not in the interest of any of the P5 nations. Consequently, it was more
attractive to the P5 nations to avoid the power and associated connotations of the genocide label
when referencing the Srebrenica killings.
The avoidance of the genocide label identified from the data also aligns with literature
concerning the domestic interests of the US and France. The observed reliance on euphemisms to
frame Srebrenica enabled the US to initially avoid putting their military personnel in harm’s way.
This was of particular significance to the US following the death of eighteen soldiers two years
earlier in Somalia.102 Similarly, France’s framing of Srebrenica may have been influenced by their
alleged complicity in the Rwandan genocide. An independently commissioned report released
by the Rwandan government in 2008 condemns most Western nations for their failure to prevent
or halt the genocide, however, the allegations made against France go much further, identifying
possible military complicity in the genocide.103 Avoiding accusations of further neglect in relation
to a genocide that occurred on European soil may have been seen by France as part of a broader
strategy to deflect attention from its role in Rwanda and to thereby help avoid subsequent legal
repercussions.104
The way in which Russia and China frame Srebrenica through the use of euphemisms differs
from that of the US, the UK, and France. Both Russia and China employed silence as their dominant
discourse when the issue of the Srebrenica killings were raised in P5 discussions, and only resorted
to the use of euphemisms when maintaining this silence became effectively impossible, specifically
during the commission of the genocide itself in 1995 and during the debate concerning whether
to officially label Srebrenica a genocide in 2015. When euphemisms were used, particularly by
Russia, the previous dominant frame of silence allowed for more weight and power to be ascribed
to particular linguistic features given the rarity of any reference to Srebrenica whatsoever. Unlike
the US, the UK, and France, Russia’s eventual framing of the Srebrenica killings as a “massacre”
99
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immediately became the country’s official position, due to its previous silence. Schroter asserts that
one of the central functions of silence is to restrict the potential for opposition.105 In effect, by not
engaging with the use of euphemisms, Russia and China limited the opportunity for the other P5
nations to provide opposing rhetoric. This not only demonstrates the unique framing on the part
of Russia and China, but also identifies the power of linguistic silence.
The framing of Srebrenica by Russia and China, especially their use of silence, may be due
to a number of explanations. With respect to international foreign policy, Russia and China view
collaboration as a counterweight to US hegemony through the promotion of a multipolar, as
opposed to a unipolar, international discourse. Both nations seek to avoid being taken for granted
by other P5 nations.106 Monteleone notes that Russia and China engage in a number of practices
reminiscent of a coalition, such as limiting engagement with the dominant coalition (i.e. the US, the
UK, and France), as well as joint abstentions and vetoes.107 However, their reasons for collaboration
differ significantly. China’s behavior in the Security Council is commonly associated with selfinterest and a focus on economic objectives.108 As such, China is unlikely to label Srebrenica a
genocide given the potential economic costs of intervention and its indifference towards human
rights issues.109
The bilateral political and economic dialogue between Russia and Serbia also represents
as a likely factor contributing to Russia’s use of euphemisms and general silence regarding the
Srebrenica genocide. Serbia is a pivotal ally of Russia, especially in maintaining Russia’s influence
in the Balkans.110 By avoiding the genocide label through euphemisms and adopting silence as its
dominant discourse, Russia both protected its political and economic interests, and promoted an
alternate discourse to that of the US, the UK, and France coalition.
Conclusion
The discourse analysis of 32 UN Security Council debates related to the Srebrenica genocide between
1995 and 2015 discussed in this article demonstrates how the P5 nations selectively framed this
event according to each nation’s own beliefs and strategic interests. Moreover, the politicization of
the rhetoric used in referring to the Srebrenica genocide appears to also have varied according to
domestic policy considerations, Security Council power politics, and the complexities of language
use within an international arena, wherein multiple actors are involved over time. Future studies
of language use within Security Council debates should focus on other acts of genocide in order to
ascertain if the trends identified in this article are replicated. An analysis of language used in other
documents relevant to the Srebrenica genocide, such as ICTY or ICJ decisions, would also provide
a helpful dataset.
While some may argue the use of language within the UN Security Council is mere incidental
semantic variation, the continued avoidance of the genocide label within the Security Council
in relation to the Srebrenica genocide supports the thesis that the P5 nations use language as a
mechanism to frame a conflict in a particular manner that aligns with their own political interests.
As such, this article reaffirms the importance of genocide recognition as more than a legal issue.
Rather, such recognition, or lack thereof, in various fora, including the official statements of the P5
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Security Council nations, has the ability to increase or decrease communal violence and revenge,
and to either help alleviate or perpetuate, transgenerational cultural trauma associated with denial.
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“Currency is a Most Poisonous Tool”: State Capitalism, Nonmarket
Socialism, and the Elimination of Money during the Cambodian Genocide
James A. Tyner
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Introduction
On April 17, 1975, the revolutionary army of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK; better
known as the ‘Khmer Rouge’) entered Cambodia’s capital of Phnom Penh. Their victory marked the
culmination of years of political turmoil and armed conflict but not the cessation of violence. Upon
assuming power, senior officials of the CPK initiated a series of economic and political programs
that resulted in the death of approximately 1.7 million men, women, and children.
The coordinates of the Cambodian genocide are relative well established.1 In just under four
years, Khmer Rouge cadre forcibly evacuated towns and cities; collectivized the peasantry onto
large-scale agricultural collectives; abolished money and markets; eliminated formal schools
and hospitals; and prohibited the practice of religion. To date, scholars have conceptually and
empirically addressed each of these practices save but one: the abolishment of money and markets.2
Heretofore, scholars routinely misrepresent and misunderstand the decision made by senior
leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to abolish money. Prasso, for example, explains,
“The Khmer Rouge … set out to impose the strictest Marxist doctrine yet implemented in the
Communist world.”3 He continues: “Money and private property, according to Karl Marx, promote
the individual over the community. Thus, Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot, who had studied Marx’s
writings while a student in Paris in the 1950s, ordered that money, markets, and private property
be abolished.”4 Prasso concludes, “In Pol Pot’s Cambodia … all barter, private commercial activity,
private ownership, means of exchange, and stores of value were prohibited and punishable by
death. Personal possessions were also prohibited, with the exception of a change of clothing and a
personal set of eating utensils brought to the collective at mealtimes.”5
Aside from sweeping assertions unsupported both by documentary evidence and survivor
testimonies, Prasso mischaracterizes the form and function of money in Democratic Kampuchea.
Indeed, historical reconstructions of party policy indicate neither that Pol Pot decided unilaterally
to abolish money nor was the decision made in haste.6 As civil war raged across the country, key
CPK leaders, including Pol Pot but also Ieng Sary, anticipated introducing their own currency, to
replace that of the former government. In December 1973, for example, Ieng Sary brought sample
1
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banknotes from Beijing for Pol Pot’s approval. Meanwhile, CPK officials imposed a temporary
system of barter until they might introduce their currency later in 1974.7
There is no sustained account of the Khmer Rouge decision to curtail currency or, more
pressing, of the form or function of Democratic Kampuchea’s economy after the CPK leadership
eliminated money and markets. In this paper, I fill this gap by providing a conceptually grounded
and documentary supported account of Khmer Rouge economic policies. I demonstrate how
senior leaders of the CPK sought to implement a non-monetary and non-market economy but, in
so doing, initiated a hybrid economy that aligned more so with Soviet-styled state capitalism than
strict Marxism.8 My argument unfolds in four sections. First, I provide some general remarks on
Marx, money, and markets. The purpose here, is to establish a common foundation for readers,
in order to properly assess Khmer Rouge monetary policies pursuant to an orthodox reading of
Marxism. Marx, in particular, critiques capital as an economic system, with money as symptomatic
of the problems of production for exchange. This is key point, one that CPK officials apparently
misunderstood, believing that the physical elimination of money offered a straightforward path to
socialism. Second, I position CPK macro-economic policies within the context of the Non-Aligned
Movement and revolutionary socialism. I maintain that these larger movements significantly
informed subsequent policies in Democratic Kampuchea, notably the introduction of import
substitution industrialization. Third, I comment upon the decision of senior CPK personnel to
eliminate currency. This was a decision fraught with internal dissent and evidence suggests CPK
leaders remained uncertain if the abolition of money was desirable or feasible. Fourth, I critically
evaluate the contradictions of CPK macro-economic policies, specifically, the suspension of money
and markets domestically while participating in the global economy in order to rapidly accumulate
much needed capital for investment purposes. These contradictions, I conclude, established the
structural context of the subsequent Cambodian genocide and the resulting famine that resulted in
a massive loss of life.
Marx, Money, and Markets
Money is a socially accepted general equivalent, that is, a common scale against which other
commodities can be valued. However, we need to distinguish between money in general and
money in its commodity form, that is, money as it appears and functions in capitalism. Money,
of course, precedes capitalism and has evolved historically to perform various functions assigned
to the sphere of exchange and general circulation.9 It is important, therefore, to make explicit
the specific forms money assumes and to evaluate how these correspond to dominant economic
systems.
Under capitalism, money in its commodity form serves multiple functions, including a medium
of exchange, as means of payment, as a store of value, and as a unit of account.10 For Marx, however,
money (in commodity form) is not simply a thing, that is, it is something more than a gold coin or
paper banknote. Instead, money in its commodity form is representative of social relations unique
to capitalism. Indeed, Marx’s critique of the capitalist system derided production for exchange,
premising that the dominance of exchange value in capitalism encourages both alienation and
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societal inequalities.11 To this end, Marx’s vision of a stateless, moneyless and classless society
aimed to encourage the fullest development of human consciousness and creativity.12
Marx offers no clear indication of how a regime of associated producers might function in
the absence of money. The theoretical idea of ‘nonmarket socialism’ however, of a cooperative,
sharing society that has dispensed with money, has various adherents.13 From the nineteenthcentury onward, myriad socialist, communist, and libertarian economists and philosophers have
contemplated the elimination of money and the promotion of a nonmarket and nonmonetary
economy. A common argument forwarded by some socialists, for example, was to replace money
with time-chits or labor vouchers; however, this would merely replace one representation of value
with another.14 As Marx explains, “it is impossible to suspend the complications and contradictions
which arise from the existence of money alongside the particular commodities merely by altering
the form of money.”15 In other words, the substitution of one form (e.g., time-chits) for another
(e.g., banknotes) does not negate money as long as the fundamental relations of exchange remain
constant. In similar fashion, the removal of banknotes from circulation, or even the physical
destruction of banknotes, does not effectly rectify the problem. For Marx, money represents
the problem, that is, money is a symptom of the capitalist mode of production; the problem is
production for exchange and the accumulation of profits for profit’s sake. Under capitalism, the
social relations between people are transformed into a material relationship between things (i.e.,
commodities), while capitalist modernity is characterized by increasing alienation, exploitation,
inequality, and misery.16 As Marx writes, “The need for money is … the true need produced by
the modern economic system [capitalism], and it is the only need which the latter produces. The
quantity of money becomes to an ever greater degree its sole effective attribute: just as it reduces
everything to its abstract form, so it reduces itself in the course of its own movement to something
merely quantitative.”17
In volume one of Capital, Marx begins with the concrete commodity and derives a number of
theoretical abstractions: exchange value, use value, value, surplus value, abstract labor, socially
necessary labor time, and so forth. As his analysis proceeds, Marx progressively develops these
concepts in his critique of capitalism.18 Commodities, including money in its commodity form, are
not things but rather relations, foremost among them being the relationship between use value
and exchange value. On the one hand, commodities, as products of human labor, possess some
useful quality for people while, on the other hand, commodities have exchange values, in that one
commodity may be exchanged for another commodity through the use of a universal equivalent,
this being money. Within an economic system predicated on exchange, such as capitalism,
commodities do not exchange according to their degree of usefulness; instead, a quantitative
relation that appears in all commodities structures their exchange to accumulate surplus value.
Later, I demonstrate this process within the context of CPK economic policies; here, suffice it to
say Marx sought to move beyond capitalism in its totality. The elimination of money, to reaffirm,
is a means to an end as opposed to an end itself. Subsequent followers of Marx, including those in
Russia, too often, mistook the symptom for the ailment.
The allure of a money-less economy lies in the hope it can help create a society free of
exploitation and oppression. Nonmarket socialism, for example, focuses on use rights and use
values. Local communities foster self-sufficiency in the production and exchange of goods and
11
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services; in turn, these communities network with other communities across a range of scales
to collaboratively manage joint resources and, in so doing, facilitate solidarity. In this system
of networked, community-based socialism, peoples’ needs are expressed as use values and the
powers vested in their use rights to commons facilitate direct decision-making without recourse
to money.19
In Russia, Bolshevik leaders attempted to abolish the monetary system and impose a
nonmonetary and nonmarket economy.20 In practice, however, this proved exceedingly difficult;
cash was required for state-produced goods and services; monetary taxes demanded; and foreign
trade required currency. Effectively, money remained a tool of state policy.21 The Soviets retained
a form of paper money; and goods and services were ‘priced’ although prices were determined by
the Party and not the market.22 Elsewhere, such as in China and Cuba, Communist party leaders
also considered the viability of a moneyless communism; but again, the need for capital doggedly
remained.23 Simply put, few empirical examples exist of widespread experimentation in the area
of nonmonetary exchange in modern society.24 Democratic Kampuchea offers one such example.
Macro-Economic Policies of the CPK
Following the Second World War, Western powers challenged and frequently opposed demands
for political and economic independence raised by their former colonies. Often, deadly conflict
erupted, as nationalist leaders resisted the imposition of colonialism. In addition, Western powers
introduced new forms of imperialism, often shrouded behind the façade of modernization and
development. For example, the establishment of international organizations, including the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, imposed myriad structural programs that served to
incorporate Western technology and methods of production into the so-called developing world.
For many nationalist leaders throughout colonies and former colonies, Western-imposed economic
programs constituted nothing more than another form of oppression and exploitation. For these
nationalists, the realities of foreign aid belied the humanitarian rhetoric of self-governance and
they decried the hypocrisy and material inequalities that accompanied modernization.
Anti-colonialism was not necessarily synonymous with anti-capitalism, but the two
movements often found common cause. Notable in this regard was the emergence of the NonAligned Movement (NAM) in 1960. In the shadows of the Bandung Conference, a handful of
nationalist leaders from the Global South convened in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in an effort to chart a
course separate from the unfolding Cold War confrontation of the Western Powers and the Eastern
Bloc.25 Proponents of the NAM forwarded several initiatives to promote and implement economic
growth and development programs, often but not always within existing institutional structures.
Of paramount concern were the guiding principles of self-reliance and self-determination, that is,
political and economic sovereignty from foreign governments.
In practice, there was no singular form, no official template for economic growth under the
NAM. Several leaders, however, found in Josef Stalin’s state-guided industrialization a working
model for national development. Perceived as a successful counterpart to Western colonial practice,
the Soviet Union offered an approach seemingly free of geopolitical encumbrances of asymmetric
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trade relations. In this way, anti-colonial nationalists rendered Soviet-styled socialism a strategy
that could guide their countries in the struggle to overcome underdevelopment.26 For several
leaders of the CPK, the aspirations and agendas of the NAM appeared promising.
During August 16-19, 1976, delegates from 86 member-states of the NAM convened in Colombo,
Sri Lanka. The assembly was momentous for several reasons. The conference, for example, marked
the first Summit of Non-Aligned members held on the Asian continent, an important event marked
by the resultant Colombo Declaration: “The history of Asia had been marked by successive periods
of foreign conquest and colonial domination.” The Declaration continues: “The struggles of the
Asian peoples for freedom, justice and equality have been victorious. A resurgent Asia enters the
last quarter of the twentieth century with its peoples united in their determination … to overcome
the problems of underdevelopment and the adverse consequences, economic, technological and
cultural, resulting from long subjugation to colonial rule.”27 Notable also is the explicit recognition
by members of the NAM of the recent victory of the CPK. Sixteen months prior to the conference,
armed forces of the CPK captured Phnom Penh; now, participants in Colombo recognized their
revolutionary triumph.
The context of the NAM is extremely important for our understanding of CPK economic policy,
not least because senior officials apparently drew inspiration and guidance from the revolutionary
socialism espoused by the NAM. Two months removed from the Colombo Conference, CPK
Standing Committee member and Foreign Affairs Minister Ieng Sary spoke at the 31st Session of
the United Nations’ General Assembly in New York City. The Session, Ieng Sary explained,
…takes place at a time when all the peoples of the world of the non-aligned countries
and of the Third World are waging a victorious struggle everywhere against imperialism,
colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism and all forms of foreign interference, aggression,
expansionism and exploitation, for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, for
the right to determine their own destiny and for the establishment of a new international
economic order on the basis of justice and equality.28

Of significance, Ieng Sary pledged that reconstruction in Democratic Kampuchea would
conform to the principles of the NAM. To this end, he vowed “Democratic Kampuchea will always
continue to follow a policy of independence, peace, neutrality and non-alignment. … Our people
resolutely defends its independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and its inalienable
right to determine its own destiny.”29
In light of the subsequent military conflict with neighboring Vietnam, and their staunch
alliance with China, the words of Ieng Sary may sound hollow. However, the economic programs
initiated by the CPK line up readily with those championed by the NAM. Two weeks prior to the
Colombo Conference, members of the Standing Committee of the CPK drafted the Party’s first
Four-Year Plan.30 As Chandler explains, the CPK never officially published and distributed the
110-page typewritten text and much of the Plan appears never to have been set in motion.31 The
document, however, remains one of the most revealing sources of Party intention available.
As stressed in the Four-Year Plan (and countless other documents), Party leaders professed
a strong commitment to self-reliance and self-determination, two terms widely misunderstood
26

Erkan Doğan, “Socialism and Nationalism in the Third World in the Age of Third Worldism,” METU Studies in
Development 44, no. 3 (2017), 284.

27

Institute of Foreign Affairs, Summit Declarations of Non-Aligned Movement (1961-2009) (Kathmandu, Nepal: Institute of
Foreign Affairs, 2011), 84.

28

Document D55874, “Democratic Kampuchea: A Workers’ and Peasants’ State in South-East Asia,” archived at the
Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

29

Ibid.

30

Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), “The Party’s Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields, 1977-1980,” in Pol
Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976-1977, eds. David P. Chandler,
Ben Kiernan, and Chanthou Boua, (New Haven, CT: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988).

31

David P. Chandler, introduction to Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea,
1976-1977, eds. David P. Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and Chanthou Boua, (New Haven, CT: Yale Center for International
and Area Studies, 1988), 36.

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1710

Tyner

148

by many scholars of the Cambodian genocide. In conventional accounts, the emphasis on selfreliance and self-determination by the CPK is rooted in Marxist political philosophy, and that Party
members sought to construct an isolated society bordering on autarky.32 In actuality, Khmer Rouge
rhetoric echoes that of the NAM and, seen in this light, hardly appears extreme or radical. For
example, economic growth and development, as detailed in the Plan, stands on “independence,
mastery, and self-reliance.”33 To this end, Party officials affirmed that they might accept foreign aid,
but would refuse any offers that infringed on their sovereignty.34
Once in power, CPK leaders effectively took possession of all productive apparatuses
throughout the country. Land and livestock, tools and tractors were all confiscated in the name
of the Party. Note, however, that the fundamental (and exploitative) relationship remained. As
Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff explain, a “change in ownership of productive assets, from
private to state, does not necessarily entail a change in the capitalist, exploitative class structure
of production. When it does not, state capital(ism) is just the substitution of state functionaries for
private individuals in the roles of capitalist appropriators of surplus labor.”35 In other words, much
like the Soviet Union, CPK officials set Cambodia on a path toward state capitalism.
Two objectives figure prominently in CPK state economic planning: the necessity to raise
the people’s standard of living quickly and to increase capital from agriculture in order to
modernize industry.36 Both were to be achieved through the promotion of an economic strategy
of import substitution industrialization—an approach widely adopted from the 1950s onward
by governments throughout the Global South.37 Effectively, governments would impose tariffs,
quotas, and other protectionist policies while simultaneously investing in the manufacturing of
products currently imported. Accordingly, import substitution industrialization constitutes an
economic strategy of self-reliance and self-determination. Such an approach is readily evident in
surviving CPK documents. Minutes from a meeting held on May 8, 1976, for example, indicate,
“We will decrease importing items next year, including cotton and jute, because we are working
hard to produce ours. We will import only some important items such as chemical fertilizer, plastic,
acid, iron factory, and other raw materials.”38
To promote effectively a program of import substitution industrialization, Party leaders
determined what they could produce locally and what they had to import. Thus, CPK officials
premised that Democratic Kampuchea was brimming with “such things as land, livestock, natural
resource, water sources such as lakes, river and ponds” and that these afforded them “great
advantages compared with China, Vietnam, or Africa.”39 Officials postulated they could “export
and sell many products such as kapok, shrimp, squid, elephant fish, and turtles” in order to “earn
foreign exchange.”40 Indeed, so optimistic were Party leaders, they expounded, “There are great
possibilities for exporting peanuts, wheat, corn, sesame, and beans. The objective would be to save
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up these products for export.”41 Ominously, the report cautions, “Almost anything can be exported,
so long as we don’t consume it ourselves, but set it aside.”42
Faced with a seemingly endless array of natural resources to exploit, Party officials determined
that agriculture—especially rice—would form the keystone of their economic policies. As indicated
in the Four-Year Plan, “We stand on agriculture as the basis, so as to collect agricultural capital
with which to strengthen and expand industry.”43 In doing so, CPK officials actually continued
policies initiated under the former French colonial government and that of former leader Norodom
Sihanouk. Senior planners of the CPK determined rice to be their main comparative advantage.
For Party leaders, the decision was profit-oriented: “For 100,000 tons of milled rice, we would get
US$20 million; if we had 500,000 tons we’d get $100 million. … We must increase rice production
in order to obtain capital. Other products, which are only complimentary, will be increased in the
future.”44
Monetary Policies in Democratic Kampuchea
With military victory achieved in April 1975, senior CPK leaders faced the enormity of reviving
a devastated economy. Much of the country’s productive infrastructure had ceased functioning.
For example, only 300 of the country’s 1,400 rice mills and 60 of 240 sawmills remained usable
when the CPK seized power. A shattered transportation network further hindered economic
recovery.45 Paradoxically, several key officials thought it possible to promote economic growth and
development in the absence of currency.
On September 19, 1975, senior leaders of the CPK announced the elimination of money. Party
officials, however, did not make the decision in earnest but apparently came to the point after
years of deliberation. In 1973, for example, senior members debated the need for currency in postrevolutionary society and, if retained, the form and function of currency. The matter remained
unsettled in May 1975, as CPK leadership summoned all military and civilian officials of the new
regime to a special meeting held in Phnom Penh.46 Held over five days, with approximately 1,000
participants in attendance, the conference detailed plans agreed upon by members of the Central
Committee of the CPK. As Kiernan describes the meeting, this was the Party’s first major attempt to
announce its political writ, with many topics discussed and key decisions rendered.47 For example,
CPK officials called for the establishment of large-scale agricultural collectives—a practice initiated
in piecemeal fashion in 1973—and paved the way for communal dining. Notably, Deputy Secretary
Nuon Chea proclaimed that building socialism entailed two components, agriculture and industry,
and that the former would be modernized within 15 years through the application of scientific
methods. In addition, Nuon Chea foretold the elimination of both money and markets, explaining
that the existence of these would restore private property, itself an anathema to the Party’s MarxistLeninist principles.48 Subsequent Party documents, including articles and commentaries published
in the CPK’s propaganda magazine, Revolutionary Flag, stressed the evils of money and markets. As
explained in an issue of Revolutionary Flag, “We do not use currency. Currency is a most poisonous
tool. It entices us at all times to return to private ownership. With currency[,] we always want to
buy this or buy that. Now no one thinks of spending money.”49
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Decisions announced at the May conference were not necessarily final and debate continued
among senior leaders. Long-time revolutionary Hou Youn, for example, opposed the idea of
eliminating markets and money, explaining that Cambodia, having just emerged from years
of fighting, was greatly short of capital.50 Other leaders also apparently expressed reservations,
leading to the appointment of Non Suon as Chair of the National Bank.51 Also, that summer, Khmer
Rouge cadre distributed posters showing CPK currency to the various administrative areas, along
with actual banknotes for use, pending final authorization from Phnom Penh.52 Throughout 1975,
further efforts were underway to introduce currency, albeit in limited fashion. In August, Pich
Chheang replaced Non Suon and immediately set up a training program in preparation of a nationwide banking system. In addition, in September Pich Chheang introduced currency in his home
district, as a trial run for a socialist-informed monetary economy.53
As plans proceeded for the re-introduction of money and markets, Pol Pot and other highranking officials toured the country in an attempt to assess conditions on the ground.54 These factfinding missions culminated with a meeting held on September 19, 1975 to determine, in part,
whether the CPK would authorize the use of currency. Prior to the meeting, Chhit Chhoeun
(alias Mok), Secretary of the Southwest Zone and a powerful member of the Central Committee,
expressed strong reservations about the use of money. Chhit Chhoeun favored a barter system.
He premised each administrative unit in the country offered its own comparative advantages, and
that the simple transfer of products between units offered the most viable means of distribution.
Ostensibly, Chhit Chhoen advanced a variant of nonmarket socialism, whereby production is not
for sale and work is not remunerated via the market.55
By September, Pol Pot and other key leaders apparently found the arguments of Chhit Chhoen
persuasive.56 Addressing the Central Committee, Pol Pot identified several practical reasons to
abolish currency, with the most pressing being ideological reasons.57 Pol Pot allegedly said,
Up to now, the fact we do not use money has greatly reduced private property and thus
has promoted the overall trend towards the collective. If we start using money again, it will
bring back sentiments of private property and drive the individual away from the collective.
Money is an instrument [that] creates privilege and power. Those who possess it can use it
to bribe cadres … [and] to undermine our system. If we allow sentiments of private property
to develop, little by little people’s thoughts will turn only to ways of amassing private
property.58

The Party Secretary concluded, “Money constitutes a danger, both now and in the future. We
must not be in a hurry to use it. … We need to think more deeply about this matter.”59
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Pol Pot’s address seemingly kept open the door for the reintroduction of currency in Democratic
Kampuchea—an observation that refutes conventional accounts of CPK policy and practice.
Effectively, Pol Pot pronounced the temporary suspension of currency and not the final abolishment
of currency. Surviving documents, coupled with oral testimony, confirm this interpretation.
Former Khmer Rouge cadre Prasith Thiounn, for example, affirms that the elimination of currency
was always a temporary measure.60 Lat Suoy, also, recalls that by 1978 rumors circulated that the
Party planned to reintroduce domestically bank notes and market exchange within agricultural
collectives.61 Indeed, Pol Pot himself reportedly told journalists from Yugoslavia, “We have ceased
to use money up to now … [but] we do not take the present system as a permanent one.”62
State Capitalism and Nonmarket Socialism under the CPK
In all senses of the phrase, the political economy of Democratic Kampuchea was always and
necessarily a work-in-progress. It is implausible to conclude with any degree of certainty the
entirety of the productive apparatus envisioned by a regime that collapsed in just under four years.
This holds especially for a regime that so clearly was fraught with internal dissent. Nevertheless,
surviving CPK planning documents allow for a partial reconstruction of Democratic Kampuchea’s
economy as it lurched forward. Far from a ‘pure’ form of socialism or communism, the mode of
production begun by the CPK resembles more a Frankenstein’s monster of state capitalism and
nonmarket socialism, with the apparent paradox of Democratic Kampuchea’s hybrid economy
explained by geographic scale.
The decision to eliminate money and markets was always marked with contradictions. As
Kiernan quips, the choice to prohibit monetary exchanges may have consigned money to join
the “dustbin of history” but it failed to eliminate the “profit motive.”63 In fact, the pressing need
to accumulate capital rapidly—a prominent goal expressed forthrightly in the CPK’s Four Year
Plan and myriad other documents—had not diminished with the decision to abolish money or
markets. This decision did introduce several daunting challenges, not least being the capacity to
raise investment capital for a moribund industrial sector. In the aftermath of revolution in both
Russia and China, for example, Marxist-trained economists premised that surpluses accrued
from agriculture would provide the necessary capital for industry. In these countries, economic
strategies included the taxation of rural peasants and the so-called price-scissors mechanism.64
In Democratic Kampuchea, the suspension of currency effectively precluded these strategies.
Neither could CPK officials rely upon non-capitalist forms of organization to generate necessary
revenues. Simply put, a barter system as that proposed by Chhit Chhoeun does not provide
surplus value; and some CPK officials apparently understood this limitation. Indeed, the resultant
economic order of Democratic Kampuchea resembled more so a hybrid form of state capitalism and
nonmarket socialism than it did either a barter economy or an economy of associated producers as
envisioned by Marx.
Domestically, in the absence of money and markets, the CPK would provide—in principle but
not practice—all material necessities for their citizenry. These would include clothing, blankets,
mats, pillows and “materials for common and individual uses” such as “water pitchers, water
bowls, glasses, teapots, cups, plates, spoons, shoes, towels, soap, toothbrushes, toothpaste, combs,
medicine … writing books, reading books, pens, pencils, knives, shovels, axes, spectacles, chalk,
ink, hats, raincoats, thread, needles, scissors, lighters and flint, kerosene, lamps, etc.”65 In addition,
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the elimination of money negated the need for wages; accordingly, CPK officials provided laborers
with food rations. To this end, Party leaders developed a system to distribute food rations based
on labor-capacity.66 Those workers classified in the No. 1 system would be allocated three cans
of rice per day; those in the No. 2 system, two-and-one-half cans; No. 3, two cans, and No. 4,
one-and-one-half cans.67 This numeric system refers to the type of labor involved; those people
performing the heaviest manual labor, in principle, were to receive the highest rations. The
lightest tasks, performed by the elderly or the sick, received the smallest rations. In addition, all
workers would receive two side dishes (soup and dried food). Detailed work-schedules were also
devised—although not necessarily implemented—that determined how many days of work were
required, and for how many days, for society as a whole. Thus, CPK officials seemingly devised
a nonmonetary and nonmarket society whereby the Party provided the individual and collective
needs of society. However, unresolved remained the matter of capital accumulation, that is, the
means to generate profits to subsequently invest in industry. Here, Party leaders turned toward
their perceived comparative advantage in the global economy, this being rice.
Whether we immediately describe the CPK’s policy of exporting rice as capitalist or not, we
must acknowledge that it constituted a system of exchange. Briefly, the process of exchange is
accomplished through two transformations—the conversion of commodities into money and the
re-conversion of the money into a commodities—as expressed as C-M-C.68 The first transformation,
C-M, represents the conversion of a commodity into money (i.e., the act of selling), while the second
transformation, M-C represents the conversion of money into a commodity (i.e., the act of buying).
Hence, this single process is two-sided: from one pole, that of the commodity-owner, it is a sale,
from the other pole, that of the money-owner, it is a purchase.69
Following the simple model of circulation, C-M-C, commodities are exchanged (sold) for
money; that money is then used to purchase additional commodities. On the surface, this would
seem to account for the both the policies proposed and practices carried out by the Khmer Rouge.
CPK officials shipped rice, as a commodity, to myriad destinations, including China, Yugoslavia,
Madagascar, and Hong Kong. For example, between January and September 1978, the CPK
exported 29,758 tons of rice, valued at nearly six million US dollars, to China.70 In return, Democratic
Kampuchea imported tons of other commodities, including machine parts and medicine. In
theory, this exchange could exist virtually; the CPK would in effect obtain ‘credit’ or a ‘balance’
from China for future purchases. At this level, no material transfer of printed money would take
place.71 International trade, therefore, could continue without the reintroduction of currency
within Democratic Kampuchea. However, the simple exchange of one commodity for another—
regardless of whether money mediates the transaction—does not generate surplus. How, then,
did Party leaders attempt to accrue profits? The answer, I maintain, lies in the substitution of food
rations (notably rice) for wages.
In Capital, Marx expounds on the role of money (as opposed to the commodity) in the
circulation process, expressed as M-C-M.72 Schematically, this constitutes the transformation of
money into commodities, and the re-conversion of commodities into money.73 Whereas the first
circulation (C-M-C) results in the exchange of commodities (albeit mediated through money),
under the second circulation (M-C-M) there is an exchange of money for money via commodities.
Here, Marx finds the crucial component of capitalism in that “the circulatory process of M-C-M
would be absurd and empty if the intention were, by using this roundabout route, to exchange
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two equal sums of money.”74 Marx explains, “In the simple circulation of commodities [C-M-C]
the two extremes have the same economic form. They are both commodities, and commodities of
equal value. But they are also qualitatively different use-values, as for example corn and clothes.”75
However, within the second circulation, “both extremes have the same economic form. They
are both money, and therefore are not qualitatively different use values, for money is precisely
the converted form of commodities.”76 Consequently, the “process M-C-M does not … owe its
content to any qualitative difference between its extremes, for they are both money, but solely to
quantitative changes.”77 As Harvey writes, “M-C-M only makes sense if it results in an increment
of value,” this being surplus value and is thus re-written as M-C-M’.78
Following Marx, the exploitation of labor capacity generates surplus value and assumes two
basic forms: absolute surplus value and relative surplus value. Marx argued that the value of laborpower (wages) is equal not to what a worker can produce (e.g. a shirt) but instead to the labor-time
necessary to make up what it costs to keep the laborer and his or her family alive. In other words,
“the value of labor-power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance
of its owner.”79 For example, laborers may produce enough value in six hours work to offset their
daily living expenses. Capitalists, however, purchase labor-power for a full day’s work, say, eight
hours. The remaining two hours, Marx argues, appear as absolute surplus labor time. As Mandel
explains, when the producer is performing necessary labor, he or she is producing a necessary
product; when the laborer is performing surplus labor, he or she is producing a social surplus
product.80 Absolute surplus value is thus that part of production produced by the laboring class
but appropriated—without compensation—by the capitalist, regardless of the form the surplus
product may assume.81 In Democratic Kampuchea, Khmer Rouge officials distributed quantities
of rice in accordance with pre-determined expectations of the amount necessary for workers to
subsist. By keeping food rations fixed and, in turn, expanding the working day, Party leaders
derived absolute surplus value.82
Long working hours and high quotas coupled with insufficient rations contributed to
exhaustion, illness, and death. For the CPK, these losses, however, were inconsequential; recall
the sentiment expressed in a 1976 report, “Almost anything can be exported, so long as we don’t
consume it ourselves, but set it aside.”83 Other documents express similar attitudes. Minutes of a
Standing Committee meeting held on March 8, 1976 for example indicate that there were “many
sick people” and “outbreaks of chickenpox and cholera.” The possibility of food shortages was
also apparent. However, the Standing Committee explained, “we think much about the livelihood
of the people, but expenditures for material purchases to solve the livelihood of the people are
limited because we must purchase many other things as well, and our funds are few.” The
Standing Committee also recognized that come August and September, there would most likely
be many food shortages and that those shortages would affect the “health and labor strength” of
the workers. However, it was concluded that “as for rice, it should be two cans or a little more.”84
This amount, following the committee, constituted an appropriate “minimum” or “living wage.”
In other words, the possibility of starvation and loss of life was significant only to the extent that
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labor-productivity would suffer, or it would embarrass the regime internationally. Beyond that,
what mattered was the continued accumulation of capital through rice production.
Limitations to the working day, coupled with the potential decline in labor productivity,
restricts the accumulation of absolute surplus value. The CPK identified this problem and,
ironically, resolved it by a deepening of capitalist logic, this being the generation of relative surplus
value. For Marx, it is not simply “necessary” labor time that defined labor-power’s value; rather it
is socially necessary labor time, that is, the quantity of labor necessary under average conditions of
labor productivity existing in a given country at a given time.85 An increase in average production
increases the average number of commodities produced per unit of time and thus decreases the
amount of socially necessary labor time required for the production of a single commodity.86
Greater efficiencies of scale lesson the costs of production, thereby facilitating greater profits. With
an increase in the productivity of labor, the value (that is, cost) of labor-power falls and the portion
of the working day necessary for the reproduction of that value is shortened, thus facilitating the
accumulation of relative surplus value.
In Democratic Kampuchea, CPK officials did not readily invest capital in technologies designed
to facilitate agricultural production. Tractors, for example, were in operation but not widely
available.87 Rather, Party leaders attempted to raise productivity through cajolery or brute force.
Workers were to “go on the offensive” and to “Plant, plant, plant; plant everywhere, plant densely,
plant until no land is left over; male youths, plant; female youths, plant; elderly and children, plant;
both the able-bodied and the weak, plant; plant collectively; plant individually; plant farm fields;
plant one or two clumps around the houses and around the worksites.”88 Immediately apparent in
this and other documents is the characteristic exuberance of Khmer Rouge propaganda; but behind
the fetishism of revolutionary zeal lies the cold, calculation of profits. In the Four-Year plan, for
each administrative region, the CPK projected both the amount of rice produced and expenditures
in the form of food rations. For the Northern Zone, for example, Party leaders determined that the
average amount of rice production would increase from 245,000 tons in 1977 to 462,000 tons in
1980; this would, according to their estimates, result in a gain of US$121,000,000.00 over the fouryear period. To meet these objectives, workers were to remain vigilant in their revolutionary zeal
and, with a proper political consciousness, increase productivity. Crucially, the amount of rations
allocated for worker consumption was to remain at 320,000 tons per annum.89 In other words,
Party leaders assumed that as productivity increased and workers became more efficient, there
was no need to increase the amount of food rations allocated. Consequently, reductions in socially
necessary labor time contributed to ever-increasing surplus value derived from the export of rice.
To facilitate the export of rice and hence the accumulation of capital, CPK officials established
several institutions to oversee their economic programs. The Ministry of Commerce, for example,
facilitated the distribution of resources domestically and managed foreign trade. In addition,
Party representatives established, with Chinese assistance, the Ren Fung Company Limited, for
facilitating imports into and exports from Democratic Kampuchea with countries that did not
want to be associated directly with the CPK government, or which had trade restrictions leveled at
Democratic Kampuchea.90
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In short, CPK officials initiated and implemented a hybrid economy. On the one hand, Party
leaders participated in the monetary-based global economy as state capitalists while, on the other
hand, they instituted a nonmonetary, nonmarket domestic economy. Under an economic system
of import substitution industrialization, the Cambodian people produced rice not as a use value,
that is, a grain produced primarily for subsistence and biologic consumption, but instead, as a
means of acquiring exchange value. Khmer Rouge policy and practice effectively transformed rice
into a commodity for export. In the process, however, senior leaders of the CPK instituted a fatal
contradiction into Democratic Kampuchea’s economy. Under the system of exchange introduced by
the CPK, the provision of higher rations (in the form of rice) would decrease the amount of capital
(rice) the Party had available for surplus accumulation in the global economy. However, decreased
rations would facilitate the accumulation of capital. When CPK leaders suspended currency, they
did not negate capital but merely substituted one form of capital (wages) with another (rations),
while leaving the basic exploitative relationship intact.
Conclusion
The macro-economic policies introduced by senior leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea
alienated the men, women, and children who endured years of hardship and violence throughout
the country. In the aftermath of the Pol Pot regime, villagers speak with bewilderment, anger,
and hatred of the many ways in which their traditional way of life was overturned.91 Prior to the
revolution, villagers had determined their own work schedules, with time for rest in even the
busiest seasons and periods of relative leisure during the year. Now, armed soldiers drove them
to perform unrelenting labor that was arduous and exhausting, with the relentless pace of work
broken only by brief breaks for hasty meals of insufficient rations.92 Survivors remember being in
a constant state of hunger despite the stockpiles of foodstuffs. As May Ebihara writes, villagers
lamented, “You could see food but you weren’t allowed to eat it” and “There were piles of rice …
but it was taken away in trucks.”93
Senior leaders of the CPK were aware of the ever-present specter of famine. Early on, Party
members called for the continued monitoring of agricultural and food rationing throughout
Democratic Kampuchea.94 For example, during a meeting of division and regimental secretaries
and logistic chiefs held on September 19, 1976, reports of food shortages were common.95 Comrade
Muth relays, “The rice harvest was exactly two tons over an area of 2,000 hectares, short by
61,000 bushels.” However, he continues, “Calculating through 15 November, the new rice which
has arrived will be exhausted,” that “food supplies … will be exhausted in January,” and that
“secondary crops … have mostly rotted.”96
Faced with acute food shortages, countless men, women, and children secretively gathered
fruits, vegetables, and other foodstuffs. If caught, however, they met swift punishment, often in the
form of arrest, imprisonment, and/or execution. On September 16, 1976, for example, a division chief
91

May Ebihara, “A Cambodian Village under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979,” in Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The
Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community, ed. Ben Kiernan (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Southeast Asia Studies, 1993); Judy Ledgerwood, May M. Ebihara, and Carol A. Mortland, introduction to Cambodian
Culture since 1975: Homeland and Exile, eds. May M. Ebihara et al. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); and May
M. Ebihara, May, Svay: A Khmer Village in Cambodia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018).

92

Ebihara, A Cambodia Village, 55-56.

93

Ibid., 56.

94

Randle C. DeFalco, “Accounting for Famine at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: The Crimes
against Humanity of Extermination, Inhumane Acts and Persecution,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice
5, no. 1 (2011), 150. See also Randle C. DeFalco, “Justice and Starvation in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge Famine,”
Cambodia Law and Policy Journal 2 (2014), 45-84; James A. Tyner and Stian Rice, “To Live and Let Die: Food, Famine,
and Administrative Violence in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-1979,” Political Geography 52 (2016), 47-56; and Stian
Rice and James A. Tyner, “The Rice Cities of the Khmer Rouge: An Urban Political Ecology of Rural Mass Violence,”
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 42 (2017):,559-571.

95

Document No. E3/810, “Minutes of Meeting of Secretaries and Logistics [Chiefs] of Divisions and Regiments,” archived
by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en.

96

Document No. E3/810, “Minutes of Meeting of Secretaries and Logistics [Chiefs] of Divisions and Regiments,” archived
by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en.

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1710

Tyner

156

reported that a man named Neak Loeung stole a haversack of rice. Khmer Rouge soldiers seized
the man, but later when he tried to escape, cadres “shot him dead and did not get to interrogate
him about anything.”97 In the ensuing months, as reports of famine and illness became more
common, CPK leaders increasingly blamed these problems on “internal enemies” or mistakes of
local officials in implementing CPK policy.98 In so doing, the macro-economic policies forwarded by
senior leaders and implemented by myriad local cadres helped establish the structural coordinates
of the Cambodian genocide. On the one hand, Party leaders recognized the need to accumulate
capital rapidly; but, on the other hand, they feared the trappings of bourgeois society, including
money. The attempted resolution by Party leaders of this fundamental contradiction constitutes
a grave failing, one that was ultimately paid not in money or food rations, but in the lives of the
Cambodian people.
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Like so many of us who study genocide, Eyal Mayroz entered this field with a simple but
troubling set of questions: “Why has the international community been sitting on its hands while
countless children, women, and men were being massacred, often by their own governments? And
why do states continue to stand by in the face of mass atrocities even today?”1
In answering these questions, Mayroz makes a significant contribution to the study of the
United States’ relationship with genocide, which is largely under-represented in the field of
genocide studies. Though not a primary focus of Reluctant Interveners, Mayroz engages with and
critiques the previous work of Samantha Power, as well as Kenneth Campbell and Peter Ronayne.2
As Mayroz appropriately describes it, his book represents an “attempt to move a primarily
theoretical debate into the realm of empirically observed political actuality. Applying interpretivist
lenses to the tension between the ideal of ‘never again’ and the reality of ‘ever again,’ the book
captures and describes multifaceted relationships among key actors and factors.”3
Actors discussed include U.S. administrations, the media and, the public. Factors include,
among others, political leadership; political and media communication; and public opinion and
behavior. In addressing the influences of these actors and the interconnectedness of these factors,
Mayroz methodically analyzes troves of primary sources and integrates the works of key scholars
in the fields of political communication and media studies on American foreign policy, such as
Murray Edelman and Robert Entman.4
Building off the works of others, especially Entman’s Cascading Network Activation model,
Mayroz devises a model for his analysis that is specific to crisis situations like genocide. Central
to Mayroz’s model are the downward flow of information from the presidential administration,
through the media, and to the public, and the upward flow (feedback) of information from the public
to the administration that also largely occurs through the media. In this model, the downward flow
represents the primary flow as political elites seek to understand and, in some cases, “manage” the
public. Put differently, Mayroz uses his model to assess how administrations have interpreted the
public sentiment and whether administrations have misread the level of public support for U.S.
leadership on genocide, or perhaps even sought to steer the public away from support for a more
robust response.
1
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What separates Mayroz’s research from similar attempts to evaluate the role of presidential
leadership in how the U.S. responds to genocide is the methodical and comprehensive nature of his
study. For example, Mayroz rightly points out that Power cited selected speeches from which she
concludes that presidential rhetoric was “strong” on responding genocide. However, according
to Mayroz’s findings that are based on the analysis of an incredible number of speeches and
statements, “no American president has ever fully committed the United States to the project of
confronting genocide.”5 Furthermore, Mayroz writes,
“Such a commitment would have contradicted a core principle of American foreign policy:
retaining the freedom to choose actions case by case, based on dynamic
circumstances and potentially changing interests.”6

In this regard, Mayroz’s findings are significant in how they challenge the prevailing notion that
what is needed from U.S. leadership is more effort to align words, which have been forthcoming,
and deeds, which have been lacking. Indeed, Reluctant Interveners has been described by others
as “sobering,” which aptly describes the following conclusion by Mayroz: “In the rare occasions
when presidents did invoke the label [genocide], their rhetoric was moralizing but mostly devoid
of meaningful commitments.”7
In his study of Rwanda and Bosnia, Mayroz makes an important distinction between public
opinion and public behavior. In a sense, Mayroz recognizes their interconnectedness, while
also demonstrating the ways in which seeming disconnects between the two may be perceived,
interpreted, or even exploited by an administration. For example, in the case of Rwanda, Mayroz
illustrates how the Clinton administration may have chosen to weigh behavioral indicators more
than expressed public opinion to conclude that “the political costs of inaction could be managed.”8
In other words, public behavior did nothing to fortify or operationalize public opinion.
In the case of Darfur, Mayroz highlights the depth of complexity in determinations about
how to respond to suspected cases of genocide. Multiple actors and factors collided, resulting in
limited action by the United States. As Mayroz explains, the Bush administration labeled what
was happening in Darfur as genocide in 2004 and was active at the UNSC. Yet, domestic and
international politics did not converge for the purposes of a robust response. Domestically, public
attitudes indicated support for U.S. leadership on Darfur. This was accompanied by the Save
Darfur Coalition, which Mayroz describes as “the most significant anti-genocide pressure group
in American history.”9 However, internationally, a more robust response would have required
convincing fellow UNSC members Russia and China to go against their strategic interests.
Mayroz concludes that this dichotomous relationship between the domestic and the
international likely permitted the Bush administration to act without acting sufficiently. As Mayroz
notes,
“Driven by domestic pressures, the genocide determination did increase the salience of the
crisis. But even such a proclamation by the world’s foremost superpower could not make a
meaningful impact on international political will. Not only that, but in an unfortunate twist
of fate it helped to legitimate domestically a reticent US policy and made it easier for the
Bush administration to evade riskier and costlier policy options.”10

Coming in at a concise 134 pages of primary text, Reluctant Interveners is tightly filled with
significant research and findings, of which the above only represents a small sample. Ultimately,
Mayroz offers his readers an informative and critical account of America’s relationship with
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genocide, from the role of the presidency to that of the public. In doing so, Mayroz also contributes
to bridging the gap between academic scholarship and policy by providing his readers with
something of a playbook. Mayroz maps the various levels of action from, as well as interactions
between, administrations, the media, and the public. Thus, key lessons can be learned from
Reluctant Interveners about how administrations, along with an all too often compliant U.S. media
on foreign policy, attempts to manage public opinion and behavior in order to elicit support for the
administration’s preferred policy response to suspected cases of genocide.
With this knowledge, citizens and civil society can implement better informed strategies in
their advocacy work. Relatedly, Mayroz “calls for those who live in countries with better human
rights protections to share a more proactive moral commitment to helping those who are less
fortunate, even at certain costs.”11 This makes Mayroz’s book, with its significant contributions
to the multiple intersecting literatures of genocide studies, political communication and public
opinion, and American foreign policy, essential reading for scholars, students, activists, civil society
actors, elected officials, and members of nongovernmental and intergovernmental institutions.
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Numerous scholars and journalists have drawn upon first-person accounts to document and
analyze the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi. Some have interviewed Rwandans who committed
the violence, while others have spoken with people who risked their lives to save others. However,
these accounts have largely focused on the actions and agency of men, in turn depicting women
as the victims of the genocide. In Gender and the Genocide in Rwanda: Women as Rescuers and as
Perpetrators,1 Sara E. Brown artfully upends these typical stories of women as victims and men as
perpetrators or rescuers by centering the women who committed genocide in Rwanda, as well as
the women who risked their lives to save others.
Specifically, Brown poses three core questions: 1) how were women mobilized to participate
in the genocide and in rescue efforts? 2) What were these women’s actions during the genocide?
3) And, what were the longer-term consequences of perpetrating genocide and of rescuing? To
answer these meaningful inquiries, Brown relies upon in-depth interviews she conducted with
seventy-seven respondents between 2010 and 2014. Among these seventy-seven respondents,
sixteen were women who had rescued, twenty-six were women who had committed violence,
and the rest were other individuals who could speak to the social setting at the time. Refreshingly,
when considering these data, Brown reflects on how her positionality as a white, Western woman
may have impacted the conversations that unfolded with the participants. She likewise carefully
addresses how her translator’s perceived identity may have shaped conversations. Importantly,
Brown also draws upon twenty-five previously collected testimonies as well as case records from
gacaca court trials in order to triangulate her findings—a noteworthy and laudable methodological
move given the difficulty of working with first-person accounts of violence.
Brown begins her well-written and impressively researched book by providing the reader with
an account of Rwandan history. Yet, rather than simply retracing the events that unfolded prior
to 1994—which have been well-documented—Brown highlights gendered dynamics within the
government and society more broadly. For instance, she examines the position of the Queen Mother
as well as the role of Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana, who was highly involved in the infamous
Akazu that planned the genocide. Brown likewise emphasizes the gendered aspects of mobilization
prior to 1994, pointing out that the first thee of the well-known Hutu 10 Commandments directly
invoked gender.
After tracing Rwandan history and pre-1994 mobilization through a gendered lens, Brown
turns toward examining rescue efforts undertaken by women. This analysis is especially vital
because of the lack of attention paid to women who rescued during the genocide in both Rwandan
society and scholarship to date. Indeed, while families often rescued together, the male head of
the household was typically accorded the recognition for these heroic acts (e.g., given a medal
by their local leader). In turn, these men have become known as rescuers and subsequently
interviewed by journalists and scholars alike. Yet, Brown illustrates that some women rescued
alongside their husbands, while others had to convince their husbands to rescue, rescued alone,
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or rescued with others. Their stories are underrepresented, and this especially fascinating chapter
shows how Rwandan women used gendered assumptions to their advantage as they undertook
rescue efforts. Women rescued other peoples’ children, for instance, and they were able to use
the guise of motherhood to their advantage. Brown even highlights how sexism could save lives,
as members of the killing groups would not enter peoples’ homes without the man of the house
present, meaning that Tutsi hiding within their homes could sometimes go undetected. Put simply,
such gendered aspects of rescue are fascinating and novel. In fact, the reader wishes to hear more
about how these findings depart from prior understandings of rescue, including whether there
were gendered differences in women’s motivations to save the lives of others in the first place.
Gender and Genocide next considers women who committed violence, and Brown challenges
the reader by asking, “… why would women not be perpetrators?”2 Although some of the women
Brown interviewed deny their crimes (or aspects of their crimes), Brown demonstrates that women
committed direct and indirect violence, including genocidal rape. Nevertheless, many women
had relatively peripheral roles in the genocide—roles that Brown suggests were due to women’s
constrained or situated agency. To Brown, understanding constrained/situated agency means that
we must comprehend how various situational and structural forces shape—and often limit—the
agency that women are able to exert. For instance, many women were tied to their homes during
the day, which in turn influenced the types of violence they committed. The notion of constrained
or situated agency is consequently quite significant, and if space had allowed, the reader would
have benefited from a fuller discussion of how constrained/situated agency maps onto the existing
debates regarding agency and structure.
Often the actors and actions that unfold during genocide are only examined within the context
of the violence itself. Yet, Brown concludes this excellent book by skillfully addressing what
happened to the women perpetrators and rescuers after the genocide ended. This chapter illustrates
Brown’s comprehensive approach to research, as well as her broad historical and temporal view.
This chapter also joins the chorus of scholars who are skeptical about the depths of reconciliation
and forgiveness in present day Rwanda.
All things cannot be done in one book, so critiquing a manuscript that already does so much
can feel strange. Nevertheless, although Brown largely focuses on the intersection of ethnicity/
race and gender, the reader does wonder how other social factors—chiefly socioeconomic status
and age—impacted the women’s situated agency and subsequent actions during the genocide.
Furthermore, a new shift in genocide studies has emphasized that actors often undertake multiple
types of actions during complex situations of mass violence. Many people who rescue also kill, for
instance, and understanding the women who perpetrated violence and rescued would be fruitful
for future studies.
Genocide studies is already richer, however, due to Brown’s fantastic book. Guided by feminist
approaches, Brown shines a light on a much-needed gap in existing literature by addressing
women—and gender—head on. This book also contributes to literature on mobilization for
violence, high-risk activism, and gender studies, and each chapter is brimming with critical
insights. Brown’s reflexivity when it comes to research methods only heightens the importance of
her findings, and her assessment of post-genocide processes likewise holds numerous implications
for policy. For instance, Brown explains that the general omission of women perpetrators from
dominant narratives about the genocide leads to missed opportunities to enact meaningful policies
tied to their reentry into society. At the same time, the lack of attention to women who rescued in
Rwanda may mean that young girls do not see themselves in the heroes of the genocide, which
could have numerous ramifications going forward.
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Red Famine is a book in which Anne Applebaum, winner of a Pulitzer Prize, focuses on the
Soviet famine of the 1930s. For the author it was implemented in a planned and systematic way by
Stalin against Ukraine artificially. It is the result of a history of submission from Russia to Ukraine
that has its genesis in Tsarism, is accentuated after the Revolution in 1917 and culminates in 1933
with the process of artificial famine. The author starts from a hypothesis of first Russian, and then
Soviet hostility towards Ukraine which is based on various historical sources and documents.
The main questions that run through the book are: what happened between 1917 and 1934? What
happened during 1932 and 1933? In addition, what place does famine occupy in the history of
Ukraine and its national movement?
In order to answer these questions, the author makes a genealogical route of the relationship
between Ukraine and Russia throughout history. In the first place, she stops at the peculiarities
of Ukraine and its cultural and idiomatic differences with respect to its main neighbours, Poland
and Russia, emphasizing that it is precisely those that constitute it as a different nation with its
distinctive language and customs.
After this introduction she focuses on the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 and its independence
after the dissolution of the Russian Empire (chapter 1) and the civil war process (1918-1921)
between the declared People’s Republic of Ukraine and Soviet Russia (Chapters 2 and 3). Then
she analyses the New State Policy of the Soviet Union in Ukraine during the 1920s (chapter 4), the
process of collectivization of land in 1930 (chapter 5 and 6) and its failure in 1931 (chapter 7). Once
the historical route is drawn, Applebaum stops in the process of planning the famine during 1932
(chapters 8, 9 and 10) and the famine during the spring and summer of 1933 (chapters 11 and 12).
Finally, the author stops at the consequences of the famine (chapter 13), its cover-up by the Soviet
government (chapter 14) and a set of conclusions about its current repercussions (chapter 15).
Starting from the idea that due to its nationalist and independence movement, Ukraine
constituted a danger to the consolidation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Applebaum
questions the idea that famine was an unwanted effect of the process of collectivization of land and
argues that Stalin’s goal was planned by finding background since the 1920. These backgrounds
were the persecution of intellectuals, members of traditional Ukrainian and nationalists, and
then against the peasantry; mainly the rich peasants (kulaks) that in Stalin’s eyes were the main
representatives of Ukrainian nationalism and potential members of new revolutions.
The persecution of intellectuals, artists, and writers occurred mainly in the 1920s from arrests,
murders, and the author points to it as a precedent of premeditated attack against the elite of the
Ukrainian national culture. As a counterpoint, she argues that the famine of 1921 was the product
of the first process of collectivization and delivery of crops and grains to the Soviet government
since Stalin himself recognized it and international assistance was received to alleviate the effects
of starvation. Not so during 1932 and 1933: Applebaum argues that neither collectivization, neither
bad crops nor the weather caused famine in Ukraine. The collectivization was an initial kick to
give the conditions that led to it but were not a direct consequence of it. Applebaum affirms that
it was a planned situation that occurred as a result of the systematic seizure of food from peasant
households, accompanied by the cutting of routes that they prevented farmers from finding food
Natalia Paola Crocco. “Book Review: Red Famine: Stalin´s War on Ukraine.“ Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, 1(2020): 164-165.
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(this did not happen in the famine of the 1920s), the development of blacklists in villages and
restrictions on trade.
As in every genocide, Applebaum argues that Stalin did not aim to annihilate all Ukrainians
but a portion of the national group. For the author, the goal of hunger annihilation was the most
active and committed Ukrainians with the nationalist project. She starts from this premise by taking
Raphael Lemkin and criticizing the purely legal and moral uses of the term genocide: she proposes
it as a category of historical use from which the Ukrainian case can be understood even though at
the moment of the perpetration of the genocide this category did not exist. The author claims that
the almost four million Ukrainian victims were the result of a deliberate famine that was part of a
systematic plan for political purposes to destroy the Ukrainian identity that put Soviet aspirations
at risk.
Applebaum argues that this fact continues until today and crosses contemporary political
conflicts between Ukraine and Russia. The author asserts that the main tensions are in the official
political discourse and are influenced by the presidents’ ties with the communist party. In 2004,
President Viktor Yuschenko politicized the debate on the facts by arguing that the events were a
matter of genocide; Yuschenko was the first president who had not been a member of the party.
The official speech changed radically by assuming Yanukovych, who reversed this debate about
the responsibility of the famine, for being a pro-Russian ruler. Currently the dispute exceeded the
official political discourse and reached on the one hand, the Russian speaking Ukrainian society,
and on the other, the Ukrainian speaking society, which the first accuse of carrying out a cultural
genocide against the part of the population of non-Ukrainian speakers. Russian speakers deny the
planned famine while Ukrainian speakers hold it and denounce its denial.
Finally, Applebaum asserts that the silencing and denial of the Soviet genocide against the
Ukrainian people continues to shape the way in which Ukrainians and Russians think about
themselves and each other. In this sense, she links the current political problems of Ukraine, such
as distrust of the State and political corruption with the loss of the political and academic elite as
a result of the genocide. For her, all these problems must go back to 1933, even if they are current.
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Although scholars began to publish significant works in the 1960s regarding the Holocaust,
Holocaust studies in the classroom for pupils and students did not begin until the 1980s. In
the decades that followed, high school teachers looked for source material often in the form of
broadsheets and sample images. Professors utilized edited books to offer their students an overview
of the Holocaust. Beginning in 2015, Bloomsbury published the first in a series of books “designed
to help students further their understanding of key topics within the field of Holocaust studies.”
Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust: Language, Rhetoric and the Traditions of Hatred is the second book
in this continuing series, offering an excellent introduction on this topic for college and university
students. In this volume, Griech-Polelle does not attempt to replace classic books on the topic of
Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, such as Jacob Katz’s From Prejudice to Destruction: Anti-Semitism,
1700-1933.1 She focuses on the “power of language,” how it influences common people to perpetrate
violence. Following the Holocaust and other genocides, scholars have asked how is it that ordinary
people that have never killed before can pick up weapons and torture, kill, and mutilate others.
Griech-Polelle argues that the “threatening” image of the Jew built up over centuries along with
destructive myths and stereotypes. Already built into the European culture, Hitler and the Nazis
merely had to draw on people’s perceptions, fears, and resentment of the Jews to obtain support
for murderous actions.
Griech-Polelle organizes the book in a thematic and chronological fashion. Employing
(French political scientist) Jacques’s Sémelin‘s Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and
Genocide,2 she introduces three themes from his work—identity, purity, and security—to set up her
arguments. From the fourth century forward, “Europe” began to Christianize with the expansion
of the Romans. As time passed, Christian Europe identified the Jew as the “other,” an enemy that
could destroy the fabric of society. It became “us versus them.” To secure a pure German identity,
the Jews had to die.
In Chapter 2, Griech-Polelle explains the developing myths regarding the Jews—from the
ancient period through the modern era. Prior to the emergence of Christianity, some polytheistic
cultures viewed the Hebrews as “other” because of their monotheism. In the pagan environment
of the Roman, Empire, persecution of Jews “revolved around political problems.” With the advent
of Christianity and Christian written works, one can see how language began to divide Jews and
Christians (seen by the Romans as simply a sect of Judaism). Griech-Polelle discusses the early
church fathers and notes that written works portrayed Christians as the “New Israel,” part of the
supersession myth. She points out that not all agreed on what to do with the Jews. Should we or
should we not try to convert them to Christianity? What is God’s plan for them? Naturally, the
harshest claim and taunt at the time was “Christ-killer.” The Jews were beginning a long journey of
living as “scapegoats.” Through the Crusades, the Black Death, and Jewish expulsion from Western
Europe, Jewish hatred continued. The images never left the minds of the Christians—Jewish
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poisoners and defilers, wearing special badges and depicted as pigs (Judensau). Significantly,
since most writers do not explain Martin Luther’s 1523 work, “That Jesus Christ was born a Jew,”
Griech-Polelle explains that early on Luther had tried to convert the Jews and it was only later,
in 1543, that Luther wrote “Concerning the Jews and their Lies.” The French Revolution, with
its ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity, offered some Jews new opportunities. In Germany,
however, many viewed these concepts as “unGerman.”
The origins of the term “anti-Semitism” opens Chapter 3. Through wars, the German states
unified giving way to “Germany” in 1871. Within a few years, German citizens were experiencing
economic struggles and looking to blame someone. Many pointed to the political left and for them,
this included Jews. Identifying Germans as enlightened thinkers, a German publicist, Wilhelm
Marr, decided that Germans needed a “respectable” word for those who articulated their hatred
for the Jews. He began to use “anti-Semitism.” One sees in the nineteenth century that Jewish
hatred begins to move from a political hatred to a racial hatred. Many now would not accept
concerted Jews. When the time comes, Hitler has his anti-Jewish platform already built for him.
The chapter continues through the fin-de-siècle and the Great War. Well known for his statement,
“The Jews are our misfortune,” Griech-Polelle concludes this chapter with an excerpt from the
nineteenth-century German historian, Heinrich von Treitschke.
In chapter 4, Griech-Polelle takes the reader through the development of the Nazi party into
Hitler’s early leadership of Germany. She asserts that the weakness of the Weimar Republic led by
moderates helped to offer fertile soil in which the Nazi party developed. Griech-Polelle continues
the story in Chapter 5 noting that Jewish life in Germany was deteriorating year by year in Nazi
Germany, but that turning points came for German Jews with forced expulsion, Kristallnacht, and
war. Throughout the narrative, she includes personal stories of those living and suffering at the
time.
Once the war begins in 1939, the Nazis move systematically toward the final solution. They had
already disenfranchised and dehumanized the German Jews; they had expropriated the businesses
and practices of German and Austrian Jews; in 1939, it was time to begin to concentrate them into
camps and ghettos. In chapters, 6 and 7, Griech-Polelle shows how the war acted as cover for the
crimes of the Nazis as they set out to exterminate the Jews. She points out that the Nazis used the
language developed over the centuries now to portray the Jews as a “true” danger and to justify
their brutal actions.
In her final content chapter, Griech-Polelle shows the culmination of centuries of hate-filled
language and images by taking the reader to the “Final Solution” of the “Jewish Problem.”
She writes about the various death camps, through the horrific work of the Sonderkommando
and finally the death marches as the war nears and ends. She concludes, “Hitler capitalized on
preexisting stereotypes, myths, and legends about the Jews in order to isolate and then persecute,
and ultimately murder them.”
As part of a series of books regarding Holocaust Studies, this book offers college and university
students, as well as any serious student of the Holocaust, a narrative of the Jews in the modern age
as “others” while maintaining the thread of anti-Semitism formed by centuries of hateful language
and images. At the end of each chapter, Griech-Polelle offers “For your Consideration,” a primary
document, which supports the content of the chapter. In addition, she presents a well-developed
list for further reading, a great help for students working on research or historiography. The book
is a readable size for students with focused chapters, which a professor could use individually
for the distinct topics. Although the book does offer images, some are not large enough or clear
enough for students to analyze. Nevertheless, one can find images on the internet to support the
text of the book. An excellent glossary of terms that also includes names and events will also be of
great help to students as they read. Beth Griech-Polelle’s Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust: Language,
Rhetoric and the Traditions of Hatred is a perfect addition to the “Perspectives on the Holocaust”
series of books.
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